Soviet Platoon Tactics

The Soviet platoon is organized around the senior lieutenant, who commands the unit, and is relegated to an integrated control element, where he is assisted by a deputy platoon commander who serves to relieve certain duties. Each platoon has a sniper/marksman, who provides precision and limited reconnaissance to the unit, he is not attached directly to the control element. A medic is present within each platoon, he operates as apart of the control element. Three motorized rifle squads totaling 24 in strength round out the formation. In the late 1980s/early 1990s the platoon would be expanded to 30 with the introduction of a machine gun which was attached to the control element. Each BMP or BTR has a crew consisting of a commander, who serves as the squad leader, a gunner (deputy commander), and a driver, who is the vehicles mechanic. These individuals will remain mounted throughout the course of an engagement. Those who dismount to fight on foot include a senior rifleman, a machine gunner, a marksman, a rifleman, a grenadier (RPG), and the assistant grenadier (RPG).

Platoons are instructed to dismount and prepare for an engagement roughly 2-3km before reaching the line of contact. This is due to the fact that the enemies anti-tank systems will struggle to reliably engage BMPs or BTRs at this distance. Following this, the platoon will break a cautious march at 600 meters and assume an offensive formation, this distance is variable and based on the conditions of the terrain/nature of the engagement. 600 meters is chosen as the ideal distance as a result of the fact tactical nuclear weapons as well as chemical munitions are just as destructive to the defending party as the attackers, limiting the likelihood of their application. APCs and IFVs are to deliver fire in support of the offensive from positions that limit their exposure to anti-armor weapons (reverse slopes being favored). If the platoon is ambushed, or crossing a minefield/artificial choke point, transportation vectors will serve as mobile cover until the immediate threat has been eliminated, after which they will resume a position behind the infantry.

The platoon commander must coordinate fires, determine objectives which are to be engaged by his subordinates, and survey the terrain to ensure the destruction of the enemy as well as the survival of his men. As a result the platoon commander operates exceedingly close to the engagement, and will fight with the platoon. He will also coordinate with neighboring units, as well as tanks which have either been attached directly to the platoon or are operating close by.

In almost every manual on this subject, three key details are present with extreme consistency, those being firepower, "striking power", and maneuverability. These factors are taken into account prior to the conduct of an offensive operation, and throughout the course of engagements with the enemy to determine the capabilities of the platoon. Firepower is expressed through the total volume of fire that can be performed by regular and attached means, the suppression this volume of fire can achieve, and the lethality of this fire. Calculating a platoons firepower is done through the analysis of anti-tank weapons, armored vehicles, and small arms. For example, a BMP-1, when in an offensive posture, scores a 1.0, an RPG-7 scores an 0.2, and an SPG-9 scores 0.5. These figures are calculated across an entire unit and used to form a rough estimate of the platoons capabilities, which is valuable information that the commander can then employ to make use of those elements. These coefficients increase or decrease depending on the threat they must engage, for example a tanks score may increase 1.5 times when firing at IFVs, and 2 times for APCs. Another example goes as follows: a platoon has three RPG-7s, and three infantry fighting vehicles, and is poised to assault a prepared defensive position, this maths out to a firepower score of 3.6, meaning that the unit should be able to reliably (in theory) defeat 4 enemy tanks. In a situation where the platoon loses its infantry fighting vehicles, it will lose much of its firepower score, and will therefore have to retreat. In unfavorable conditions, if 50% of the units infantry fighting vehicles are destroyed, it stills maintains the ability to defeat 2 tanks, and therefore the commander can make estimates on the units conditional capabilities. Calculating the ability for a platoon to deliver effective fire through small arms was done on the basis of rounds per minute per 1 meter of frontage per squad. This is achieved by dividing the expected rounds per minute by the length of the squads offensive front in meters. The expected expenditure of ammunition per minute of combat is 100 in regards to the AK-74, 150 for RPK-74, 250 for the PKM, and 40 for the SVD. Assuming a fully equipped platoon is advancing on a 300 meter front, they would be able to achieve a rough density of 8.5 rounds per minute per meter when combining capabilities across all 3 squads as well as the command section. Striking power is the ability for a platoon to deliver fire while one the move, or as manuals would state "deliver powerful blows to the enemy". As a result the striking power is best defined as the ability for a unit to advance on the enemy and capture their immediate position (through the lens of defending vs offensive force ratios). The inherent striking power of a platoon does not depend entirely on its own capabilities, but the understood capabilities of the enemy to diminish the effectiveness of the offensive party. Striking power is calculated through examining the ratio of anti-tank and anti-infantry weapons compared to the enemies, to achieve success an advantage of 2-3 times is required. To actualize a breakthrough it is understood that an advantage of 4-6 times would be needed. Maneuverability is defined by the mobility of the platoon within the terrain they are most likely to encounter as well as the capacity for the unit to reposition, overcome obstacles such as rivers, zones of chemical/radiological contamination, fires, etc etc. In order to determine the expected offensive front of a platoon, the firepower expressed by the unit's small arms is used. For example, it is generally understood that a density of 9 rounds per meter per minute offers a platoon a 3 fold superiority over defending forces, the average platoon is capable of firing roughly 2540 rounds per minute, taking into account 20% losses, averaging out to roughly 2000 rounds per minute, the platoon offensive front will be 220 meters (2000/9 = 220), which would correspond with the requirements that no more than 300 meters is to be engaged by any one platoon.

A platoon may see the attachment of automatic grenade launchers, flamethrowers, as well additional machine guns. In the case of tanks being attached to a platoon, intervals of 100 meters between APCs or IFVs and MBTs will see use. The attachment of tanks to a motorized rifle platoon significantly increases the ability for ATGMs and other systems to be destroyed. The infantry platoon will assist in target designation as well as protection of the MBTs from manportable systems. To ensure the best possible interaction between armored vehicles and their accompanying infantry, a signal/command tank is often attached to ease the burden of coordination. If available artillery assets are insufficient for the suppression or destruction of enemy ATGMs, armored vehicles and missile systems from the second echelon will reinforce the platoon and provide direct fire. Ideally tanks will advance 200 meters ahead of the infantry, this is done to minimize shrapnel injuries if one of the vehicle's comes under fire. In difficult terrain the infantry may actually overtake the attached MBTs and operate 200 meters ahead of their armor.

Despite the availability of attached river crossing systems and amphibious IFVs/APCs, river crossings were still considered a serious obstacle in the 1980s for any unit to reliably contend with (of course the significance of this obstacle depends largely on the width, depth, speed of the river and the geometry of its banks). Depth is one of the least important facets for the platoon itself, unless attached tanks are present, so the primary items of concern would be width and speed, which have a serious impact on the possibility of making an amphibious crossing. It is recommended to avoid any crossing that presents waves reaching heights of up to 0.5 meters (0.8 for BTR due to its increased amphibious properties), and those which present exceedingly steep banks made from concrete or granite. It is also important that the proceeding terrain is taken into account, for example a narrow crossing could become a daunting task if swamps are present at the infil and exfil points. Depending on the time of year, ice could either destroy the possibility of crossing entirely, especially in faster flowing rivers, or increase it's capabilities by the ablation of the obstacle entirely (in case of a frozen lake or comparable body of water). When speaking to the latter, APCs can reliably cross frozen water obstacles if the ice is 35-43 centimeters thick with 25 meters of dispersion (4 centimeters thick at a distance 5 meters for infantry in single file formation). In either case, units will be rendered vulnerable, their haste will be impeded, and their ability to respond to the enemy will see a massive decrease. As a result it is advised that platoons cross major water obstacles as apart of a combined company effort, only breaking from the main body to conduct reconnaissance. If the platoon is tasked with maintaining the security of a crossing, they will attempt to cross using amphibious capabilities or limited bridge laying application 1-2 kilometers ahead of the main body.

This is done so that the opposing bank can be secured, they will then move to assume a defensive posture 300 meters from the waters edge with the purpose of repelling counter attacks which may inhibit the main body in their crossing efforts. In this case the platoon will cross simultaneously, this is done while support is administered from the main body in the form of artillery and air attacks. The platoon will advance towards the water obstacle at full speed, before this is done the procedure for firing at resistance on the opposing bank is established, smoke will offer limited concealment while the fire support plan is engaged. It is emphasized that all of the platoons weapons are to be fired as to ensure that the enemy is effectively suppressed, it is not uncommon for an automatic grenade launcher platoon to support the unit as they cross (occupying the bank in which they departed from and providing additional fire).

In urban settings, the platoon commander has similar expectations, of course his terrain assessment must include unique obstacles, but the bulk of his work remains unchanged. Flamethrowers, and additional machine gunners will see attachment before the operation begins. Prior to attacking, it is advised that buildings adjacent to the enemies position be destroyed. The platoon will advance while firing into buildings, making use of RPGs and RPOs to most effectively do so. Much of this fire is to be directed at points in which the enemy would have an extreme advantage over armored vehicles, such as attics, roofs, etc etc. Engineers which may also see attachment are to create passages between buildings and assist in clearing (or leveling) occupied structures with explosive ordinance. The platoon will advance on each side of a street, providing mutual support. Lower floors of buildings such as basements are to be cleared with chemical agents or explosives, it is advised to avoid such engagements when possible. If tanks see application, infantry will use them as mobile cover, suppressing anti-tank weapons located in positions where MBTs cannot reliably engage them. Machine guns and grenade launchers operate behind the platoon and carefully advance from position to position, maximizing their coverage while supporting the maneuver, they will often make use of passages created by engineers to facilitate concealed repositioning. Heavily fortified buildings are, as a rule, surrounded and promptly destroyed.

A motorized rifle platoon advances in a "chain" formation, IFVs operate in intervals of 100 meters, with grenade launchers occupying 50 meter gaps in between if attached. Individual combatants are often separated by 8-12 meters. The "chain" is preferred as the infantry can move forward or to the side without interfering with the actions of those around them. Anti-tank weapons are usually deployed alongside grenade launchers with a distance of 10-20 meters (15 meters as a rule for ATGMs). In offensive operations of considerable haste IFVs or APCs may be no more than 50 meters behind their dismounts. In a pursuit the platoon will seek to cut off the enemy and position themselves along the axis of their retreat. If this is impossible, the platoon cooperates with neighboring formations to deliver as much fire as possible in the direction of the fleeing enemy while moving to cut them off. Once the enemies position has been captured, artillery supporting the unit will prepare measures to repel a counter attack.

A motorized rifle platoon may dedicate one of its squads to establishing a reconnaissance ambush, conducting chemical reconnaissance, or surveillance of the enemy through more active means. The platoon itself passively conducts reconnaissance through the capture of prisoners, the interview of civilians, and the examination of captured documents/equipment. The squad assigned to conduct specialized reconnaissance activities may be reinforced with engineers, observation equipment such as thermal imaging systems, and ground surveillance radars.

A reconnaissance ambush is done to capture prisoners, weapons, and documents, to determine the composition of an enemies defense, targeting singular combatants, primarily officers, or unsupported patrols. A successful ambush is one which does not arouse immediate suspicion from opposing forces, and is executed without casualties on behalf of the squad. They are often established along roads, trails, bridges, or water sources, where singular soldiers are likely to appear. It is recommended that if available, suppressors are to see use to ensure a clandestine exfil on behalf of the reconnaissance squad. Ambushes are divided into groups, those being fire support, observation, and capture, these are determined by the squad leader. The task of the fire support group is to suppress and demoralize the enemy with overwhelming fire once they reach the predetermined point of engagement, the capture group consists of 2 to 3 combatants who have excellent hand to hand combat skills, they are tasked with (as their name suggests) capturing prisoners, lastly the observers are tasked with warning the commander of an approaching enemy force. It is also possible that a reconnaissance squad will actively hunt down and capture a certain individual, these attacks may be supported by artillery, or other elements present within the platoon. For such operations a capture group and fire support groups are formed. The capture group, similar to a reconnaissance ambush, is comprised of 2-3 combatants, the fire support group is often 2. When involved in these activities, the squad will don leaf suits, and move at night, in conditions of low atmospheric transparency. The capture group departs first, followed by the support group. In this case the fire support group is given the secondary task of requesting artillery support.

A squad operating as a reconnaissance patrol moves at a distance of 400-1500 meters from the platoon. They may also engage in raids within the rear of the enemy. If it is possible to conduct surveillance from an armored vehicle, the squad commander will leave his deputy in charge, and dismount with two or three combatants, before moving to an advantageous position. These units may transition to a reconnaissance ambush if the need to do so arrives. In each of these circumstances, the platoons sniper is attached as a rule to the reconnaissance squad.

When a motorized rifle squad dismounts from its transportation, be that an IFV or APC, the commander instructs the driver where to situate the vehicle as to best support his dismounts. The squads machine gunner will position himself in a location where he may conduct surveillance of the surrounding area, he must also ensure his position allows for the engagement of helicopters and low flying aircraft. If the squad is planning to rest (as is expected every 4 kilometers of a march), they will disguise their AFV and establish tents, making use of all available means to conceal their position. The squad will then advance, seeking to destroy their "objects of importance", these could be recoilless rifles, ATGMs, command installations, etc etc. If the squad dismounts while on the move, the commander instructs his men to do so, after which they will advance behind or alongside their transportation following confirmation that the initial fire support plan has shown success. If a mine field is present, the commander informs the squad on the new direction of the offensive, and the procedure for overcoming the obstacle ahead of them. The enemy is to be suppressed with walking fire directed towards objects of importance if no concealment or cover is available. As a rule tanks and IFVs are to destroy barriers such as barbed wire, infantry are to follow behind them, as to ensure that they are not exposed to incoming fire, if this is not possible the infantry will fall back. Ideally the squad will dismount and administer fire from reverse slopes, natural obstacles, and other items which provide shelter from small arms fire. Once a minefield has been breached the unit is expected to assume a momentary defensive position and deliver accurate fire to objects of importance before transitioning to an approach which makes great use of available cover.

The squads commander is to employ quite a lot of initiative when commanding his men, and the platoon commander is trained to expect this of his squads. He will inform his units when it is best to throw grenades, when they are to advance, and how to most effectively make use of the terrain. It is stressed in each manual on the matter, that the preservation of life is paramount, the commander of the squad is therefore expected to make use of each and every bit of cover and concealment in the process of coordinating the actions of his men. It must also be noted that this does not mean each individual in the squad is not expected to determine the most efficient means of executing these orders, and preserve their own life if the commanders orders are endangering the unit.

When assaulting a trench it is important that the squad avoids engaging in point blank engagements with the enemy, unless it is necessary that the trench see application as cover. In this case the squads machine gun will protect the flanks, accompanied by the grenadier (RPG), they will ensure the squad is not sidelined while conducting close combat. Grenades are to see use in any situation where the squad may expose themselves to unnecessary threats. In extreme cases bayonets may be employed if the distance between the squad and the enemy facilitates their application.

As soon as the enemy has been destroyed or fled from the position the squad was instructed to occupy, the platoon commander is informed, and a pursuit begins. If the enemy has been routed, the squad may remount and pursue the enemy within their transportation. If tanks have been attached to the platoon, the squad may even mount an MBT to ensure that they are not ambushed by anti-armor munitions while inside the vehicle. It is also possible that the squad may ride tank desant on their IFV or APC when in a pursuit to lessen the likelihood of a hasty ambush bringing about the demise of the entire unit. When riding on a tank the squads commander positions himself behind the turret, the rest of the squad position themselves behind the turret atop the engine, the machine gunner is situated towards the commanders right, while the squads designated observer for reconnaissance operations is positioned to his left, the machine gunner is tasked with providing additional covering fire from air attacks alongside the tanks machine gun.

As a rule a platoon marches at night, or whenever conditions of limited visibility are available that would diminish the possibility of contact with the enemy. This changes when the platoon is anticipating an engagement or is within the rear of the enemy, where daylight marches are to be expected. The platoon will often march on foot alongside their APC/IFV when approaching the line of contact, dismounting while under fire is generally discouraged. The distance between the platoon and their vehicle should not exceed 50 meters. The average speed of the march when mounted tends to be 25-30 kilometers per hour (30-40 kilometers per hour if trucks see use) and 5-7 kilometers per hour when on foot. Before the march begins, the squad leader must ensure the serviceability of his men and their equipment, he will make sure the vehicle they are to arrive within is functional, fire extinguishers are present, night vision devices are operational, communications equipment is in working order, decontamination kits are properly stowed/accounted for, ammunition is stowed correctly within the vehicle, tracks are properly tensioned, and that combat rations are not only available but sealed.

While on the march, a platoon will assign one of its squads to act as a guard, they are referenced as the patrol squad. The task of this unit is to warn the platoon of an ambush or sudden attack from the enemy. The patrol squad prior to the march will be briefed on locations in which the enemy may or may not exist, he must study the route, the terrain, and previously mentioned details to establish an order of observation (areas of responsibility which each member of the squad is expected to engage). This squad will move ahead of the platoon, no numerical value is provided which denotes the exact distance, but it is agreed upon that the patrol squad should remain within the platoons line of sight, this is done to ensure that fire support can be provided once the rest of the squads have dismounted and assumed an offensive posture.

Roads are the preferred mode of transportation, avoiding them is recommended when approaching the line of contact. Transportation is to be regularly refueled at coordinated stops throughout the duration of the march, at this time weapons are to be checked, lubricated, and adjusted. While the platoon rests a squad is chosen to provide protection, the platoons commander will brief the unit on the individual responsibilities of each man in case of an attack on their position. Observation posts are established 1500 meters from the camp, foot patrols may see use to expand the area of observation. If a patrol is organized, it will consist of two men, one of which will be designated the leader of said patrol, he serves to inform the platoon of contact with the enemy.

It is important that each soldier in each squad be capable of providing first aid to wounded combatants. As a rule before each battle the squads commander will check whether his subordinates are provided with adequate medicinal provisions, he will denote where wounded are to be transported on the battlefield, and that sanitary and hygienic standards are maintained as to prevent the spread of disease or infection.

Each member of the squad is provided with a first-aid kit which is to see use in situations where bacteriological, radiological or chemical weapons have been employed. The contents of this first aid include Physostigmine (atropine with 1ml of sulphuric acid) which is to be administered in case of visual and respiratory impairment as a result of organophosphorus poisoning, an analgesic agent, and 12 "radioprotective" tablets. Dressings for wounds as well as tourniquets are provided in sterilized packages, additional protection from contamination is provided by a rubber lining. The bandages are designed in such a way that their application does not compromise their sterility. The rubberized "shell" of the bandage may see use in closing a sucking chest wound. An individual anti-chemical package is provided which serves to neutralize agents on one's skin or equipment, the application of this kit is described in my NBC defense article. Each combatant is also to carry water purification tablets which may disinfect one canteens worth of water in 40-45 minutes. Within each infantry fighting vehicles a first aid kit is provided, containing a tourniquet, sterile bandages, 5% iodine tinctures, ampoules containing 10% alcohol, and water purification tablets. Each combatant is to receive comprehensive training in regards to caring for all manner of injuries (both life threatening and superficial), burns, frostbite, poisoning, broken/fractured limbs, and miscellaneous ailments which may effect the unit in the field.

When tanks see integration into a platoon, the commander of the unit determines where exactly they will be positioned before, and during the offensive. The gunner is informed as to what targets he must prioritize, the driver is made aware of the direction in which he is expected to advance, as well as obstacles he may encounter, the commander will be briefed on the likelihood of airborne attacks and the procedures for infantry coordination. While executing the directives established by the platoon commander, the tanks commander must consider favorable route adaptation, maintain continuous communication with the platoon commander as to update him on the situation so he may adjust the plan of attack, and independently determine the most efficient pace for destroying the enemy in conjunction with attached infantry elements. The tank will not break from the platoon's predetermined order of battle unless given permission to do so. If a tank is damaged, but remains operational, the crew will continue to deliver supporting fire from the position they were immobilized (if the damage is easily serviced the driver will exit the vehicle and attempt to repair it). When abandoning a tank due to the presence of incendiary complications, ammunition, and grenades are to be unloaded if possible to avoid a larger explosion transpiring from their eventual detonation. When engaging the enemy it is important that the vehicle stops in a position where they are somewhat concealed. It is important that the commander considers reverse slopes and other elements which will protect the tank from incoming fire. When tanks are integrated into a patrol squad they assume control of the attached infantry and may organize groups of two to three soldiers to observe distant or suspicious objects. When this is done the tank alongside the squad's remaining infantry will assume a sheltered position.

When issuing commands via radio, the transmitting party must identify the radio they are contacting and themselves, before issuing an order. For example: "Hawk-10, I am Falcon-15, increase speed, I am Falcon-15, over". The received command is immediately confirmed by the exact repetition of the order and the word "understood", after which they will provide their callsign and conclude the interaction. This would manifest as shown here in the following example: "Falcon-15, I am Hawk-10, understood, increasing speed, I am Hawk-10, over.". Acknowledgement of a received command may also be given through a secondary command following the first. A callsign relating to the entire unit will also see establishment, when these orders are issued they are not to be acknowledged and are immediately assumed by all squad commanders. As an example: "Hawk-10, I am Falcon-15, from line X attack in direction Y to seize Z, readiness (X amount of time), artillery suppress A, "Raven" advances in direction B, and seizes C , I am Falcon-15, over.".

R-147 is a small highly portable transceiver used for short distance communication between squads. They saw a great deal of use with 9K34 operators, engineers, special forces, and general infantry. R-147P serves as the receiver and is smaller yet. The device is available in 26 "variants" each with a unique frequency/channel combination, of which there are 4 across all models. R-147 has a frequency range of 44-52 MHz, weighs 680 grams, has dimensions of 77×120×45mm, a range of 1 kilometer (400 meters when using the flexible antenna), a sensitivity of 1.5 uV, a frequency departure of 5 kHz, operates in temperatures between 0 to +50 degrees celsius, and can withstand a relative humidity of 98% at temperatures of +35 C. R-147 consumes 70 mA while operating and requires a 7V power supply. It may operate for 12 hours with a 3:1 ratio of reception time to transmission time. The system can accommodate an external power source between 6-8V (with a current of at least 75 mA). R-147 makes use of printed circuit boards, which is in line with modernizations found on R-105M, a battalion level radio from roughly the same era. At this time Soviet radios became partially transistorized and began making greater use of soldered sub-micro tubes. R-147s frequency is set by adjusting quartz resonators through a switch available to the operator. DAMSH-1A noise resistant differential microphone and TA-56M telephone capsule (resistance of 2 = 600 ohms at a frequency of 1000 Hz) facilitate communication. R-147P is a superheterodyne receiver with dual frequency conversion. The system contains a two-circuit bandpass filter with capacitive coupling. When set to "receive" the circuit receives no more than 300mV, the T1 transistor is closed as a result, allowing the signal to pass through the filter to the UHF input. If the device receives too much power the transistor locks shunting the circuit. This serves to protect the receiver automatically. R-147P contains the 219PS1A mixer chip and 219GS1 heterodyne microcircuit, which are combined into a single unit. R-147s (transceiver) exciter and submodulator are combined into a single unit consisting of local oscillator 219GS1 and submodulator 219MS2. The oscillation frequency is determined by the quartz resonator. R-147 contains the same heterodyne microcircuit as R-147P. Resistors (R1-R4) serve to shunt the resonators in case of parasitic oscillation.

R-157 is a fully transistorized UHF frequency-modulated system which sought to replace R-147 in the mid 1980s, it is entirely waterproof, and is designed to withstand humidity of up to 98% between temperatures of -50 to +50 degrees Celsius. The device features a frequency range between 44.00-54.0 MHz, a signal to noise ratio of 10 dB, an HF output of 150 mW, a frequency departure of 5 kHz at 44.0, 46.0, 50.0, and 52.0, a sensitivity of 3 uV at 48.0 and 48.8, a sensitivity of 1.5 uV at all other frequencies, a noise suppression system which is efficient up to 20 dB, a range of 1.5km, two-signal selectivity at +/- 100 kHz which does not exceed 70 dB, a power consumption of 40 mA when receiving (100 mA when transmitting) from the 10TsHK-0.45-12.6V battery, a maximum departure of 8 kHz when transmitting, and an output power of 150 mW. At an ambient temperature of +45 Celcius the batteries capacity is reduced to 80% efficiency, this drops to 20% at -18 degrees Celsius. After 392 cycles the battery degrades to 60% efficiency. A backup power source is provided in the form of 9 dry cells of the A316 type. In optimal conditions the radio may function for 8 hours with a reception to transmission ratio of 1:5 (transmissions lasting 5 minutes on average). R-157s receiver is designed to amplify, convert, and detect FM signals received by the antenna. The synthesizer is designed to generate oscillations with a frequency of 100 kHz. Two knobs are present for setting the operating frequency, shifting them to the right changes the frequency in kilohertz (left for megahertz). The signal of the first intermediate frequency is equal to 5 MHz, while the second is amplified to 500 kHz ensuring high quality operation of the demodulator and noise suppressor. When transmitting, the limiting amplifier sends the signal to the quartz FM oscillator, as a result diode D2 delivers a combined frequency to the preselector. FM oscillations are sent to the antenna through contact 23, 22 and delay PI, they are then converted to high frequency electromagnetic energy. The ultrasonic synthesizer generates HF oscillations between 55.5-65.4 mHz with a frequency grid pitch of 100 kHz. The synthesizer includes amplifiers, a phase detector, a low-pass filter, a voltage stabilizer, a discharge monitoring device, a search generator, and a smooth range generator. Oscillator GG is stabilized by quartz resonators PEI and PA2, these generate fluctuations of 5.1 or 5.2 mHz. The reference frequency is amplified ahd fed to the input of the phase detector, the second input receives HF oscillations from amplifier 2 and 3. When the oscillation frequency of the FC4 reduction path coincides with the reference frequency, a constant voltage is created at the output of the phase detector which switches the device from search mode to amplification mode. The low pass filter found at the output of the phase detector is designed to suppress interference. The synthesizers reduction path comprises mixers CMI, CM2 and SMZ, amplifiers 2, 3 and 4, and oscillators G4, G5, and G6. Oscillator G6 generates a frequency of 2 mHz, which is doubled and applied to mixer SMZ or resistor R47, in this case the mixer works as an amplifier, oscillator 15-1 or 15-2 generate 43 mHz and 44 mHz respectively, these interact with the mixer and form a combined frequency. As a result the frequency grid pitch is 100 kHz with a range of 16.5-17.4 mHz. The oscillations provided by G4 are stabilized by quartz resonators PEZ-PE, and are transmitted through the amplifier. Depending on the position of the previously mentioned switches the frequencies as a result of this interaction will be between 4, 6, 8, 12, and 12.2 mHz respectively. After amplification an alternating voltage is generated at the output of the phase detector, which switches oscillator 12 into search mode. Three printed circuit boards make up the system (synthesizer board, transceiver board, and a circuit board). The circuit board is placed between the synthesizer and transceiver boards and serves to connect them to one another. R-157s operates a quarter wave antenna, it's interior is sealed from external elements via rubber gaskets and nylon, this protects the interior from moisture, dust and liquids. Due to the fact the radio is stored vertically on the operator moisture entering the battery compartment usually exits the system without entering the interior and as a result this section does not compromise the seal. Corrosion resistant metals, plastics and a nickel + chromium coating ensures the device does not rust or corrode. The preselector consists of an input circuit, UHF, and receiver input protection circuit. The two-circuit bandpass filter offers rather good selectivity in the near reception area within a fairly wide bandwidth. If a powerful signal is received by the antenna, the DC diode opens, and shunts the CO2 circuit, as a result the voltage entering the UHF input does not exceed the maximum permissible value. The limiter provides suppression of parasitic oscillations and a constant voltage at the input of the demodulator. When no signal is received transistor TI remains closed.

Each individual within a squad determines their path of movement on the battlefield, and must conceptualize terrain which will most effectively shield them from incoming fire. Most manuals state that an individual should seek cover every 20-40 paces in an advance, and that periods of fire are to be delivered from these short stops with accuracy, before resuming suppressive walking fire. Before reaching cover it is standard procedure to lie down and approach in a prone position. Platoons may conduct infantry movement one at a time, within small groups, or as entire squads. When advancing one at a time, upon receiving the command to do so, the right most squad member will assume a low running posture and advance 20-40 paces, once he has stopped the next man advances to his selected cover/concealment. Those who remain in place are to provide supporting fire until it is their turn to advance, the last man will be supported by the IFV or APC they arrived within.

The Soviet motorized rifleman carried an AKM/AK-74 with three/four magazine pouches, a grenade pouch (two-cell), an MPL entrenching tool, a 750ml flask, a gas mask pouch (Type A for those with corrugated hoses and Type G for standard filters), a raincoat which could also serve as a tent, a duffel bag, a mess kit, an OZK protective suit, a rifle cleaning kit, an AI-2 individual first aid kit, an IPP-8 individual anti-chemical package, bandages, and a tourniquet. additional ammunition was carried in the transportation vector the squad arrived within, 300 rounds for each AKM/AK-74 and 1000 for the RPK operator was standard.

It must be noted that the Soviet approach to equipment was defined by the understanding that the purpose of the army was to engage in a major European war. Everything within the Soviet army was built and structured with this thought in mind. In this regard the simplicity and cost-effective nature of Soviet equipment was indeed sufficient, especially when one considers that the majority of a units sustainability was carried in their transportation, meaning the Soviet soldier was significantly lighter when compared to Western contemporaries, only operating 40kg of equipment at a maximum. Of course, during the Afghan war this proved to be a curse rather than a blessing. In these conditions, soldiers were incapable of relying on mechanized elements and as a result had to carry their sustainability with them into combat. Here I intend to cover what would see use in Europe, not Afghanistan, as this subject has already been covered front to back by others.

Duffel bags employed by Motorized Rifleman are to carry an exceedingly light load, that being field rations, soap, and a change of underwear. Everything else the Soviet soldier was expected to rely on was affixed to his load-bearing equipment. Officers and sergeants were to carry maps and documentation within a field bag, these could be affixed to a thin shoulder strap.

The KZS oversuit actually served the purpose of offering limited chemical/nuclear protection. They were designed to be disposable as their primary application was shielding one's OZK from the heat of a nuclear blast. As a secondary goal, the KZS suit provided much-needed camouflage to the Soviet soldier and was rather successful in this regard due to its loose construction and effective pattern, which was designed to confuse those operating NVDs.

The origins of Soviet load-bearing equipment as it was known in the 1980s can be traced back to 1949, where modernizations were made to accommodate the magazines of newly introduced weapon systems such as the RPD and early AK pattern rifles. These adolescent models offered 6 magazines to the individual. At this time the 1936 model hand grenade pouch was still in service, which proved inconvenient. In 1955 a new magazine pouch was developed which did away with the previous "shoulder strap" design, limiting the operator to just 4 magazines. Modernizations ushering in a polyvinylchloride coating applied to the surface area of load-bearing equipment which improved decontamination procedures and diminished wear due to atmospheric conditions also came about at this time. Later the standard issue raincoat employed by the Soviet Army saw the introduction of belt loops which allowed for more secure attachment to one's equipment. Alongside the aforementioned improvements, a new hand grenade pouch would see service which was not only more secure but easier to operate. With the introduction of this new pouch came another improvement, that being a modernized RPD pouch that offered a similar attachment mechanism as well as a new gas mask pouch. In 1964, as a result of Order No. 130 a new set of load-bearing equipment would enter service which would abandon the shoulder-mounted gas mask pouch as the attachment point found on the first generation of load-bearing equipment is absent (in all other regards the system was identical to the 1st generation). In 1969 as per Order No. 191, new elements would be introduced to the Type 2 design (which saw production in 1972), notably the protective coating became darker, and metal elements otherwise left untouched were finally offered a similar paint, alongside the buckle which would see the application of an anti-corrosive film to extend its shelf/service life. For those operating heavy instruments such as ATGMs and RPGs, new mounting points were added which improved the comfortability of carrying the standard issue raincoat.

Each combatant was expected to carry oxacillin sodium salts which are a narrow-spectrum antibiotic. There is evidence that psychostimulants were also issued with the goal of preventing sleep if one needed to endure a long engagement. To treat anxiety trioxazine was available.

50mm smoke grenades were commonly employed which could be fired up to 400 meters or thrown towards a target manually.

Dry rations in the Soviet army consisted of 3 cans weighing 340g each, delivered in a cardboard box. The first can contained meat, it was either beef or pork stew, it is said that this meat was high quality, in the case of GSFG much of this meat came from Troitsk. The other two cans contained buckwheat, pearl porridge with meat (which is said to be quite good), or rice. Canned fish could be issued, but it was not terribly common. Nickel-plated can openers were commonly employed to open these rations, though knives could also do the job in the pinch. Some dry rations contained condensed milk, these were sought after as they were supposedly the best. Within each box one could also find breadcrumbs, galettes and rye bread, alongside sugar (3 bags 15g each) and tea (three bags packed in cellophane). Some state that 400g cans of meat stew were issued alongside the 250g cans. Some menu options also contained dumplings, chicken with noodles, stewed beef with tomatoes, kasha with fruit, an undescribed vegetable dish, one unmarked plastic bag containing a "fruit drink", and in some cases four packs of sugar.

The RGD-5 is an anti-personnel offensive fragmentation grenade designed to detonate 3.2-4.2 seconds after it is thrown. RGD-5s thin walls are constructed from steel and contains 110 grams of TNT. RGD-5s fuse is universally applied to F-1, RG41 and RG42. It is possible to throw RGD-5 45-55 meters. The expected fragmentation range is no more than 20 meters. RGD-5 was developed in response to the fact that RG-42 could endanger the user, as the expected fragmentation range exceeded the range in which it could be thrown. When compared to its contemporaries in Soviet service RGD-5 is by far the weakest system in service and by the 1970s it was relegated to use in simulations and training.

The F-1 is an anti-personnel defensive fragmentation grenade designed to detonate 3.2-4.2 seconds after release. Defensive grenades often have a fragmentation range which exceed the range in which it can be thrown (in these cases the soldier would be shielded in a defensive position and as a result this would only endanger the enemy). F-1 has a body made from steel containing 60 grams of TNT, weighing roughly 600 grams in total. F-1 can be thrown 30-45 meters from the user and has an expected fragmentation range of 30 meters. Some manuals state that fragments can reach distances of 200 meters but this is unlikely, while it is true that some RG-42 fragments have exceeded 100-200 meters in range, this is rare and is almost always caused by an unfavorable detonation containing remnants of the fuse.

The RGO is an anti-personnel defensive fragmentation grenade which is equipped with an impact-fuse. The system was adopted in the late 1970s and was to replace the F-1, which had disadvantages such as an uneven fragmentation pattern. The grenade is designed to explode when into comes in contact with a surface (excluding water and freshly fallen snow). To increase the safety of handling the grenade, the fuse is only armed 1.3-1.8 seconds after it has been thrown. If the flight time does not meet these requirements a 3.2-4.2 second fuse will be armed which will detonate the grenade. The grenade is roughly 310 grams, has an effective fragmentation range of 35 meters (some sources state 20 meters), may be thrown 30-45 meters, and employs 67g of PVV-4. At a distance of 10 meters there is a 60% chance that one will be impacted by RGOs fragmentation, this drops to 20-25% at 20 meters and only 0.5-1% at 35 meters. During testing remnants of the grenades fuse were found at distances of 200 meters, if this fragmentation would have been deadly is unknown.

The RGN is an offensive anti-personnel fragmentation-concussion grenade. The system was developed and adopted in the late 1970s and was expected to replace the RG-42 and RGD-5. The fuse and impact characteristics are identical to those found on RGO despite the grenade using a proprietary fuse which is not compatible with the UZRGM type. RGN weighs 290 grams, contains 97 grams of PVV-4, can be thrown up to 45 meters, has an effective fragmentation range of 35 meters and can induce barotrauma within 8-10 meters. The probability of inflicting lethal injuries within this range is as high as 75-85%. The average mass of each individual fragment is roughly 2 grams, as a result they lose speed rather quickly, reducing the lethality of RGN at a range of 20 meters to 5-7%. Larger fragments may fly up to 35 meters but the probability of being hit by them is rather low.