Soviet Night Fighting Tactics And Technology

 

 

A Brief History of the Airborne Forces: 

Following the Second World War, a decision was made concerning the subordination of the Strategic Airborne Forces. Initially, and during WW2, airborne troops were under the Supreme High Command of the USSR, though they were still considered a part of the air force; this would be forgone in favor of reorganization underneath the Ministry of Defense. At this time titles such as Commander of the Airborne Forces were being reestablished. In April of 1946 Colonel-General B.V Glagolev would assume the position. Alongside these organizational shifts, the Airborne Forces of the USSR would see extensive rearmament initiatives, with the purpose of giving these units a greater capability for independent operations within enemy depth, which was severely lacking as experienced in WW2. They began to receive systems increasing their ability to engage both indirect and direct fire, the operation of artillery and mortars within these units improved their efficacy substantially. In 1953, this ideal was fully actualized. Following this an effort to adopt improved anti-armor capabilities was pushed, seeing as this was an element which was similarly absent in WW2. 

It was also demonstrated during the war that airborne forces were only as valuable as the aircraft that could transport them, and therefore, some of the first developments that followed this period surrounded aviation, which could effectively deliver them. Initially, these would take the form of IL-12 and IL-14, which followed the discontinuation of gliders and other less conventional means of delivery. It was later found that similarly, the parachutes employed by the airborne forces were just as (if not more) underdeveloped than even their lift capability, in regards to the landing of heavy equipment such as light armored vehicles. Due to this deficiency, work on improving these systems was pushed. Prior to these improvements, jumps could not be carried out at speeds exceeding 180 kilometers per hour. In accordance with the requirements of these programs, this rose to 300 kilometers per hour, which allowed the airborne forces to keep up with the development in transportation at the time. This would culminate in Dolgov and Andreev receiving Hero of the Soviet Union after a record breaking jump from the stratosphere, Andreev would fall for 270 seconds before opening his parachute less than a kilometer above the ground, Dolgov would open his parachute earlier, though unfortunately died due to the depressurization of his equipment. At this time, work on multiple parachute systems for heavy equipment saw simultaneous development, which would conclude with the adoption of PP-127 (max load of 4600kg) in the late 50s, allowing for the airborne forces to effectively land artillery, vehicles, radio stations, engineering equipment, and chemical protection elements, though the PP-127 would soon be replaced by the superior PP-128 (max load of 6700kg).

This would not satisfy the airborne forces, work began on new means of landing heavy equipment at greater speeds and capacities almost immediately afterwards. The introduction of retrorockets as a result of this program served as a quantum leap in the capabilities of the VDV, which was finally breaking from the conventional understanding that they would be of most use coordinating closely with ground forces for the rapid development of offensive operations, especially when water obstacles were involved. The rationale for this doctrine was a result of limited amphibious elements at the time, which did not allow for the transfer of entire divisions in a reasonable period, only small raiding detachments. The VDV would capture bridges and crossings and hold them until the main body could sort out an effective means of advance, or strike at the rear of a well-prepared defense as the crossing occurred. This doctrine soon developed into the idea that the airborne forces would instead be used to encircle an enemy which was being engaged by the main body, though after some debate this was revised into the concept of employing the VDV as a decentralized element in the rear of the enemy to disrupt a withdrawal if they were decisively routed by the main body, setting up ambushes to enact raids on fleeing convoys and cutting off reserves. As their capabilities grew, so did the scope of their objectives, and by the 1960s it was solidified within military thinking that the VDV was best used to disrupt strategic elements such as communication centers, command posts, airfields, warehouses, nuclear deliverance and political assets.

This shift was accompanied by a great deal of experimentation, which worked to diagnose issues which may be present in the equipment assigned to the VDV when accomplishing such tasks, which ultimately resulted in the adoption of the BMD-1, this influenced the foundation of the airborne forces in a fundamental sense, ushering in the era of a mechanized airborne composition. At the same time, the VDVs transportation saw revisions seeking to keep up with these ideals, which brought about the An-12, and An-22, as well as the Il-76 later down the line. Innovations in both mechanization and airlift capabilities coincided with success in the application of retrorockets, which made it possible to transport an assortment of modernized, heavier equipment within the enemy's rear. These elements were accompanied by a wave of reforms in the late 60s and 70s, which worked to redefine the airborne forces as a specialized, elite element within the military system, this translated to training and conscription practices as well. Airborne forces were to be politically reliable, they were to be well-versed in navigation, hand-to-hand combat, largely immune to psychological subversion enacted by the enemy, medical affairs, parachute operation, and have a superb mental and physical fortitude. Under this new regimen, airborne forces would only accept the bravest of conscripted individuals, who would begin their training with parachute qualifications, while being taught high moral standards such as determination, courage, and the importance of not losing one's nerve, even in the most difficult of conditions. Intense training preceded this, almost all classes were conducted in simulated field conditions, where subjects such as reconnaissance and land navigation were engaged, former service members within the VDV often note the lack of rest or relaxation from exercises as a primary critique.

These revisions would continue into the mid-1970s, but the first large-scale training endeavor, which featured the improved airborne force (excluding BMD-1) was Dnepr 67, during which several landings were conducted aimed at seizing elements in the rear of the enemy. The first unit to land during this demonstration was a reconnaissance unit, which worked to capture a landing zone as fixed wing aircraft suppressed defenses as the forward element arrived, followed by An-22s carrying heavier elements (this was also one of the first demonstrations of retrorockets in simulated combat conditions), in only a few short minutes, thousands of airborne forces had been delivered. Following the operation, observers writing for Izvestia remarked " It must be said that the paratroopers are warriors of boundless courage and bravery. They never get lost, they always find a way out. The paratroopers are proficient in various modern weapons, they wield them with artistic skill, each fighter of the winged infantry knows how to fight one against a hundred During the days spent on the exercise, we had to see a lot of skillful actions not only by individual soldiers and officers, but also by entire units, formations and headquarters. We have witnessed the art of using military equipment in the most difficult combat conditions. But perhaps the strongest impression was left by the airborne troops, which are led by Colonel-General V. Margelov… Their soldiers showed high training and such courage and initiative that they can be said with responsibility ... they worthily continue and multiply the military glory of their fathers and older brothers — paratroopers of the Great Patriotic War. The relay of courage and valor is in safe hands".

In later exercises engaged the same year, the airborne forces found themselves encircled by enemy armor before reinforcements could be delivered, but thanks to the initiative displayed by Major Belchikov the battalion managed to break through the encirclement, Deputy Defense Minister Moskalenko (who observed these actions) stated "The tactics and ways of solving combat tasks of the paratroopers are different from the actions of, say, motorized infantry or tankers. Paratroopers, fighting behind enemy lines, have no neighbors either on the right or on the left. The rapidity of blows, mobility, and the ability to impose one's will on the enemy — factors that are important in any battle, here acquire a special role. The battalion and its attached units coped with the task. The pace of the offensive and especially the combat rush of the paratroopers was high. The moral and combat training of paratroopers is respected."

The integration of initiative in regards to the tactics employed by the VDV was one of the greatest reforms to their operation following WW2. This was actualized through impressing creativity in regards to problem solving within each lesson, which worked to cement this element as a fundamental facet of the functionality of each paratrooper, as he may be forced to engage the enemy alone. The lack of reliable command and control over the airborne forces at the operational level when in depth is what encouraged this tactical outlook.

ASU-76:

After the Second World War the development of armored vehicles for use within the airborne forces was a constant endeavor. In 1946 at No. 92 work would begin on a system to fulfill this requirement. The early concept mounted a 76mm gun on a light air deployable chassis that was developed at Mytishchi plant No. 40. In 1947, the chassis, designated Object 570, was completed. No. 40 would receive two prototype LB-76S guns from No. 92 later that year, allowing for the first functional prototype to be completed in December. In 1948 testing would begin, and by the end of that year the LB-76S was approved for service and would receive the designation D-56C. Four prototype vehicles would see further tests conducted in 1949, before the vehicle was accepted into service as ASU-76. 

ASU-76 would operate the OPT-2-9 sight which would allow for direct fire engagements. The chassis was protected by 13mm of armor which provided resistance against fragmentation and small arms fire. The vehicle would mount the GAZ-51E engine with a four speed gearbox. To increase cross-country mobility, the vehicle's rearmost roadwheel is lowered. The vehicle would operate the 10RT-12 radio for communications and feature an intercom system. 

Despite its revolutionary status as the first airborne fighting vehicle produced in the USSR, it did not enter mass production. This was primarily a result of limited lift capabilities experienced at the time. Initially, the vehicle was to be landed using the IL-32 glider, which was produced in 1949. This device could carry a maximum of 7000kg, meaning it could transport one ASU-76 or two ASU-57s. While promising, the aircraft designed to deliver the system, that being the IL-18, proved unsatisfactory and did not enter service. 

ASU-57:

A project that would transpire in tandem with the previously discussed system would be the ASU-57, which sought to develop a lighter alternative to complement ASU-76. The 57-mm 113P automatic gun that the vehicle was to operate was interestingly not developed for an airborne fighting vehicle but for the Yak-9-57. However, the installation of this gun proved problematic and did not meet program requirements. As a result, the Ch-51 compact 57mm gun was developed between 1948 and 1958 at No. 106, and was initially designed to improve the ZIS-2 anti-tank gun. Within ASU-57, the gun could move 8 degrees (+/-) horizontally and -5 to +12 degrees vertically. The gun could operate high-explosive fragmentation rounds (projectile mass of 3.75kg), conventional armor-piercing ammunition (projectile mass of 3.14kg), and armor-piercing discarding sabot (projectile mass 2.4kg). At zero degrees, the armor-piercing ammunition supplied to ASU-57 was capable of penetrating 85mm at 1000 meters; the APDS available to the system was significantly more effective and offered 100mm of penetration at 1000 meters (72mm at 2000 meters). In 1954 the Ch-51M would replace Ch-51, which featured an improved muzzle break. 

No. 40 would propose a lesser-known prototype before developing the ASU-57 which would mount the 57-mm 113P automatic gun, which could achieve a pathetic muzzle velocity of  720 m/s when firing UBR-271. The only advantage this gun offered the vehicle was an increased rate of fire. The vehicle was equipped with a four-cylinder 50 HP engine and carried 51 rounds, most of which were stored within the fighting compartment. Unlike the ASU-57, this vehicle was made of steel, and used little aluminium in the construction. 

In 1949, VRZ No. 2 would propose a 3.4-ton vehicle that mounted the Ch-51 compact 57mm gun combined with the OP2-50 sight, and an SG-43 machine gun for anti-infantry application. This vehicle would carry 30 rounds for the main gun and 400 for the machine gun, operated 6mm of armor, employed the GAZ-51 engine (70 HP), and (arguably the most appealing facet) was amphibious. The system employed a propeller to allow for speeds of 7-8 kilometers per hour when afloat. Unfortunately, this project would be a failure as it demonstrated poor cross-country capabilities. 

Object 572 (which would become ASU-57) was created at OKB-40 and would feature the same Ch-51 compact 57mm gun found on VRZ No. 2 proposal. Between 1948 and 1949 the vehicle would pass field and military tests with flying colors. ASU-57 entered service in 1951, the same year it began serial production. The system would make its first public appearance in 1957. Inside the vehicle, an SG-43 could be found, and eventually an AKM. The vehicle employed thin aluminium armor; some steel was used, but it was sparing to keep the weight down. ASU-57 operated the compact four-cylinder M-20E, which provided 50 HP at a speed of 3600 RPM (this engine was also used in the GAZ-69). The reduced weight of the ASU-57 contributed to its exceptional cross-country performance. The vehicle had a ground pressure of 0.35 kgf/cm2 which ensured its functionality within heavy snow cover and swamps. 

ASU-57 was equipped with the TPU-47 intercom system which allowed the crew to effectively communicate with one another, and a 10RT-12 radio. The radio was located in front of the commander's position. In 1961 the 10RT-12 and TPU-47 were replaced by R-120 TPU and R-113, which afforded the ASU-57 with a communication range of 20 kilometers. 

Following the ASU-57's introduction to service, they were organized into anti-tank companies featuring nine vehicles; every airborne regiment operated such a unit to combat medium tanks of the time. 

The moment the ASU-57 entered service, an amphibious variant was being devised under the designation Object 574 (ASU-57P), which was first built in 1952. Four prototypes were tested between 1953 and 1954. This modification weighed 3.35 tons and significantly expanded the hull to allow for buoyancy to be achieved. The engine installed on the standard ASU-57 was improved to offer 60 HP, which would supply sufficient power to cross water obstacles. Interestingly, ASU-57P would feature an improved gun, known as Ch-51P, which improved the fire rate to 12 rounds per minute and introduced a more advanced muzzle break. Initially the vehicle was to feature two propellers, but this design reduced traction when coming ashore, and therefore, a new system was employed that used the gearbox to generate power to a propeller. A heat exchanger was also installed which cooled the vehicle while afloat and dispersed this heat into the water. Unfortunately, this vehicle would remain a prototype. 

In 1955, the airborne forces were in need of a new combat vehicle with a more powerful gun to engage modern threats. To meet these requirements, an ASU-57 equipped with the B-11 107mm recoilless rifle was developed; this design was, for obvious reasons, a failure. 

To land the ASU-57, the Yak-14 heavy glider was developed in 1948, coinciding with the production of Object 572, which was delivered by the IL-12D. Experiments with Tu-4T were considered, but this proved unsatisfactory. With the adoption of AN-12 in 1959, the capabilities of ASU-57 were greatly expanded. Parachutes to deploy the ASU-57 from this aircraft were developed at No. 468 in Moscow. Here, the MKS-4-127 and MKS-5-128R multidome parachutes were conceptualized and designed. When employing these systems, the ASU-57 was secured to the PP-128-5000 landing platform (later P-7). The combined weight of the platform, parachute, ASU-57, and associated provisions was 5,160kg, two of which were deployed from a single AN-12 with a descent speed of 7 meters per second. The ASU-57 could also be lifted by the Mi-6. 

SU-85: 

The SU-85 was developed to fulfill a wide array of tasks and was not designed with the express purpose of serving as an airborne fighting vehicle. Because of this, they were to see integration within motorized rifle, tank, and airborne formations (which were, of course, the primary consideration of its development). It is best to consider the SU-85 akin to the Kanonenjagdpanzer present within the Bundeswehr at this time. 

Object 573 (which would become the SU-85) began development in 1953 at the Mytishchi Machine-building Plant and entered service in 1956. The vehicle mounted the 85mm D-70 as its main gun, which was developed by F. F. Petrov at Plant No. 9 (produced at No. 75). The gun could move 15 degrees horizontally in either direction and from -4.5 to +15 degrees vertically. For direct fire, the TSHK2-79-11 was employed, and for indirect fire, the S-71-79, when used in this way, it is stated that a range of 13400 meters could be achieved when employing OF-372 (high explosive fragmentation). For engagements in night conditions, the SU-85 was supplied with TPN1-79-11 and L-2 IR illuminator. 

The ammunition employed by SU-85 included UBR-372, 3UBK5, and OF-372. UBR-372 employed the BR-372 armor-piercing tracer (weight of 9.3kg), which could penetrate 180-200mm at an angle of 60 degrees with a distance of 1000 meters. The round has an exit velocity of 1005 m/s. UBR-372 makes use of the KV-5 percussion primer due to the fact that the round exceeds the maximum pressure KV-4 is capable of withstanding. In many regards, the round is identical to BR-367 and employs the same base fuze. The dimensions of the ballistic cap are indistinguishable, with the only difference being the wider copper obturator and driving bands present on BR-372; this modification marginally increased the weight of the shell. While this round was capable of easily defeating tanks such as Centurion Mk. 2, it stood no chance against the upper glacis of M48. It must be noted that despite this, BR-372 was still capable of defeating M48s' lower glacis at a distance of 2400 meters. 3UBK5 operated the 3BK7 HEAT round, which shares many of its design components with 3BK2. 3BK7 included six-bladed stabilizer fins with a steel slip ring (which departs from 3BK2 in its location and through the use of a nut as opposed to a wedge collar to secure the ring), as well as the GPV-2 piezoelectric spitback fuze. Compared to earlier systems such as 3BK2, 3BK7 had a higher muzzle velocity and was lighter due to the use of the A-IX-2 explosive charge. The round is designed to reduce the influence of rifling, but not eliminate it entirely. 3BK7 uses a copper obturator band instead of the iron-ceramic band found on 3BK2. These changes assisted in reducing the weight of the projectile. 3BK7 penetrates 240mm of RHA and poses a serious threat to MBTs in service at the time of its introduction. 

For anti-infantry application, an SGMT (SG-43) could be found inside alongside 250 rounds for the machine gun (dispersed across 8 boxes), one AKM with 300 rounds, 15 F-1 fragmentation grenades, and an SPSh-44 flare pistol. 

SU-85 protected the crew from small to medium caliber armor-piercing ammunition. An emergency hatch was present on the floor of the fighting compartment for immediate evacuation of the vehicle. 

Much to the design team's chagrin, the YaMZ-206V two-stroke diesel engine was employed within the vehicle, which had 210 HP and an RPM of 1800. The engine was started electrically and employed a relatively large liquid cooling system to offset its poor performance. It was impressed upon those developing the vehicle that SU-85 had to be designed around this engine, as a result, the cross-country performance of the vehicle was diminished (albeit marginally). The engine was positioned in such a way that it offset the weight of the gun. SU-85's mechanical transmission featured a five-speed gearbox, with 5 forward and 1 reverse gear. A torsion bar suspension was present that incorporated hydraulic shock absorbers. 

SU-85s commander employed the TKN-1T night observation device, which was independent from the gunner's optic, for the driver; TVN-2 was available. When outside of night conditions, the commander operated the TNPK-240A, which had a maximum magnification of eight times. The crew communicated using the R-120 TPU intercom system and had access to an R-113 for long-distance interaction (20km). To obscure itself on the battlefield, SU-85 operated two BDSH-5 smoke bombs, which were mounted to the rear of the vehicle; these could be repurposed to allow for the transportation of fuel drums. 

Each airborne division operated 31 SU-85s organized into assault gun battalions, which were to be delivered by AN-12. The SU-85 was severely constrained by the fact that it was intended to be landed and unloaded on a prepared runway, after which a PP-128-5000 platform would arrive supported by an MKS-5-128M multi-dome parachute, which contained a GAZ-66 loaded with boxes of ammunition for the vehicle. In 1961, the inability to conduct high-altitude drops using SU-85 into the rear of the enemy was becoming a factor that limited the application of the airborne forces, and as a result, a solution had to be devised. This would come in the form of the P-16 landing platform, which could support a maximum weight of 21,000kg. This made it possible to deploy SU-85s from AN-22s. While this development was indeed important, it coincided with the development of the BMD-1, which would soon make the SU-85 obsolete. 

Mechanization of the Airborne Forces and the introduction of the BMD-1: 

The BMD-1 was first conceptualized due to the lack of an amphibious vehicle that could be supplied to airborne troops. Volgograd Tractor Plant was chosen to design and produce the system, this is due to their experience in the production of light armored vehicles. Astrov Design Bureau wished to usurp the contract, seeing as they had spearheaded the previous generation of ASU-57 and SU-85. At this time, Volgograd was in the process of updating the aging PT-76, and found that the strict requirements which were demanded by both programs shared many facets, and therefore, BMD's distant ancestry is tied closer to PT-76 than BMP-1. The BMD's unique requirements were that it had to be light enough for AN-12 to carry two of them, be capable of employing the P-7 + MKS-760 multiple parachute system, and to share its armament with BMP-1 (which was a contract Volgograd competed for years prior).

The BMD was to have a crew of 2, and transport 5 (this would be diminished to 4) paratroopers internally, there were also to be firing ports along the hull to allow for defense from any direction the system may be engaged from. It was to share similarities to the BMP-1's power plant, and operate a water jet propulsion system. The first prototype to see similarities to the BMD was Object 911, which saw propositions for a rear engine and transmission configuration, and the ability to carry six dismounts. The vehicle was to feature a two-man turret, alongside a bow-shaped front which would improve its amphibious capabilities. Similarly to the BMD, Object 911 would concentrate the dismount compartment towards the front of the vehicle, six sitting behind the turret, alongside firing ports along the sides and rear. The system would feature a unique hatch design, forcing the crew to dismount over the engine, being wide enough for two to exit simultaneously. Object 911 would operate a mechanical transmission with a two-disc main friction clutch and a gearbox containing two clutches and two coaxial planetary gears, alongside two hydrojets, being almost identical to those found on PT-76. The vehicle would also employ a tracked suspension with a rear drive sprocket and front idler, and 5 road wheels, which were identical to those found on PT-76. Like the BMD, pneumatic suspension was used, which allowed the vehicle to raise and lower its height from 426 millimeters to just 96. The armament would be identical to that of BMP-1 as per program requirements, the vehicle would functionally depart in its more niche characteristics.

Object 914 would be a more conventional proposal, and was the first prototype to be air transportable, though it could not be dropped from altitude. The vehicle would have a crew of 10, factoring in dismounts, and would operate a nearly identical layout to that of BMD in regards to the position of machine gunners relative to the driver, though unlike the BMD, the armor would be high hardness steel. The V-6M diesel engine was employed, which was located to the rear of the hull, similarly, a two-disc main friction clutch and a gearbox with two clutches would see integration. A conventional torsion bar suspension was employed as well as hydraulic shock absorbers, the second prototype would see the integration of hydraulic track tensioning. Object 914 would employ the same water jets as Object 911.

Finally, Object 915 came along, which actualized each requirement. The vehicle was made of an aluminum alloy (ABT-101); this material was easier to repair in the field compared to alternatives that required heat treating following argon welding. ABT-101 is composed of 91% aluminium, with the other 9% being largely zinc, with small quantities of magnesium. ABT-101 has a hardness of 145 BHN.

Object 915 protected the crew from 12.7mm armor-piercing munitions along the frontal arc; some sources claim the turret was rated for 14.5mm, and along the sides, the vehicle was rated for 7.62mm. After ballistic tests conducted in 1972 it was found that BMD-1s front hull and turret were immune to 23mm BZT from a distance of 500 meters when shot from a frontal arc. To ensure proper amphibious capabilities, the hull is quite narrow and has a bow-shaped front. There were three TPNO-170 optical devices installed in the driver's compartment, which feature electric heating to prevent fogging, this is engaged through a conductive layer of glass glued to the front planes of the prisms; thermal resistors are soldered into the prisms, acting as temperature sensors. The commander's optics are reinforced to prevent penetration from shrapnel. In front of the commander's seat is a machine gun with TNPP-220A sighting device, which is similarly electrically heated, and has 30 degrees of observation, and TNPO-170 observation device. There is a second machine gunner located on the other side of the driver, who has access to TNPP-220A. Dismounts have access to two TNPO-170 devices and an MK-4S periscope device near the rear hatch, which provides an unmagnified picture, though it could be adjusted along the vertical axis. This periscope could be elevated by 18 degrees and depressed by 12 degrees. The hull is equipped with headlights, side lights, a wave deflecting shield, front and rear mudguards, and water jet propeller flaps, as well as a radio antenna, landing gear mounting equipment, towing hooks, and a device for transport on a trailer alongside two boxes for spare parts, a crowbar, shovel, and emergency buoy. The engine transmission compartment is located to the rear of the hull, and is isolated from the middle compartment with a sealed partition, the engine is a V-shaped 6-cylinder, four stroke diesel 5D-20, which is liquid cooled, this system is almost identical to BMP-1s engine, but 5D-20 employs a different cooling and ventilation system.

The engine has only 240 horsepower, which is 60 less than the BMP-1s, though this does not limit the system considering its weight. The engine uses an electric starter or a backup air intake system; with the introduction of a compressor driven by the engine, the air intake system became the main option in 1973. To facilitate starting at low temperatures, the engine is equipped with an electric nozzle heater included in the cooling system. The fuel system includes three tanks located in the engine-transmission compartment. The air purification system is two-stage, with a cyclone block in the first stage, filter cartridges in the second, and automatic dust removal. To increase the safety of tackling water obstacles, two connected valves are included in the engine air intake system, providing air intake when submerged through the center compartment. The engine has an ejector-type cooling system, which also provides ventilation for the engine compartment and dust extraction from the air cleaning system. The transmission is mechanical, consisting of a two-disc main friction clutch; there are 4 forward and 1 reverse gears. The 3rd and 4th gears are synchronized, the system also features two coaxial single-stage planetary gearboxes and two clutches. Track tensioning is done with a hydraulic drive, the suspension system is pneumatic with hydraulic shock absorbers. The suspension consists of a pneumatic spring, lever, balancer, and travel limiter, made in the form of a stop with a rubber cushion. The return rollers also have a pneumatic spring, which works as both an elastic element and as a hydraulic shock absorber, as well as an actuator when changing the vehicle's ground clearance. This mechanism also holds the return rollers in the appropriate position (when preparing the BMD for jumps and when afloat). This system involves two cylinders, the first cylinder is divided into two chambers by a piston, one which contains nitrogen gas, the second is filled with a mixture of transformer and turbine oils (50x50%). The volume of the oils can be adjusted, as a result the clearance is changed. The chamber in front of the piston is filled with oil and is connected to the chamber in the pneumatic cylinder, as a result of which the piston moves and the gas is compressed. During its return stroke, because of the compressed gasses having expanded, the oil returns and pushes the piston to its original position. Valves allow the return stroke to operate higher fluid resistance than during the forward stroke. The clearance can be controlled from 100 to 450 millimeters. The change in clearance was originally to be used only when preparing the vehicle to be loaded onto an aircraft, but the BMD's ability to change its height gave it significant advantages in the exploitation of cover and concealment in ambushes and defensive positions. Amphibious capabilities are provided by water jet propulsion, consisting of two water jets. There are two pumps with electric motors that serve to pump out water and displace the system.

The vehicle is armed with the 2A28 smoothbore low-pressure cannon, which was designed to allow ammunition compatibility with airborne forces who employed SPG-9 (an early requirement that did not function in reality). The 2A28 has a barrel life of around 1250 rounds. The weapon is fired electrically, though a backup mechanical striker also exists. The fire control system of BMD-1, like BMP-1, offers the shooter a reliable chance of first-round impact against armored targets at up to 800 meters. The probability of destroying an APC with the 2A28 from 500 meters is roughly 80% in the first two rounds. Against a stationary tank at 500 meters the percentile is 70%, though at 800 meters the chances degrade to 50%. At 200 meters the PG-7V is capable of hitting a tank with a roughly 90% chance of impact, cementing the vehicles role as an ambush weapon. The primary ammunition supplied to BMD-1 is PG-7V (later VM) and OG-15V. PG-7V combines the PG-9 fin-stabilized assembly with the PG-15P propellant charge. This munition had superior ballistic performance as well as penetration compared to 76mm HEAT fired from the PT-76s D-56T, and is capable of reliably destroying barriers with equal effectiveness to its contemporary. The maximum penetration PG-7V is capable of achieving is 346mm, which is more than enough to defeat M60A1, Leopard 1, AMX-30 and Chieftain frontally, though it was less capable against M60A1 and Chieftain when compared to Leopard 1 and AMX-30. Once the heavier OG-15V entered service, it was issued to BMD-1. The OG-15V is subsonic, and operates smaller stabilizing fins, and is significantly more capable than the 76mm employed on PT-76 against light armored targets and barriers. OG-15V had superior fragmentation effects compared to its contemporaries. This round's downside is its inferior range compared to PG-7V. Later OG-15VM would enter service, which would improve its incendiary capability and explosive effect.

Object 915 would successfully pass tests in 1967 and was praised for its high degree of cross-country mobility. The accuracy of firing the main gun on the move was significantly increased compared to BMP-1 due to the hydropneumatic suspension system. The vehicle was also superior in its amphibious capabilities when compared to BMP-1, in regards to effectively and safely exiting and entering water it held further advantages. After its adoption the BMD-1K would enter service which supplied the vehicle with a second R-123M, there is an antenna filter which allows both radios to operate on a single antenna, alongside R-124, an AB-0.5P/30 gasoline electric charging unit, a GPK-59 gyroscopic course indicator, a heater and fan for the fighting compartment, and GO-27 chemical reconnaissance device were installed. 

BMD-1P would begin development soon after and integrated 1PN22M2, which included markings for firing OG-15V, stamped road wheels that were hollow, which served to improve buoyancy, and 9M111 Fagot. All previous systems were upgraded to BMD-1P standard, later 9M113 would be adopted and employed, oftentimes 9M111 and 9M113 would be carried in tandem, one 9M113 and two 9M111. The missiles may be removed and employed separately from the vehicle on tripods stored within the system. BMD-1P was later affixed with 90V2 Tucha smoke system, according to some sources, R-173P and R-174 radios would later be installed on BMD-1PK.

By the mid-80s, Increasing the lethality of the BMD-1 was seen as an important step in keeping the system relevant; as a result, work on BMD-2 began. The 2A28 did in some regards struggle to engage smaller targets, especially those on the move, and there was also the ever-present threat of rotary wing aircraft, which would cause problems for airborne forces who operated diminished anti-aircraft measures compared to their conventional contemporaries. Initially, there were proposals for a lengthened 73mm gun, which was tested on the BMP-2 competitor Object 681, though the success demonstrated by 2A42 (open-bolt, gas-operated autocannon with a short-stroke recoiling barrel mechanism) resulted in the adoption of this cannon instead. As a result, accuracy against weapon teams and mobile targets was drastically improved, and the system could still threaten second-generation MBTs from the sides and rear. The new turret restricted the use of 9M14, though by this point, 9M111 and 9M113 had been fully integrated, and 9M14 had already been largely retired after the introduction of BMD-1P. The ability for the 30mm cannon to engage air targets with its high degree of elevation was exceptional, this was only bolstered by its fire rate, which could be shifted from 200 to 550 RPM. BMD-2 finally ushered in an electromechanical stabilizer, in the form of 2E36-1 (dual axis), which has both semi-automatic (for anti-aircraft engagement) and automatic modes. The accuracy of the weapon allows it to engage ATGM teams with a 100% chance of destruction within 15 rounds. BMD-2 operates BPK-1-42 sights found on BMP-2. This optic has a fixed magnification of 5.6x in regards to the day channel, and is stabilized. The system includes a stadiametric rangefinder and passive + active night vision, which has a detection range of roughly 900 meters for tank-sized targets. Interestingly, when firing the 30mm cannon, BMD-2s turret had a tendency to rotate every so slightly right, this is a symptom of the way in which 2A42 is mounted, it is negligible and only an issue in long continuous bursts . The BMD would later inspire an entire family of vehicles based on its chassis, those being the BTR-D APC, the 1V119 Artillery control vehicle, the BREM-D armored recovery vehicle, and 2S9 Nona.

BMDs may be transported in pairs of two in both Mi-26 and Mi-6. When it deployed from an aircraft the BMD falls at a rate of 5 to 6 meters per second, and crews are often dropped directly behind them. The systems included a locator so the crew could find them without complication. In 1971, General Margelov decided that Airborne forces would benefit from BMDs landing with a limited crew inside the vehicle. Obviously, there was a great deal of concern, and the project was scrutinized for its lack of reason, or serious consideration of the dismounts' safety. Initially the tests would be denied entirely, but exceptions would be made if a proper staff could be assembled to observe and manage the endeavor. The State Research Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine would begin preparing with tests that sought to determine how such a landing would effect the crew, here a new issue would arise, chief among them being the inability for the crew to save themselves if the landing was doomed to fail. When questioned about who would conduct these landings Margelov immediately volunteered, but Grechko refused to endanger him, as a result, Margelovs son would be selected, who understood the importance of the project and was personally working on the system at the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Airborne Forces. Equally as enthusiastic was Leonid Gavrilovich Zuev, who would join Marshal Kulikov in the drop. 

After many preliminary experiments using sensors to test the impact speed (some involving animals and others dummies), the landing system was considered safe for the volunteers. Before the test could begin, in 1972, simulators were developed to prepare the crew for the experience and procedures that were expected of them. At this time Grechko would once again halt the program citing fears that these systems could significantly endanger the airborne forces, he would have to be convinced yet again that this was indeed a good idea by Margelov before he would allow the project to continue. The simulators proved vital as following their application many candidates for the test would be excluded after their spines were examined and determined to be unfit for the extreme parameters presented by the exercise. 

Testing of the Centaur landing system was to be engaged in 1973. The crew was to land in the vehicle, unmoor the BMD in just 2 minutes (automatic pyrotechnic unmooring was not employed for this test), before conducting firing drills while on the move. On January 5th the jump occurred, and the crew miraculously survived. During the test, Margelov kept his service pistol loaded so that he could end his own life in the event of his son perishing in the exercise. Later tests would be conducted, and similarly the crew survived. 

Centaur would be quickly replaced with Reactaur in 1976 (or Reactive Centaur), this variant used only one parachute which primarily served to align the BMD with the retrorockets. This was more effective as the parachutes did not have the chance to cover the vehicle following the landing, the descent speed was 4 times higher, and in many regards Reactaur was significantly safer. The only complaint leveled against the system was that the retrorockets were quite loud and startled the crew. Reactaur also increased the readiness of the airborne forces by being attached directly to the BMD, meaning no preparation was needed before loading the vehicle into the aircraft. The speed of descent experienced when using Reactaur ensures that the BMD is only visible for an exceedingly short period and therefore the location in which it will land is difficult to pinpoint. The first unit to test the new landing system was the 76th Guards Airborne Division, this test was unfortunate, as the crew was supposed to be dropped in snow to reduce the shock endured by the first experiment, but due to wind conditions they landed on a small patch of ice, despite this the mission was successful and the evaluation would result in the system entering service that year. 

From 1973 to 1991, the Centaur and Reactaur systems were used over 100 times. 

Airborne forces equipped with the BMD were provided with extreme degrees of cross-country mobility as well as massive firepower advantages over threats they expected to encounter. This capacity for rapid shock attacks and incredible anti-armor capabilities was unrivaled throughout the 70s and 80s, which drastically increased the Strategic Airborne Forces' capability to seize key terrain and complete objectives, while offering a unique scope for raids at considerable distance and momentum.

BTR-D:

In 1969, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Airborne Troops Scientific and Technical Committee drafted proposals for the design and eventual adoption of an armored personnel carrier that would complement the BMD-1. Work on this system began at Volgograd Tractor Plant under the supervision of A.V. Shabalin. The most important requirement that was almost immediately outlined for the program was that this new vehicle had to preserve much of the BMD-1's components and characteristics, to ensure a great deal of parts compatibility. This proved difficult, and as a result, after much deliberation, it was decided that lengthening the hull of the vehicle was an acceptable adaptation. The BMD-1's extraordinarily compact design made it difficult to significantly increase troop carrying capabilities without this addition. This was problematic, as lengthening the vehicle would reduce lift capabilities and would, more importantly, require parachutes in service at the time to be redesigned. Luckily, this project would coincide with the development of the IL-76 and new advanced landing capabilities, which would alleviate these concerns. Initially, the vehicle was to feature a remote-controlled machine gun, but the turret in which it was housed proved problematic and interfered with the landing + dismount process. This also diminished the storage of ammunition inside the vehicle. 

Object 925 (as it was designated) would begin state tests in 1973 and would be adopted in 1974 (after which it was designated BTR-D). In service, this vehicle would fill a vital transportation requirement which had not yet been realized. The BTR-D could transport material, evacuate wounded personnel, and ferry infantry. Due to the importance of this vehicle, each airborne unit would receive a company of BTR-Ds, and all engineers subordinate to the airborne forces would be issued them. 

The BTR-D carried a total of 14 passengers, 10 F-1 fragmentation grenades, multiple ammunition storage boxes for the dismounts, 2 RPG-16s/RPG-7Ds, 2 RPKs, 21 VOG-25s, 5 magazines for each of the crew's rifles, 26mm flares for SPSh-44 (5 per gun), and two MANPADS. Dismounts ride on 8 folding quick-release seats. The communication equipment, observation devices, and chemical protection measures on board are identical to those found on the BMD series of vehicles due to the reduction of proprietary parts outlined in the program requirements. 

BTR-D can be modified into an ambulance with an easily affixed package that allows the vehicle to accommodate four stretchers. To engage this, the seats are removed, and stretcher brackets are installed. The stretchers are stacked in pairs on the right and left sides of the troop compartment. To retrofit the BTR-D to support the transportation of two 200-liter drums (which can be filled with fuel or lubricants), all seats except for three are removed. In this configuration, the vehicle can also be made to carry twelve boxes of ammunition.  

In 1975, the airborne regiments would receive BMD-1KSh, which saw the commander's station rearranged among other changes to accommodate two R-123 radios, two R-111 radios, and one R-130 radio. R-123M and R-111 possess the ability to engage (and automatically switch between) four predetermined frequencies, and can operate simultaneously. Staff officers are provided with two tables so that they can more comfortably conduct their work. A similar vehicle, BMD-1R, is equipped with the R-161A2M VHF radio, which can provide clear communication up to two thousand kilometers in range. 

In 1979, the BTR-D was modified to operate the 902G Tucha smoke grenade launcher system. Two launchers were affixed to each side of the vehicle. The projected 3D6 smoke grenades generate a 60-meter smoke screen with a duration of 60-130 seconds and have a range of 300 meters. 

In 1979, Volgograd would design the BTR-RD anti-tank missile carrier, which would be adopted in 1983. BTR-RD operated the 9M113 ATGM, which could be fired at a rate of two missiles per minute. Inside the vehicle are a 9M111 and 12 additional missiles that are to be dismounted and operated separately. BTR-RD replaced the SU-85 and the D-44 anti-tank gun. 

BTR-ZD, which entered service in 1984, was designed to carry anti-aircraft missiles, 20 of which were stored inside. This vehicle often mounted the ZU-23-2s supplied to the airborne forces out of convenience and increased flexibility. This started due to the fact that BTR-D was chosen by the troops as the preferred option for towing the ZU-23-2, as the GAZ-66 proved unsatisfactory. Eventually, during exercises, especially those that involved river crossings, the ZU-23-2 would be placed atop the BTR-D. This would allow for the system to fire throughout the course of thwarting a water obstacle. This eventually became standard practice no matter the circumstance, much to Volgograd's chagrin, as their representatives thoroughly objected to this solution. Because this was never a formally authorized modification, different units had different methods for mounting the ZU-23-2, which led to some less than elegant results, aesthetically speaking. 

In the mid-1980s, the BTR-D would see the inclusion of R-123M, R-173 and the R-174 intercom system, which would replace the older semi-transistorized radios. 

In 1984, the BREM-D was proposed, which was an 8-ton armored recovery and engineering vehicle. This vehicle would enter service and serial production in 1989. I will avoid speaking about this system as it falls outside the timeframe of this article. 

GT-MU is a light airborne armored personnel carrier, which is considered an inexpensive alternative to the BTR-D, and as a result occupied many rear service positions within the airborne forces. Command posts, chemical reconnaissance, and material support were its primary aims, though it could serve as a troop transport if necessary. This is not encouraged as the vehicle lacks an integrated weapon system and is therefore rather vulnerable. 

RKhM-2 is a chemical, radiological, and biological reconnaissance system designed for use within the Soviet Airborne Forces, improving upon the lackluster UAZ-469RH. Like UAZ-469RH, RKhM-2 has no defensive armament but makes up for this by carrying an RPG-18 (or RPO-A), and a large volume of F-1 fragmentation grenades. Just like its contemporaries, the vehicle is equipped with GSP-12, VPHR, PKhR, DP-3B, and DP-5B devices for complete, and constant atmospheric monitoring, as well as KPO-1, and fence dispensing measures. RKhM-2 conducts chemical reconnaissance at 30 km/h and radiation as well as biological reconnaissance at 5 km/h. In regards to communication systems R-124 intercom and R-123 are available. Due to the GT-MU being used as the chassis for RKhM-2, an attenuation factor of 2.6 to 4 is present. The primary disadvantage of this system as opposed to BMD/BTR-D-based proposals, is that the crew cannot land inside the vehicle, though it makes up for this with an impressively inexpensive production cost per unit. 

1V119, which sought to provide an artillery reconnaissance and fire control capability to the airborne forces akin to PRP-3, began development in the late 1970s. The system employed the BTR-D as its chassis, which expedited the R&D process as this vehicle already had an established reputation of excellence. In 1982, the vehicle would enter service, and that same year it would begin serial production. 1V119, like PRP-3, occupied a myriad of roles, including terrain navigation assistance, general reconnaissance activities, spotting for ATGMs when operating within a defensive posture, limited chemical reconnaissance, and the transmission of target coordinates to artillery systems. When supporting batteries, 1V119 is used as a mobile command post, which may be manned by the Chief of Staff or the Senior Officer of the battery. The Chief of Intelligence within an artillery regiment may also be assigned to 1V119 to conduct his duties and coordinate actions on the battlefield. In regard to onboard equipment,1V119 operates the 1RL133-1 ground surveillance radar, 1D11-1 laser range finder, 1PN32 night observation device, GO-27 radiation alarm/detection system, 1V44 navigation system as well as the 1G13M and 1G25-1 gyrocompass, 1V520 ballistic computer for fire direction, two R-123M radio stations, an R-107M radio station, and the R-124 tank intercom system. Two TA-57 field telephone sets are present alongside 500 m telephone line to establish the R-107M in a detached observation position. A 6000X9000 mm camouflage net is provided to the crew that may be used to obscure the vehicle or a reconnaissance position erected by the crew. Stored inside for self-defense purposes, one can find an RPG-18 or Strela-2M. Many of these systems and the roles of those who operate within the vehicle are described in my night fighting article, where I break down the PRP-3. 

2S9 Nona-S:

In the early 1960s the SU-85 was becoming increasingly antiquated, and towed guns were no longer an effective solution to offsetting the inefficacy of this system. To solve this complication, between 1967-1968, two prototypes were proposed by Volgograd which employed Object 915 as their chassis, these would be the 2S2 122mm howitzer, and 2S8 120mm breech-loaded mortar. 2S2 was requested under the same decree which would result in the development of 2S1, 2S3, and M240. In 1969 it was determined that the next generation of airborne fire support vehicles would use a 120mm mortar as opposed to a 122mm howitzer. Research and development to design such a system was carried out between 1972-1975 at TsNIITOCHMASH (No. 25) under V.M. Sabelnikov.  F.F. Petrov was also involved in the design process, he would frequently propose the application of his 122mm M-30 howitzer, which proved unsatisfactory due to the space it occupied inside the vehicle. 

At this time, V.A. Golubev at OKB-9 was working on the installation and development of the new 120mm mortar, which was to be mounted on 2S2, as this transpired, early experimentation which would lead to the mounting of the prototype 120mm mortar on Object 925 had already begun. The ammunition for this system was developed at NPO Bazalt, which was headed by E.I. Dubrovin and G.E. Belukhin. High explosive fragmentation rounds were spearheaded by M.M. Konovayev and Y.G. Snopok, while V.A. Priorov developed an anti-tank munition that would allow for the dual purpose application of the new weapon system. 

The 120mm mortar which would be selected for the project had its roots in a towed recoilless system that had been in development for quite some time. Here it was found that a recoilless rifled mortar offered similar efficacy to that of a 152mm howitzer. The project was subjected to a great deal of scrutiny, and machines to produce ammunition which would allow the system to function were non-existent at the time. It would take some time to convince those who objected to the concept that this was indeed the future of mortars within the USSR and that designs produced on the basis of Shavyrin’s guns could no longer be modernized. Rifled mortars featured greater accuracy and could operate heavier, more effective ammunition. After developing this mortar it was necessary to determine a system in which it could be installed, this is how Margelov and Petrov got involved in the program and proposed its use on a new airborne artillery system. Of course Petrov would push against the integration of this gun but that was entirely a result of his personal preference towards the howitzer he had designed. It is stated that the French MO-120-RT-61 provided a great deal of inspiration for the project. 

Eventually, after many heated debates, in 1974 a mockup was devised which would receive the designation Nona-D. Firing trials proved difficult, as due to a freak accident a round exploded in the barrel a day before the vehicle was to be demonstrated. Luckily the system was repaired well before this event was to transpire, after which the support of Margelov was won and the vehicle was selected in favor of its competitors. Unfortunately at this stage in the Nona’s development, Volgograd backed out of the project and refused to produce the vehicle. Despite this the first version of the turret would see production in 1976, and by 1979 a battery to test the vehicle was assembled. The airborne forces were eager to get their hands on the new weapon system, so much so that they began using the Nona well before it officially entered service. 

When the Nona was tested by those from the Artillery Academy, there was a great deal of skepticism present regarding the likelihood of a 120mm mortar creating a crater with a width of 5 meters, as was promised by the design team. After two rounds were fired, General Matveyev was so impressed he requested that a photo be taken with him standing at the edge of the crater created by the system. 

The Nona would officially enter service in 1981. The artillery regiment of the 98th Airborne Division was one of the first to fully integrate the Nona in 1982. The vehicle employs the BTR-D as its chassis and retains its internal layout. Within the vehicle the gunner is placed left of the gun, while the loader is located on the right. After 2A51 is fired, compressed air clears the barrel, this lasts 1.2 seconds. The Nona incorporates a hydraulic recoil brake which ensures a recoil stroke of 400mm. An experienced crew can achieve a rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute, though a more likely ROF is 4-6 rounds per minute. 25 rounds are stored inside the vehicle. Nonas gun can be adjusted vertically between -4 to +80 degrees. The 1P8 periscopic sight is employed for indirect fire, while 1P30 sees use in direct fire engagements. 

1P8 can be used for direct fire in emergency situations if 1P30 is rendered inoperable. In cases of low visibility the K-1 cannon collimator can be employed to engage targets with reduced accuracy. Systems are present which reduce the probability of errors occurring when operating the sight if the vehicle is at an angle or on the move. A level is present which provides increased redundancy. A terminal is available to the gunner which is used to provide him with information supplied by the FCS. If the gun is elevated to an unfavorable position which may endanger the crew a warning light is lit to inform the gunner of this error so that he may correct it. The other lights on the terminal assist the gunner in determining if the gun has been elevated to the correct position to engage his desired target, when all three lights are illuminated, 2A51 is ready to be fired. 1P30 features divisions which assist in direct fire with the various types of ammunition supplied to 2S9. When direct fire is to be engaged, the gunner turns the turret to face the target, after which he reports the range of the enemy using the divisions present on the sight. 

3OF49, the primary munition employed by the Nona, has a steel body and has an explosive mass of 4.9kg. The round is capable of producing 3500 fragments with a mass between 0.5 to 1.5 grams (with a velocity of 1800 m/s), the largest of which can penetrate up to 12mm of RHA at a distance of 10 meters. The crater generated via the use of this round is often 2 meters in depth and 5 meters in width. 3OF49 can be fitted with a proximity fuze which increases its effectiveness by 2 to 3 times. The round has a range of 8800 meters 3OF51 has a cast iron body with an explosive mass of 3.8kg, and has a muzzle velocity of 367 m/s. 3OF50 is a rocket assisted projectile which engages its engine 10-13 seconds after leaving the barrel. 3BK19, which was introduced towards the conclusion of the Cold War, is a HEAT muniton with a mass of 13.2kg and a muzzle velocity of 560 m/s. 3BK19 has a range of 600 meters meaning 2S9 would have to ambush its target. The round penetrates 600mm of RHA which is enough to threaten most MBTs of the era. 

Nona operates the R-174 intercom system which allows the crew to communicate with one another, and R-123M or R-173 for long distance interaction. The vehicle is landed using the PRSM-925 retro rocket parachute system, three of which are dropped from an IL-76. 2S9s were organized into batteries which featured two Nona platoons and a command platoon alongside a material support unit to ferry ammunition to the mortars. Such a unit could deploy Win roughly 4-5 minutes. Each division had access to 2-3 batteries. 

Command and Control: 

Throughout much of the early Cold War, the Soviet airborne forces were not afforded their own communication devices and instead relied on specialist systems designed for operation within the army. After their reorganization under the General Staff of the USSR, the airborne forces saw renewed investment, which meant the development of airborne radio systems became a possibility. This was only bolstered by the integration of mechanized elements, which meant that heavier communication equipment could be carried across all units which allowed for greater range and flexibility. This removed the need to lay telephone lines between command installations, which increased the speed at which control elements could reposition, and more importantly, meant that orders could be issued while on the move. 

Of the means in which airborne command and control could be improved, automation was indeed one of the most important endeavors. Automating aspects of the control process would increase the speed at which the airborne forces could deploy. Fifteen automated alarm systems were integrated within each airborne unit, and as a result, deployment times fell to just 10 minutes. These alarms would sound regularly to uphold the readiness of these units; an experienced formation could assemble into columns within 4 minutes of receiving the signal, and in 12 minutes, not one BMD was to be left at the base. 

The primary communication systems employed by the airborne forces included the R-128, R-154, R-141, R-152, R-440, BMD-1KSh, and BMD-1R. 

R-128 alongside R-254 were used to assemble units once a landing had occurred, and were exceedingly common in airborne formations. R-128 was a beacon transmitter that broadcasted a single tone, which could be tuned from 44 to 50 MHz. R-128 employed HKN-20 NiCad batteries filled with potassium hydroxide (starved electrolyte), which was common across most batteries present within the Warsaw Pact. R-254 is a 600 kHz beacon receiver that exists to pinpoint the location of R-128. R-254 comes in ten frequency variations. 

R-154-2 entered service in 1960 and was produced by Kozitsky Omsk Radio Plant and is a long-distance communication device proofed against shortwave interference. The device can receive telephone and telegraphic signals, of which it can receive two simultaneously. High-speed telegraphy was enjoyed within the  Soviet military as it was rather difficult to intercept or interrupt. Telegraphic communications are recorded within the device and can be printed for later inspection. R-154 has a frequency range of 1 to 12 MHz and has three subranges. A sensitivity of 10 mV is present when operating in telephone mode which drops to 2 mV in telegraph mode. The system weighs 100kg and therefore requires a mechanized transportation device to operate effectively. Compared to R-250, R-154-2 is the superior radio; this is evidenced by the quartz filters in the UHR, far greater stability, and the fact it was exceedingly simple, which made it relatively easy to repair in the field. 

R-141 is a medium power radio station mounted on GAZ-66B and BTR-D, which served in separate communication battalions. The R-140 semi-transistorized simplex short-wave transmitter was the primary mechanism by which the system operated. This device featured an output power of 1000 watts (or 800 according to some sources) and a range of 1.5-30 MHz. When operating in telegraphic mode, R-140 has a range of 2000 km, when engaging telephonic communications a range of 1500 km is present. R-140s range is significantly reduced if two-channel, single band operation is engaged due to the splitting of the systems power between each of the channels. Before an operation, the radio was tuned to 10 preset frequencies, this would define the range in which the radio would operate as it was used. Automatic tuning was present. R-140 included the R-155P and R-311 receivers, a TA-57 field telephone, and R-105M (frequency range between 36.0-46.1 MHz with a communication range of up to 25 km. A signal-to-noise ratio of 20 dB is present alongside a frequency departure of positive or negative 4 kHz). 

R-152 is a portable high-frequency radio that was developed for use within the airborne forces with a frequency range between 2.0-30.0 MHz. R-152 allows for broadband telegraph (7x2 kHz) transmissions at a speed of 25, 75, and 150 baud, as well as narrow-band telegraph (7x2 kHz) at speeds of 25, 75, and 150 baud. When employing the dipole antenna, R-152 can achieve a range of 500 km, this increases to 300 to 2000 km if the system's traveling-wave antenna is used. The radio has a sensitivity of 3-4 µV and a transmitting power of 30-40 W. R-152 features a spurious emission suppression of 50 dB. 

R-440 is a rather unique system that was designed to solve an exceedingly difficult task, that being the effective transmission as well as reception of commands, information and requests for support within strategic depth. Of course, the need for long-distance communication systems was by no means a requirement exclusive to the airborne forces, but such a capability was necessary to ensure that they were properly employed. 

In the 1970s, a complex that would become the solution to this problem was already in development at the Moscow Research Institute of Radio Communications and Krasnoyarsk Radio Engineering Plant under the “Unified Satellite Communication System” program. At the outset of the project, USSS was to be a general-purpose device that would see integration across all branches of the armed forces. This communication system was to be entirely digital, immune to deliberate interference, and operate as a network across multiple vehicles with 1.5-2.5 m antennas in 9 to 11 directions simultaneously. Around 1975, the first iteration of R-440 was delivered to the troops mounted in GAZ-66 alongside PTC-1 and PTC-2 receiving + transmitting centers, which would act as information handling control points. R-440 would officially enter service in 1980, after which efforts would be made to increase resistance to noise jamming, throughput capacity, and flexibility. R-440 had a frequency range of 4/6 GHz, which would be improved to 7/8 GHz via the introduction of R-441. R-440 is designed to interact with satellites in geostationary and elliptical orbits, which provide digital duplex telegraphic, telephonic, and telecode communication. A single R-440-0 communication station provided communication in two directions with a maximum transmission speed of 4.8 or 5.2 kbit/s, which allowed for the creation of many high and low speed channels. Low-speed telegraph channels with a speed of 50 baud would always be available in either direction. When operating in anti-EW mode transmission speed decreases to 1200 baud. One transmitter has an output of 130 W. When transmitting, the frequency range of the device is broken into 10 trunks, each with 50 MHz. 

Why a Mechanized Airborne Force: 

The mechanization of the Soviet airborne forces allowed for quite a lot of independence within enemy depth. The ability to establish a highly mobile rear service capable of transporting large quantities of supplies considerable distances, provide heavy, long-range radio systems to each unit, and cross water obstacles without additional assistance was unrivaled at this time. Compared to light infantry, who are primarily foot mobile, a mechanized airborne force can land farther from their objective and still reach the target with enough haste to ensure surprise is achieved. Deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, and defensive positions become increasingly deadly with the integration of airborne IFVs and artillery systems. Night combat is considerably easier as each vehicle can assist in finding and engaging targets. The anti-aircraft capabilities of a mechanized airborne force are similar to those of a motorized rifle unit at the tactical level, which is favorable when one considers the extremely limited anti-aircraft capabilities of a light infantry unit. The ability to reliably defeat armored targets such as APCs, IFVs, and tanks is of great importance when operating within the rear of the enemy. This issue is difficult to solve as ATGMs are exceedingly heavy and are difficult to transport long distances on foot. Mechanization solves this complication by providing vehicles that can use them independently of attached infantry. Due to the fact that a mechanized airborne unit carries all of its sustainability with it, these formations can fight for longer periods and will not suffer fatigue anywhere near that of a light infantry unit. Mechanized airborne transportation vectors protect their crews from chemical and nuclear weapons, can conduct chemical reconnaissance (as well as decontamination), and therefore can be used in recently nuked terrain. 

While these advantages are not to be ignored, they come with unique disadvantages that are important to consider. Due to the exponential increase in mechanization experienced within the airborne forces throughout the Cold War, the ability to deliver ASU/BMD-equipped units was an ever-present concern. As an example, it would require 110 IL-76s to deliver a BMD-equipped regiment. The solution to this issue was a wide array of aircraft, each occupying a unique lift requirement. While these aircraft did have the disadvantage of varying speeds, altitudes, and ranges, this was indeed the most effective decision. In wartime, it was expected that the VTAs' lift capability would be augmented by Aeroflot, which possessed many An-12s and IL-76s (these aircraft were regularly involved in airborne exercises to simulate this capability). It is also possible that the massive volume of Aeroflot's medium and long-range passenger aircraft would see integration (employing civilian aircraft to deliver airborne forces would allow for a significant degree of surprise to be actualized if done in isolation). 

Because of the large volume of aircraft needed to deliver a BMD-equipped unit, the period in which such a drop could be conducted is limited. The airborne forces would be restricted to a surprise attack in the first few hours of a war in Europe, or a situation where temporary air superiority was achieved. In regards to surprise, in an ideal world, the enemy will not be expecting an attack at all, though this is unrealistic, so the Soviets focus instead on ensuring the enemy is unaware of when the offensive is to transpire. The enemy is not likely to be shocked when the attack comes, but he may be surprised as to the exact moment it begins, and therefore he will be disadvantaged. In regards to a conflict in Europe, the Soviets believe that against a coalition such as NATO, the ability to surprise certain members is exceedingly important; if any given ally is unprepared, it will leave fatal gaps in a defensive line which are to be exploited. In this more realistic situation, the airborne forces may be able to make many successful deployments. It is important to note that the target of this deception is not military leaders but instead political officials, as they decide on key matters such as mobilization. At this level, Soviet surprise manifests within the manipulation of tense political situations, it is important the enemy does not see the Soviet Union as an immediate threat, nor believe itself to be in a situation that could insight war. If the enemy believes they may provoke an attack, they will not be properly surprised. Soviet leaders believe that striking prior to the peak of a political crisis is imperative for this reason. Surprise may begin at the political and military level, but it transcends these realms and penetrates civil action as well. The entire nation must be involved in the act of deception and disinformation or surprise will be impossible. At the operational level, commanders will work to ensure the defender is unaware of where exactly the attack will occur. Measures to ensure the enemy cannot scramble are impossible to achieve due to modern hardware preventing such actions. Therefore, the Soviets must deceive the enemy into establishing itself along the wrong axis or preparing for the wrong kind of threat. All of these factors are important when considering the possibility of limited airborne operations within the strategic rear of NATO. Further applications that transcend conventional deep operations include the immediate occupation and exploitation of areas hit by nuclear strikes, as well as counterattacks to diminish the capabilities of an offensive force are possible. 

The vulnerability of a mechanized airborne force during insertion is high, during the fly-in and drop, air attacks would likely inflict significant casualties on these formations before they reach the ground. Once a successful landing has occurred, the speed at which a mechanized airborne force can regroup is slightly diminished when compared to light infantry, as more equipment is involved in any one deployment. The first 45 minutes of a landing are seen as the deadliest time for the airborne forces, as even a numerically inferior enemy can destroy the unit in pieces as they work to prepare air defense and anti-tank weapons. As a result, the prospect of landing paratroopers with their equipment was subject to significant consideration. This was successfully implemented through the Centaur (later Reactaur) landing system present on the BMD-1/2. A multitude of failed designs preceded this, many of which attempted to employ the Kazbek-D landing seats initially developed for the Soyuz descent module.

While airborne forces will initially have a large reserve of logistical support, once this runs out, the volume of supplies required by such a formation is exponentially higher than that of a light infantry unit. It must be noted that despite this, a light infantry unit will have just as much trouble receiving supplies as a mechanized one; here, the primary concern is not the volume needed but the ability to deliver it at all. Here, the integration of a mechanized rear service becomes vital, as supplies can be delivered at considerable distances from the main body without complication. 

Generally speaking, if these units are capable of landing, regrouping, and receiving minimal or satisfactory resupplies, a mechanized airborne force is tactically, as well as operationally, more capable than any light infantry contemporary. 

History and Challenges of Landing a Mechanized Airborne Force: 

The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the beginning of a renaissance in airborne development. During this time, the VDV received systems such as the BMD-1, D-30 122mm howitzer, AGS-17 grenade launcher, 9M111 anti-tank missile, and the BM-21V multiple rocket launcher. These innovations, of course, could not exist without a considerable amount of research and development being directed towards landing platforms and parachutes. At this time, the future of the airborne forces was still uncertain, and as a result, a myriad of unique proposals were still subject to consideration. Notably, the development of landing systems that would facilitate the airborne deployment of PT-76, BTR-60PB, BMP-1, and 2S1. 

Following the introduction of the highly successful PP-128-5000, a new landing system for An-22, which would become P-134, was already in development. P-134 would be a unified system that allowed for various loads to be deployed from a single platform. 14P134 was the lightest of the three variants, with a maximum capacity of 7 tons, followed by 2P134, which could deliver 12 tons of equipment; the heaviest of the bunch was 4P134, which could comfortably support 16 tons. Between 1968 and 1969, 4P134 would be tested alongside the experimental PS-9404-63R parachute system and the VPS-11782-68 extraction system. At this time, the 2P131 automatic release system was also being trialed. The P-134 series would consist of a steel frame featuring longitudinal beams that allowed the platform to slide into An-22's cargo hold, two nets for securing cargo, and a massive foam pad to cushion the landing of heavy equipment. On average, it took 1 hour and 15 minutes to load a P-134 series platform into an An-22, but heavier loads that did not interface easily with the available loading equipment could take up to 7 hours. 4P134 would enter service under the designation P-16 in 1972, with its express purpose being the transportation of BMP-1 and 2S1. Interestingly, the 2S1 passed state tests and was fit to enter airborne service, but was rejected for unknown reasons. PP-128-5000 would be replaced by 14P134 (designated P-7) in 1973, and would serve as the primary system for landing lighter vehicles in conjunction with the MKS-5-128M multi-dome parachute system. The MKS-5-128M allowed for a maximum deployment altitude of 8000 meters. P-7 would differ from P-16 in its aluminium frame. To deploy its shock absorbers, P-7 included valves that captured air during the platform's descent. Upon impact, this air would rapidly release from these valves and cushion the landing even at high speeds.  

After the introduction of Il-76, the P-7 and P-16 platforms would be improved, receiving the designations P-7M and P-16M. The improved P-7 platform would support 11 tons and would make use of the recently introduced MKS-5-128R parachute system. As the airborne forces grew, their need for heavier equipment such as the SU-85 decreased, and as a result, the P-16 series of platforms would be removed from service, making P-7 the VDVs' primary landing system. The first successful application of these recently introduced technologies was at the 1970 combined arms exercise conducted in Belarus known as “Dvina”. Here, 7000 paratroopers and 150 heavy elements were deployed in just 22 minutes. It was here that Margelov first suggested the deployment of BMD-1s with a limited crew inside them, which led to the application of Kazbek-D shock-absorbing seats and the development of the Centaur landing system discussed above. 

While these platforms were in development, the Parachute Jet System (PRS) that would define the airborne forces in the latter half of the Cold War was underway. This technology was designed alongside the BMD-1 and received the designation PRS-915 (due to its close relationship with Object 915). This solution offered many advantages; not only did it reduce the weight of the platform and its instruments, but it turned out to be far cheaper when compared to conventional landing practices. The PRS was also more reliable than standard multi-dome parachutes due to the fewer moving parts involved in the deployment process. PRS-915 would successfully pass state trails in 1970, and see adoption between 1972-1973. After its introduction, PRS-915 was immediately modified to feature an improved suspension system, which further stabilized the BMD-1 in flight and increased its reliability. After the adoption of Il-76, the increased space provided within the cargo hold allowed for the equipment present on PRS-915 to be reorganized, increasing the ergonomics of loading BMD-1 into the aircraft. This variant, dubbed PRSM-915, would enter service in 1976 alongside an improved parachute that no longer had the unfortunate side effect of tearing as a result of high descent speeds. Initially, PRSM-915 was to be a modular platform that could land equipment with weights between 4 and 20 tons, but this did not see further consideration as development continued. 

PRSM-915 has a service life of up to 7 years and could be collected after a successful deployment, but this number was ultimately extended after tests were conducted in 1984, where systems produced in 1972 were used multiple times without complications. With the introduction of BTR-D, 2S9, and 1V119, PRSM-925 would enter service to support the modified hulls of these vehicles. A similar modification was designed to support BMD-2, which had an increased weight of around 8 tons. This incorporated design solution employed in both PSRM-915 and PRSM-925 it would be designated PRSM-916. 

A Comparison Between M551 and BMD-1: 

In regards to armament, the M551 and BMD-1 are difficult to effectively compare, and present challenges unique to their respective designs. This comparison is important as these are the only truly airborne armored vehicles designed for direct confrontation within their respective militaries. 

BMD-1 has a clear disadvantage when speaking to the volume of missiles offered to each vehicle. Prior to receiving the more advanced 9M111 and 9M113 (of which 3 were carried), BMD-1 carried four 9M14 missiles, two of which were placed on a ready rack within the turret. The other two missiles were located in the troop compartment. Loading these missiles was rather easy and did not force the gunner to expose himself to enemy fire. To do this the gun is placed at a 30 degree angle, which allows the gunner to access the launch rail. Here the 9M14 is mounted, the fins are deployed, and the missile is ready to fire. The location of the ready racks are convenient and allow the gunner to engage these actions from his seat. To prepare the 9M14 for firing a 50 to 55 second period is expected, which includes preparing associated elements like the guidance equipment, it is possible for an exceptionally competent gunner to engage this process in 40 seconds. This is a rather long period, which could prove problematic in combat conditions, but is offset by the ability for BMD-1 to exploit reverse slopes via the use of its hydropneumatic suspension and exceedingly small size. An additional advantage presented by this configuration is found in the event of an ambush, where the BMD-1 can quickly re-engage the enemy with its main gun after a missile has been expended. In the first two minutes of an engagement a gunner is expected to be capable of achieving two successful loading, launching, and guiding cycles before replenishing the ready rack. If the BMD-1 is employed in a prepared defensive position three missiles within the first two minutes is possible if the turret is turned to the left as to allow the gunner to access his reserve ammunition. The speed in which one can load the 9M111 and 9M113 later supplied to BMD-1 and BMD-2 is similar when compared to the prior figures. The issue presented with this upgrade was that the gunner had to expose himself when loading the missile.

The M551 carries 8 missiles (some sources state 10 missiles were carried), significantly more than the BMD-1. Due to the gun launched nature of these missiles, exposing oneself to enemy fire was not a possibility. This came with its own disadvantages though, due to the extremely cramped turret, and the frequent failures experienced with the electronic breech (caused by the ten removable separate circuit boards present within the turret being shook from their beds by the violent recoil of the gun) the loader frequently found himself operating a manual crank before loading the 27kg missiles. This left him exhausted, and diminished his ability to perform his role in high stress situations. Despite this the M551 still maintained an advantage in loading speed over the BMD-1, with a reduced re-engagement capability. This is because the HE and HEAT rounds upon being fired resulted in a particularly violent recoil that had the unfortunate consequence of generating a great deal of dust and smoke, which could interfere with the MGM-51s guidance system rendering it momentarily inoperable. This compounded on a reported MTBF of fifty shots. 

The BMD-1P and BMD-2 despite carrying less missiles than the M551 provide exponentially greater capabilities in this regard. The minimum firing range of the MGM-51 is 730 meters, which is exceedingly long, this was due to the unfortunate layout of the tank. This is problematic as it severely limits the ranges in which the missile can be employed, especially in the context of a meeting engagement, and significantly reduces the time in which the gunner can correct the missile along its trajectory. Early variants such as the MGM-51A had a rather short range (around 2000 meters), this was resolved via the introduction of MGM-51B and C which extended the range to 3000 meters. Due to the use of thrust vectoring the missile experiences reduced steering responsiveness once its engine burns out. MGM-51 penetrates 150mm of RHA at 60 degrees, and 600mm at 0 degrees. 

The minimum firing range of 9M111 is just 70 meters, and provides superb engagement capabilities against fast moving targets at speeds up to 60 km/h at and beyond 300 meters. The maneuverability of both Milan and TOW do not surpass 9M111, which is exceedingly impressive considering Milan is a thrust vectoring system (like MGM-51) known for being rather responsive. While MGM-51 is slightly faster than 9M111 at 323 m/s (9M111 having around 200 m/s), It has roughly comparable range. 9M111 has a maximum engagement range of 2000 meters, this was later extended to 2500 meters with the introduction of 9M111M. 9N122 is a relatively small warhead at just 1.76kg when compared with the 6.8kg shaped charge of MGM-51, but still manages to penetrate 200mm at 60 degrees. For both missiles this is likely higher as the technical penetration depth of missiles tends to be lower than the average depth. 9N122M found on 9M111M is a larger and heavier warhead which provides an additional 30 mm of penetration. 9M111 would later be replaced on BMD-1 and 2 with the 9M113, which offered 3000 meters of range. Due to the 9M113 seeking to replicate the impressive characteristics of 9M111 its aerodynamic and steering characteristics are identical, with the only differences in flight performance being improved speed (260 m/s). 9M113s warhead, 9N131, has a technical penetration of 250 mm of RHA at 60 degrees, but many secondary sources state that this figure is inaccurate, and the realistic penetration depth expected from 9M113 is 560 mm. 

The 152mm M657 HE-T employed by M551 is obviously superior to the 73mm OG-15V employed by BMD-1 when used against fortifications and personnel. This round is exceedingly sensitive and cannot be fired through brush or other obstructions, which can limit its application. Furthermore, the highly flammable cartridge cases are vulnerable once the barrier bag has been removed, and can be ignited easily. This round has a maximum range of 9000 meters (and a muzzle velocity of 682 m/s) when used to deliver indirect fire. The preferred ammunition for anti-personnel is the M625 canister round which is extremely effective in dense foliage. This munition employs 10,000 steel flechettes loaded in five separate bays that are secured by a closing cup crimped over the forward end of the body. OG-15V employed by BMD-1P is a subsonic HE-Frag round with a 1,600 meter maximum range and a muzzle velocity of 290 m/s. This round provides excellent fragmentation and has a rather high explosive mass relative to its caliber. While this round does provide limited anti-armor capabilities and later saw the introduction of an increased incendiary effect through OG-15VM, it was nothing compared to the aforementioned rounds. While these details are important one could argue that the OG-15V was more practical for the vehicle's expected application. OG-15V was much easier to load, which increased the rate of fire significantly, was smaller and therefore more could be carried, was more accurate against priority targets, and could be used in closer proximity to friendly infantry. One could also argue that the 2A28 is the more practical gun, as it features a nigh non-existent recoil stroke of just 150mm and has a barrel life of 1,250 rounds. This is favorable when compared to the M81 of M551, which was found to have a barrel life of only 100 rounds in testing, this was later raised to 200 rounds after the missile key and tube keyway were modified. It is also important to consider the fact that upon firing its main gun M551s front road wheels were thrown into the air by the violent recoil forces, the muzzle blast is so great that all crew members are to be inside the vehicle when a conventional round is fired as to avoid injury. M551s conventional anti-tank round, M409 HEAT, penetrates 355 mm of RHA and has a maximum range of 1600 meters (as defined by the gunnery manual, secondary sources are inconclusive on this range). Past 800 meters, it is stated that MGM-51 is the preferred munition; this could be a result of limited accuracy at this distance. PG-15V has a very similar muzzle velocity when compared to M409 at 665 m/s (680 m/s for M409) and a similar penetration at 326 mm. 

The fire control system of BMD-1, like BMP-1, offers the shooter a reliable chance of first-round impact against armored targets at up to 800 meters. The probability of destroying an APC with the 2A28 from 500 meters is roughly 80% in the first two rounds. Against a stationary tank at 500 meters the percentile is 70%, though at 800 meters the chances degrade to 50%. At 200 meters the PG-7V is capable of hitting a tank with a roughly 90% chance of impact, cementing the vehicle's role as an ambush weapon. The primary advantage M551 has in this regard is its gun stabilization, which BMD-1 lacks. The M551 also has more favorable conditions for the commander, which diminishes the workload expected of the gunner, this is indeed important but is offset by the BMD-1s dismounts providing visibility and coordinating with the gunner. 

BMD-1 employed the 1PN22 combined day-night sight, which featured fix magnification of 6x in regards to the day channel. The night channel features a 6.7x fixed magnification and a field of view of 6 degrees. At night BMD-1 could identify tank sized targets up to 400 meters in favorable conditions, which is still within the range in which 9M111 and 9M113 can engage targets. While information on the exact range of the M44 night vision periscope is sparse, it is stated that this optic could only be employed with conventional ammunition. 

While M551 has slightly thicker armor than BMD-1, BMD-1s upper glacis is angled more aggressively, and employs ABT-101 which is harder than 7039 found on M551 (ABT-101 is 45% as effective as steel and has a BHN of 145, 12 more than 7039), this gives it the ability to resist 23mm BZT at distances beyond 500 meters. Against the most likely threats both vehicles are likely to encounter BMD-1 and M551 are well protected and immune to 12.7mm AP. What makes BMD-1 more survivable when compared to M551 is its size. BMD-1 is 1.9 meters tall, and can reduce its height to 1.5 meters via the use of its hydropneumatic suspension, while M551 is 2.9 meters. 

While BMD-1 and M551 are similarly protected, M551 is 7.7 tons heavier, which is 0.2 tons heavier than two BMDs stacked atop one another. This significantly reduces the cross country capabilities of M551 in comparison and means that the vehicle must be prepared before limited amphibious actions can be engaged. Due to the use of a screen to ensure floatation the M551 is incapable of defending itself while crossing water obstacles and the driver is effectively blinded (the commander must give instructions). Because no water jets are provided to M551 it swims at a speed of 4-6 km/h (the BMD-1 swims at 8 km/h). Of course the amphibious capabilities of M551 in an airborne context are significantly less important as the infantry they are supporting cannot follow them across rivers. A unit employing BMD-1s will have no issues fording water obstacles of any width as infantry can ride within these vehicles and dismount upon reaching the other side. M551 does not provide any sustainability to infantry nor does it protect them from chemical weapons. 

The airborne capabilities of M551 are inferior when compared to BMD-1, the crew must land separately and the vehicle remains in the air for a considerable period of time which increases the speed in which the enemy can determine where the landing will be regrouping. The low-altitude parachute-extraction system is preferred to this method, but has the added disadvantage of requiring a prepared landing area that is controlled by friendly forces. The Soviet airborne forces experimented with such a system and determined that in parachute operations such a capability is impractical as well as rather dangerous. Due to the extreme weight of M551 it cannot be transported via helicopter and therefore its use case is further restricted. BMD-1 also provides air defense through the inclusion of a MANPADS launcher stored in the dismount compartment. 

The Airborne Forces at the Operational and Strategic Level:

Operations involving the airborne forces are often planned and executed by the TVD, and seek to engage assets of both theater and frontal importance. The primary objectives of the airborne forces include the destruction of nuclear deliverance systems and their command elements, the seizure of bridges alongside associated crossings of extreme value, the destruction of higher level command/communication facilities including political institutions, seizure of anti-aircraft systems, destruction of reinforcement points such as airfields as well as ports, taking out key industrial facilities such as power stations, oil refineries, military production facilities, and storage depots, and lastly the capture of important transportation junctions. 

Units will seek to deploy 150-300 kilometers behind the enemy. The depth of the mission is directly tied to the size of the force required; shallow operations could be engaged by a battalion or even a company, but objects of strategic importance may require a regiment. Some sources state that 100 kilometers behind the enemy is cause for the application of a regiment, but this is inconclusive. Divisional assets such as artillery batteries, engineer companies, and reconnaissance elements will be attached to augment the capabilities of these units depending on the mission. No matter the objective, raiding detachments are the primary element employed by the VDV in pursuit of its aims. These units can take the shape of a company or battalion, and as a rule, are mounted in BMDs. The purpose of raiding detachments is to cause as much chaos as possible while seeking to destroy the unified target of the unit they are attached to. The mobility of these units is extreme, which improves their ability to engage the enemy on their terms. 

24 hours before a drop is to transpire, special long-range reconnaissance units will be deployed, which will seek to triangulate communication posts, objects of importance, and threats that could diminish the likelihood of a parachute operation succeeding. If possible, air defense weapons 20 kilometers from the route are to be suppressed, though this may not be possible; in this case, local air superiority is to be temporarily achieved. This will allow radars, air defense weapons, and airfields 200 kilometers from the line of contact to be suppressed. Drops are to take place at night, usually a few hours before dawn in pursuit of surprise and concealment. Aircraft will depart from separate airfields and move to create a coherent formation shortly before leaving friendly airspace, this will significantly reduce the effectiveness of nuclear attacks. Airfields will not house more than one VTA regiment for this reason. Airborne operations will depart from 1000 kilometers within friendly territory to avoid medium-range missiles and air attacks destroying airborne formations on the ground. Depending on the level of readiness present, these units can deploy within 5-8 hours. 16 main and 4 to 6 reserve airfields are required to facilitate an operation. Airborne formations are not to remain at an airfield for more than 24 hours when preparing to deploy, and will move between bases at night. 

The fly-in will be conducted at the lowest possible altitude, with a great deal of top cover provided by air superiority fighters, fighter bombers, and electronic warfare aircraft. Chaff trails will be deployed to potentially confuse the enemy as to the true size of the formation. Similar electronic warfare and suppression attacks will be conducted on non-essential axes to confuse the enemy on where the attack will transpire. Individuals and personnel of extreme importance will be dispersed across a multitude of aircraft.

Ideally, a security element will land and secure a drop zone; in this case, regiments will employ three drop zones, and battalions only one. In extreme cases, a regiment can land at just two drop zones. A regimental drop zone is likely to be 6x1 kilometers in size (2500x500 meters for a battalion). In daylight conditions, a unit can deploy in 25 minutes; this increases to an hour at night. In this case, two ingress routes will be employed. Regimental drop zones will be placed 5-15 kilometers from one another, with each battalion separated by 5 kilometers. 

Despite the integration of artillery, airborne IFVs, and a considerable volume of SHORAD, the lack of heavier fire support restricts the airborne forces to maneuvers that champion stealth as well as surprise. The mechanized capabilities of the airborne forces shine in defensive positions established around recently seized terrain/installations and rapid attacks on unprepared enemy forces. BMD-equipped troops also function in decentralized ambushes, where they can level their firepower and mobility to disorient larger formations. 

Combined Arms in the Rear of the Enemy: 

A unique capability present within the Soviet airborne forces is their ability to conduct true mechanized combined arms operations in the rear of the enemy while still preserving the capability for decentralized raids. These maneuvers begin with the unit landing and eventually regrouping. Following this, groups, usually a platoon to battalion in size (depending on the scale of the operation), break off and begin to engage in tasks detached from the main body. Here, command and control are divided among these units. Eventually, as the mission develops, these forces will recombine into a centralized formation and pursue a common goal. Night conditions are considered ideal as the airborne forces can stealthily reposition and avoid meeting engagements. Due to the equipment employed by the airborne forces, the tactics demonstrated by BMD and BTR-D mounted formations are exceedingly similar to those of conventional mechanized forces from the battalion to platoon level when under fire, with the primary differences between the two being present in the length of engagements these units can withstand and the types of engagements they will pursue, which are described above. Many of the locations in which the VDV will seek to capture are to be destroyed. Airfields, for example, are to be disabled by engineers before an immediate exfiltration from the area. When industrial assets are disabled, energy and water supply sources, fuel depots, raw materials, and finished products are destroyed. 

The airborne forces cannot succeed in any of their aims if they are not supported by comprehensive logistical and technical reserves, with material as well as medical support being the most difficult to manage. Battalion and company commanders are personally responsible for leveraging their staff and capabilities to ensure that this support is delivered in a timely fashion, as the inability of units to receive missiles, ammunition, fuel, food, and other material resources will destroy their functionality. As a result, the battalion commander monitors the consumption of material using automated systems and his staff to establish a realistic picture of the logistical situation. He must report to the regimental commander on the readiness, supply, and consumption of these resources if he is operating as part of a larger formation. He will also draft reports on the condition of armored vehicles, the sick, and the wounded. The individuals involved in this process include the deputy battalion commander for technical support of landing equipment, the deputy battalion commander for airborne training, the deputy battalion commander for technical support of communications, the chief of communications of the battalion, and the battalion medical staff. At the company level, the airborne training instructor, senior technician, and sanitary instructor. A technical observation post will usually be deployed (which serves to track supplies present within individual units) alongside a repair/maintenance point for armored vehicles, a field kitchen (to supplement dry rations), a ration supply point, and a medical station. A rationing system will be drawn up at the beginning of an operation, which will be modified as the mission progresses to meet the availability of material within the battalion. 

Supplies are broken into two categories following an airborne landing. These are expendable supplies, which encompass most combat provisions, and reserve supplies which are not to be employed for any means outside of specifically supervised application. Items in this realm include fuel, lubricants, and other supplies that cannot be easily replenished. In urgent cases, reserve supplies may be consumed, but only with the permission of the battalion commander. 

If a vehicle is damaged, it is to be repaired at its immediate position if possible, and if it cannot be evacuated, it will be destroyed to avoid capture. 

Once a unit has landed, supplies are to be regrouped and organized under the regiment or battalion. A “depot” is established, which is operated by the material support staff of the regiment or battalion. As a rule, hot food is to be prepared and served three times a day at these locations; in certain circumstances, hot food twice a day, with the provision of dry rations, is considered satisfactory. In a worst-case scenario, dry rations can be eaten cold for three meals a day at the expense of individual comforts. Water is provided on a similar schedule, but must first be examined by the sanitary and medical service of the battalion to avoid an unfavorable epidemiological situation. 

When supplies are delivered to a unit, the rear services of the battalion or regiment are sent to collect them and bring them to established supply points. Missiles and ammunition are delivered from these points directly to units engaged in combat. If this is not possible, ammunition will be delivered at the closest possible point to minimize the period in which vehicles and personnel spend out of combat. 

Medical attention is provided to units in combat by evacuating them on mechanized ambulances and bringing them to established field hospitals. If this cannot be done, they will be attended to within a mechanized element. 

At the divisional and regimental level, the Chief of the Rear, who is a deputy commander and logistics staff officer, coordinates all logistical planning and controls transportation. The Deputy Commander for Armament controls technical support actions. To ensure the Chief of the Rear is informed of the situation at the front, so that he may properly adjust plans and so on, systems are in place to ensure he receives reports every 12 hours on fuel and ammunition states, and another report every 24 hours on other materials. He must monitor the operations net and maintain constant communication with his subordinates, he must monitor troop movements and make regular appearances before his subordinates, or have members of his staff do so in his place. While maneuver units are preparing their plans, the Chief of the Rear, the Artillery Supply Officer, and Chief of Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply attend combat briefings. As these events transpire, the Rear Commander and his deputies prepare proposals for logistical support using calculation tables. The Chief of the Rear will issue proposals as the Formation Commanders issue orders, once these are each approved by the Overall Commander, copies are then submitted to subordinate formations so that rear services may be briefed. There is no set organization for these units, as the size and scale of the formation is often determined with each mission and the requirements they will need to meet. Though more often than not the Divisional Rear carries five days of supply, three days being held at unit level and two days held at divisional level, these units are highly mobile and only operate material support, maintenance, and medical battalions. In practice, combat formations are capable of consuming their mobile reserves until proper supply lines can be reestablished. This is done through what is known as skip echelon resupply, which calls for bypassing the next higher formation and delivering directly to subunits. This is exceedingly similar to motorized formations, this is a massive advantage present within a mechanized airborne force. A functional rear service can be established to supply such a formation and ensure greater autonomy. 

Air Defense Tactics: 

A considerable threat to the airborne forces was helicopters and fixed wing aircraft; the solution to this is abundant SHORAD, which is for good reason in great excess within these units. In regards to organic support, each regiment operates a minimum of twenty-seven 9K32 or 9K38 (depending on mission requirements, specifically the exclusion of 9K31, a greater number will see operation, up to fifty-four) and an attached air defense battery consisting of six ZU-23-2 alongside a platoon of 9K31 (these were not air deployable and would only see use in an air landing).

In practice, there is at least one 9K32/9K38 attached to each group of vehicles. In a situation where 9K31 is not present, it is possible that every other vehicle will carry 9K32/9K38. Dedicated MANPADS operators, a part of the anti-aircraft missile battery, are usually tasked with covering tactical command posts and enveloping platoons. ZU-23-2 (which is capable of being attached to BTR-D for mobile support) defends the unit's main body during a march, every two battalions often has a battery between them. When attacking, these units will deploy to advantageous positions or attach directly to attacking battalions, depending on the mission.

While the airborne forces lacked the insurmountable anti-aircraft protection afforded to conventional Soviet formations, the threats they were likely to encounter called for a greater reliance on short-range weapons. Studies conducted by Soviet military academies, aimed at both the Vietnam War and WW2, discovered that pilots are likely to expend their munitions well before they have entered their effective range when under fire. It was also found that traditional anti-aircraft artillery forces the height at which such attacks are flown to be raised significantly, which in the age of the missile is invaluable to the defending party. When observing proxy conflicts, the presence of resistance (even if numerically insignificant) was enough to severely degrade the efficacy of air attacks, and engagement via missiles severely degraded the cohesion of attacking pilots. This was further demonstrated in the Middle East, where it was observed that Israeli pilots were frequently routed by relatively weak air defense in the form of fire from anti-aircraft machine guns atop armored vehicles. For these reasons, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the airborne forces should not be disregarded. 

To best exploit short range air defense weapons masking terrain is to see liberal application in the establishment of anti-aircraft ambushes. These terrain features will also decrease the effective range of some air launched munitions, forcing enemy aircraft to close within range of the aforementioned systems. 

To supplement the lack of radars to detect incoming air attacks, round robin visual reconnaissance is established throughout each unit. This method of surveillance is conducted through observation sectors where conventional optics are employed in 360-degree search networks. Each sector will overlap by 20 to 30 degrees. In ideal circumstances the aircraft will be detected 2-2.5 kilometers before it reaches the unit. 

With the introduction of BMD-2, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the airborne forces increased significantly. The BMD-2 includes a dedicated anti-aircraft sight known as the PZU-8, which is effective against targets traveling at 300 meters per second, at altitudes of 2000 meters, and a range of 2500 meters. This range increases to 3000 meters against helicopters. The 2A42's high rate of fire and 3UOR6 fragmentation tracer (OT) rounds facilitate this. Usually, one 3UOR6 is mixed into a burst of 3UOF8 high-explosive incendiary (OFZ) rounds. 3UOF8s' incendiary effect increases its effectiveness against air targets. In an anti-aircraft role, 30mm OFZ is generally more efficient when compared to 23mm OFZ, with only 1.4 hits being required to guarantee a shootdown (this is favorable when considering 3 hits are required to bring an aircraft down using 23mm OFZ). Against larger aircraft, 23mm OFZ was found to require 6 impacts, which is rather inefficient when compared to the 2.8 hits required when using 30mm OFZ. The range in which a BMD-2 gunner can correct his fire against an airborne target is identical to that of ZU-23-2. To supplement 2A42, PKT is also employed against airborne targets out to 2000 meters. 

When engaging aircraft with the BMD-2, the gunner aims ahead of the aircraft and fires a “barrage” as it is described in the manual for three to four seconds. Each individual within the BMD-2 who is capable of doing so, especially the squad machine gunner, is to deliver one magazine's worth of ammunition in the direction of the aircraft to increase the likelihood of striking the target. Small arms fire should not be engaged until the target is within 500 meters of the unit. When firing at enemy rotary wing aircraft, it is not unlikely that 9M111 and 9M113 will see use against such systems, as they possess the range and speed to target these threats when they are hovering. 

BMD-2s 2E36-1 stabilizer possesses a unique semi-automatic mode of operation, which is to be used when firing at enemy aircraft. This is activated automatically once the gun has elevated past 35 degrees, after which it begins to interface with the PZU-8 anti-aircraft sight. In semi-automatic mode, 2E36-1 loses some of its precision but gains a great deal of speed, which facilitates the tracking of fast-moving targets. In automatic mode, the stabilizer permits a full turret rotation in 12 seconds, while in semi-automatic mode, this decreases to just 10 seconds. In semi-automatic mode, the elevation speed decreases significantly, which ensures accurate adjustments can be made by the gunner against a maneuvering aircraft.

Defensive Positions and Anti-Armor Tactics:

An airborne battalion would be tasked with defending a frontage of up to 5 kilometers, with a depth of 3 kilometers. This front may widen significantly if the battalion has erected its defensive positions in difficult terrain that would decrease the capabilities of the attacking party. 

A battalion defense is made up of company strongpoints, connected by a network of anti-tank missiles and machine guns. The gaps between these positions are on average 1500 meters in length. Platoons will be separated by 300 meters each across this system. If this position is established outside of combat conditions, a reinforced platoon will occupy a position 2 kilometers from the main body. Their primary efforts will consist of disrupting reconnaissance activities and warning the main body of an impending attack. 

If the battalion is operating as a part of a regiment, a second battalion will prepare for a counterattack to exploit a successful defense. This reserve is capable of supplementing the defending party if they need to, and will be briefed on the positions they must occupy in the event that the first echelon suffers unacceptable losses.

BMD-1, ZU-23-2, and other systems capable of providing fire support are located in advantageous positions that allow for the exploitation of reverse slopes. These units will be placed 200 meters from one another, and will vary in their depth depending on the role of the system. Killzones, where anti-tank weapons can exploit the sides of armored vehicles, will be established before an engagement. The maximum range of these systems will be taken into account before a defense is established, to ensure they can exploit their range against the enemy. Continuous fire from anti-tank weapons is ensured by the “leapfrogging” of missiles (one operator fires and guides his missile while his neighbor reloads and does the same). It is possible that a roving contingent of BMD-1s will be established to harass the enemy; this will ensure that the primary base of fire is difficult to locate. Within platoon's strong points, BMDs are dispersed by 150 meters per fighting position. Tanks and IFVs are to be destroyed first, followed by APCs and infantry. It is possible that 2S9 and SU-85 will accompany BMD-1s in anti-armor ambushes. 

The capacity for BMD-1Ps to erect extremely effective ambushes is high, as their missiles (9M113/111) are situated well above their main gun. Because of this, a skilled crew can make use of the vehicle's hydropneumatic suspension to conceal the vehicle, leaving all but the ATGM above a reverse slope. This means that engagement via the BMD-1Ps missile can be quickly followed up with a shot from the 2A28, all by raising the height of the system above the ridge long enough to engage the already damaged target, before returning to a concealed position. Areas that allow for this to be effectively executed will be located on the flanks of a likely attack. 

Air defense weapons will be located between each defensive position, reserve air defense weapons will be located in depth along the probable route of exfil that enemy aircraft will employ following an attack. 

The transition between an effective defense to a counterattack will be rehearsed and conceptualized before an engagement. 

After engaging the enemy, missile systems, anti-aircraft weapons, and machine gunners are to rapidly shift their positions to ensure that priority targets are difficult to pinpoint. Due to the high mobility of the airborne forces, it is possible for a defending force to rapidly move to flank the enemy if they manage to actualize a breakthrough.  

In an event where the defending force has been encircled by a superior enemy force, a circular defense will be established before a hasty exfiltration under the cover of night. A breakthrough must accompany this endeavor, and as a result, the battalion will seek to mount a surprise attack on the encircling force to potentially form a momentary gap, which would facilitate the unit's escape. 

At night, units occupy secondary fighting positions closer to the line of contact, but as dawn breaks, they are encouraged to return to their daylight posts. 

Cities are an ideal location for an airborne battalion to establish a potent defensive position. In this case, a platoon will occupy up to two buildings, and the unit will work to spread itself evenly throughout two to three blocks. Buildings are to be fortified with whatever elements are available to the airborne forces, such as bags of soil, foliage, bricks, and other improvised solutions. BMD-1s will be situated within the first floors of occupied structures, or across long streets where they can make use of their guided missiles. If the battalion has time to prepare a defensive position, BMD-1s will be hulled down in fighting positions behind stone/brick fences. Anti-aircraft systems are placed atop roofs alongside observation posts. 

Airborne Organization: 

The average airborne division is rather small, being only 6900 strong. This is easy to critique externally, considering the massive size of international contemporaries like the 82nd Airborne Division. But this would be a mistake, as the airborne forces were more akin to an understrength motorized rifle division than a conventional airborne formation. The difference in manpower is not the result of diminished squad sizes or anything of the sort, but the lack of a tank regiment, anti-aircraft missile regiment, independent tank battalion, independent anti-tank artillery battalion,  independent chemical defence battalion, tanks within infantry regiments, and an independent helicopter detachment.

This is accurately reflected at the tactical level, where squad sizes are, in many regards, identical to those found in conventional motorized rifle formations. The average BMD-1 mounted squad is comprised of a radio operator armed with an AKS-74, a machine gunner armed with an RPKS-74, a grenadier armed with an RPG-16 or RPG-7 (depending on the year), a senior rifleman armed with an AKS-74, and a rifleman armed with an AKS-74 (like motorized rifle platoons, a marksman is present and will accompany one squad in the unit). 

Each airborne division had three parachute regiments, an artillery regiment, an independent anti-aircraft battalion, an independent self-propelled artillery battalion, an independent reconnaissance company, an independent communications company, an independent engineering battalion, an air-landing security battalion, an independent material support battalion, an independent equipment maintenance and recovery battalion, and an independent medical battalion. Each parachute regiment comprised 84 BMD-1s (with an additional 6 in the reconnaissance company), 12 BMD-1Ks (plus one in the reconnaissance company), 12 BTR-Ds (plus one in the reconnaissance company), 6 120mm mortars, 12 9M111s, 6 ZU-23-2s, and on average 6 9K38s. 

The primary element employed by the airborne forces for raiding and associated actions is the company. A parachute company totals 79 personnel, including 6 officers, 2 ensigns, 11 sergeants, and 60 soldiers. There are 9 BMD-1s, 1 BTR-D, and 1 BMD-1K within each company alongside 44 RPG-18/22s, 30 9M111s, 81 rounds for the 3 RPG-16s, 295 F-1 fragmentation grenades, and 75 RGD-5 fragmentation grenades.

Individual Equipment of the Airborne Forces: 

Throughout much of the Cold War, the Soviet paratrooper's equipment centered around the immortal RD-54 (Paratrooper’s Backpack Model 1954), which went unchanged since the day it entered service. The RD-54 belongs to a unique set of simplified load-bearing equipment that places a satchel at the heart of the system. The primary function of the RD-54 is to allow for ammunition, explosives, chemical protection equipment, and battlefield provisions to be carried long distances, while also being light enough to wear during a descent. Each individual within a squad was expected to carry two F-1 fragmentation grenades, two thirty-round magazines, an entrenching tool, an unspecified number of hand-held anti-tank grenades, grenade fuses stored in small side pockets, and consumables similar to what was provided to motorized rifles (discussed in my platoon tactics article). It was not uncommon for paratroopers to modify the RD-54, allowing for additional ammunition to be carried alongside other creature comforts. The small size of the RD-54 is often criticized for its inability to sustain significant overpacking comfortably, and the limited ammunition it provides the user. In Europe, these issues are limited by the highly mechanized nature of the airborne forces, which allowed for much of the unit's sustainability and ammunition to be stored within their transportation. In Afghanistan, where light infantry became the norm for the VDV, these critiques proved costly and resulted in the RD-54 receiving a somewhat poor reputation among those of the limited contingent. 

The RPG-16 is an anti-tank weapon designed specifically for the airborne forces. The system can be broken into two pieces, both of which are placed in specialized coverings alongside its ammunition to ensure a comfortable landing. The 58.3mm PG-16V grenade, including the PG-16P propellant charge employed by the weapon, weighs 2.05 kilograms and has a muzzle velocity of 250 m/s, which accelerates to a maximum speed of 475 m/s. This is significantly faster than the RPG-7’s PG-7V, which has an initial velocity of 115 m/s, with a 300 m/s maximum. PG-16V has a unique design when compared to PG-7V, as the rounds' 6 stabilizing fins are placed towards the front of the munition, alongside the nozzle block. This was done to limit the possibility of a shot being carried off its trajectory by the wind. PG-16V penetrated up to 300mm of RHA and could be fired accurately out to 520 meters. While the weapon was enjoyed for its range, precision, and ergonomics, the introduction of improved ammunition for the RPG-7D resulted in its replacement. RPG-18 and RPG-22 were distributed across squads to improve the anti-tank capabilities of the unit. 

The GC-30 is designed to land heavy equipment alongside its operators, such as portable radio stations, mines, reserve ammunition, medical supplies, and engineering equipment. The maximum weight that GC-30 can support is around 30 kg. The system is suspended 15.65 meters beneath its operator during a descent, in such a way that it does not interfere with the parachutist. 150-200 meters from the ground, the GC-30 is disconnected and descends independently. This serves to decrease the speed of the landing experienced by the paratrooper moments before he reaches the ground. 

Individual Parachutes: 

The D-1 family of parachutes, initially developed in 1955, was an important step in the modernization of the airborne forces. Before the introduction of this system, significant skepticism surrounded the concept of a parachute with a round canopy. This configuration was believed to be unstable when compared to the traditional square canopy design employed by earlier models. Of course, after tests were conducted involving the D-1, it was found that this was indeed the superior layout, which led to its adoption shortly thereafter. 

D-1 was originally designed to provide a simple parachute system that was accessible to those undergoing basic training. Including the paratrooper and all of his associated equipment, the D-1 had a combined weight of 120 kg. The system permitted jumps at a maximum speed of 350 k/h, from a minimum altitude of 150 meters, meaning the parachute could be employed from rotary wing aircraft. On its own, D-1, when stored, weighs 17kg and has dimensions of 595x385x240mm. The canopy has an area of 82.5 m2 when deployed and is connected to the individual by 28 SHKHB-125 cotton cords, which can each withstand up to 25 kgf. 

In 1959, due to the increased flight speed of modern transport aircraft, it was necessary to improve the D-1's tolerance. This was done through the strengthening of all relevant materials and the introduction of a secondary stabilizing parachute. This did increase the weight of the parachute to 19.5kg, alongside lengthening the minimum deployment altitude by 300 meters. These disadvantages were offset by the fact that the new D-1-8 parachute increased the maximum deployment ceiling by 1000 meters and effectively negated deployment speed regulations. The stabilizing parachute also ensured that the user did not tumble and would always exit the aircraft with his feet towards the ground. The parachute also introduced much-needed redundancy, which reduced accidents. One such introduction was the so-called “double cone lock”, which could be automatically activated by the integrated safety mechanism if one did not pull their parachute in time. One of the primary advantages D-1-8 provided was that the pilot chute cords no longer possessed the tendency to wrap around the user's legs, equipment, or head during a descent. The pilot chute of the earlier iterations was also prone to causing failures if it overlapped the main parachute, which would cause the entire system to fail. D-1-8's descent speed was favorable when compared to D-1; the gradual speed reduction meant that the user experienced two to three times less G-forces when compared to the former. 

To train recently conscripted paratroopers and civilian skydivers, the D-1-5U was produced. This variant featured a simplified control mechanism that made it significantly easier to orient the parachute in the air and perform accurate landings. This was achieved through the introduction of three holes in the rear of the canopy that allow for air to be pushed through the system, and by extension, pushing the operator forward at a speed of 2.47 m/s. 

In the 1970s, the D-5 parachute would enter service and replace the D-1 series. This was a rather advanced design, in that it was simplified to just one parachute, removed the pilot chute, featured the immediate deployment of the stabilizing parachute, and allowed for deployment speeds of 400 km/h. The D-5 increased the maximum deployment altitude by 6000 meters and the descent speed of the user, making the landing safer to conduct and more efficient. The D-5, like the D-1-8, could employ two semi-automatic or automatic safety systems for added redundancy. The one disadvantage presented by this configuration was a lack of a dedicated steering mechanism; one could adjust their trajectory by shifting their weight, but this was not sufficient for anything other than avoiding obstacles. D-5's canopy is made from nylon and has an area of 83 m2 when deployed. The canopy is connected to the user by 28 9-meter-long cords made from SHKP-150, each supporting 5 kgf respectively. 

In the early 1980s, a new parachute, known as D-6, was put into production to replace the D-5. This development was important as it allowed for the user to freely manipulate the trajectory of their descent, alongside significantly reducing the effect wind had on the accuracy of this process. Outside of these major shifts, the core characteristics, deployment process, and safety mechanisms of the parachute remained similar to that of D-5.

 

 

A Brief History of the Airborne Forces: 

Following the Second World War, a decision was made concerning the subordination of the Strategic Airborne Forces. Initially, and during WW2, airborne troops were under the Supreme High Command of the USSR, though they were still considered a part of the air force; this would be forgone in favor of reorganization underneath the Ministry of Defense. At this time titles such as Commander of the Airborne Forces were being reestablished. In April of 1946 Colonel-General B.V Glagolev would assume the position. Alongside these organizational shifts, the Airborne Forces of the USSR would see extensive rearmament initiatives, with the purpose of giving these units a greater capability for independent operations within enemy depth, which was severely lacking as experienced in WW2. They began to receive systems increasing their ability to engage both indirect and direct fire, the operation of artillery and mortars within these units improved their efficacy substantially. In 1953, this ideal was fully actualized. Following this an effort to adopt improved anti-armor capabilities was pushed, seeing as this was an element which was similarly absent in WW2. 

It was also demonstrated during the war that airborne forces were only as valuable as the aircraft that could transport them, and therefore, some of the first developments that followed this period surrounded aviation, which could effectively deliver them. Initially, these would take the form of IL-12 and IL-14, which followed the discontinuation of gliders and other less conventional means of delivery. It was later found that similarly, the parachutes employed by the airborne forces were just as (if not more) underdeveloped than even their lift capability, in regards to the landing of heavy equipment such as light armored vehicles. Due to this deficiency, work on improving these systems was pushed. Prior to these improvements, jumps could not be carried out at speeds exceeding 180 kilometers per hour. In accordance with the requirements of these programs, this rose to 300 kilometers per hour, which allowed the airborne forces to keep up with the development in transportation at the time. This would culminate in Dolgov and Andreev receiving Hero of the Soviet Union after a record breaking jump from the stratosphere, Andreev would fall for 270 seconds before opening his parachute less than a kilometer above the ground, Dolgov would open his parachute earlier, though unfortunately died due to the depressurization of his equipment. At this time, work on multiple parachute systems for heavy equipment saw simultaneous development, which would conclude with the adoption of PP-127 (max load of 4600kg) in the late 50s, allowing for the airborne forces to effectively land artillery, vehicles, radio stations, engineering equipment, and chemical protection elements, though the PP-127 would soon be replaced by the superior PP-128 (max load of 6700kg).

This would not satisfy the airborne forces, work began on new means of landing heavy equipment at greater speeds and capacities almost immediately afterwards. The introduction of retrorockets as a result of this program served as a quantum leap in the capabilities of the VDV, which was finally breaking from the conventional understanding that they would be of most use coordinating closely with ground forces for the rapid development of offensive operations, especially when water obstacles were involved. The rationale for this doctrine was a result of limited amphibious elements at the time, which did not allow for the transfer of entire divisions in a reasonable period, only small raiding detachments. The VDV would capture bridges and crossings and hold them until the main body could sort out an effective means of advance, or strike at the rear of a well-prepared defense as the crossing occurred. This doctrine soon developed into the idea that the airborne forces would instead be used to encircle an enemy which was being engaged by the main body, though after some debate this was revised into the concept of employing the VDV as a decentralized element in the rear of the enemy to disrupt a withdrawal if they were decisively routed by the main body, setting up ambushes to enact raids on fleeing convoys and cutting off reserves. As their capabilities grew, so did the scope of their objectives, and by the 1960s it was solidified within military thinking that the VDV was best used to disrupt strategic elements such as communication centers, command posts, airfields, warehouses, nuclear deliverance and political assets.

This shift was accompanied by a great deal of experimentation, which worked to diagnose issues which may be present in the equipment assigned to the VDV when accomplishing such tasks, which ultimately resulted in the adoption of the BMD-1, this influenced the foundation of the airborne forces in a fundamental sense, ushering in the era of a mechanized airborne composition. At the same time, the VDVs transportation saw revisions seeking to keep up with these ideals, which brought about the An-12, and An-22, as well as the Il-76 later down the line. Innovations in both mechanization and airlift capabilities coincided with success in the application of retrorockets, which made it possible to transport an assortment of modernized, heavier equipment within the enemy's rear. These elements were accompanied by a wave of reforms in the late 60s and 70s, which worked to redefine the airborne forces as a specialized, elite element within the military system, this translated to training and conscription practices as well. Airborne forces were to be politically reliable, they were to be well-versed in navigation, hand-to-hand combat, largely immune to psychological subversion enacted by the enemy, medical affairs, parachute operation, and have a superb mental and physical fortitude. Under this new regimen, airborne forces would only accept the bravest of conscripted individuals, who would begin their training with parachute qualifications, while being taught high moral standards such as determination, courage, and the importance of not losing one's nerve, even in the most difficult of conditions. Intense training preceded this, almost all classes were conducted in simulated field conditions, where subjects such as reconnaissance and land navigation were engaged, former service members within the VDV often note the lack of rest or relaxation from exercises as a primary critique.

These revisions would continue into the mid-1970s, but the first large-scale training endeavor, which featured the improved airborne force (excluding BMD-1) was Dnepr 67, during which several landings were conducted aimed at seizing elements in the rear of the enemy. The first unit to land during this demonstration was a reconnaissance unit, which worked to capture a landing zone as fixed wing aircraft suppressed defenses as the forward element arrived, followed by An-22s carrying heavier elements (this was also one of the first demonstrations of retrorockets in simulated combat conditions), in only a few short minutes, thousands of airborne forces had been delivered. Following the operation, observers writing for Izvestia remarked " It must be said that the paratroopers are warriors of boundless courage and bravery. They never get lost, they always find a way out. The paratroopers are proficient in various modern weapons, they wield them with artistic skill, each fighter of the winged infantry knows how to fight one against a hundred During the days spent on the exercise, we had to see a lot of skillful actions not only by individual soldiers and officers, but also by entire units, formations and headquarters. We have witnessed the art of using military equipment in the most difficult combat conditions. But perhaps the strongest impression was left by the airborne troops, which are led by Colonel-General V. Margelov… Their soldiers showed high training and such courage and initiative that they can be said with responsibility ... they worthily continue and multiply the military glory of their fathers and older brothers — paratroopers of the Great Patriotic War. The relay of courage and valor is in safe hands".

In later exercises engaged the same year, the airborne forces found themselves encircled by enemy armor before reinforcements could be delivered, but thanks to the initiative displayed by Major Belchikov the battalion managed to break through the encirclement, Deputy Defense Minister Moskalenko (who observed these actions) stated "The tactics and ways of solving combat tasks of the paratroopers are different from the actions of, say, motorized infantry or tankers. Paratroopers, fighting behind enemy lines, have no neighbors either on the right or on the left. The rapidity of blows, mobility, and the ability to impose one's will on the enemy — factors that are important in any battle, here acquire a special role. The battalion and its attached units coped with the task. The pace of the offensive and especially the combat rush of the paratroopers was high. The moral and combat training of paratroopers is respected."

The integration of initiative in regards to the tactics employed by the VDV was one of the greatest reforms to their operation following WW2. This was actualized through impressing creativity in regards to problem solving within each lesson, which worked to cement this element as a fundamental facet of the functionality of each paratrooper, as he may be forced to engage the enemy alone. The lack of reliable command and control over the airborne forces at the operational level when in depth is what encouraged this tactical outlook.

ASU-76:

After the Second World War the development of armored vehicles for use within the airborne forces was a constant endeavor. In 1946 at No. 92 work would begin on a system to fulfill this requirement. The early concept mounted a 76mm gun on a light air deployable chassis that was developed at Mytishchi plant No. 40. In 1947, the chassis, designated Object 570, was completed. No. 40 would receive two prototype LB-76S guns from No. 92 later that year, allowing for the first functional prototype to be completed in December. In 1948 testing would begin, and by the end of that year the LB-76S was approved for service and would receive the designation D-56C. Four prototype vehicles would see further tests conducted in 1949, before the vehicle was accepted into service as ASU-76. 

ASU-76 would operate the OPT-2-9 sight which would allow for direct fire engagements. The chassis was protected by 13mm of armor which provided resistance against fragmentation and small arms fire. The vehicle would mount the GAZ-51E engine with a four speed gearbox. To increase cross-country mobility, the vehicle's rearmost roadwheel is lowered. The vehicle would operate the 10RT-12 radio for communications and feature an intercom system. 

Despite its revolutionary status as the first airborne fighting vehicle produced in the USSR, it did not enter mass production. This was primarily a result of limited lift capabilities experienced at the time. Initially, the vehicle was to be landed using the IL-32 glider, which was produced in 1949. This device could carry a maximum of 7000kg, meaning it could transport one ASU-76 or two ASU-57s. While promising, the aircraft designed to deliver the system, that being the IL-18, proved unsatisfactory and did not enter service. 

ASU-57:

A project that would transpire in tandem with the previously discussed system would be the ASU-57, which sought to develop a lighter alternative to complement ASU-76. The 57-mm 113P automatic gun that the vehicle was to operate was interestingly not developed for an airborne fighting vehicle but for the Yak-9-57. However, the installation of this gun proved problematic and did not meet program requirements. As a result, the Ch-51 compact 57mm gun was developed between 1948 and 1958 at No. 106, and was initially designed to improve the ZIS-2 anti-tank gun. Within ASU-57, the gun could move 8 degrees (+/-) horizontally and -5 to +12 degrees vertically. The gun could operate high-explosive fragmentation rounds (projectile mass of 3.75kg), conventional armor-piercing ammunition (projectile mass of 3.14kg), and armor-piercing discarding sabot (projectile mass 2.4kg). At zero degrees, the armor-piercing ammunition supplied to ASU-57 was capable of penetrating 85mm at 1000 meters; the APDS available to the system was significantly more effective and offered 100mm of penetration at 1000 meters (72mm at 2000 meters). In 1954 the Ch-51M would replace Ch-51, which featured an improved muzzle break. 

No. 40 would propose a lesser-known prototype before developing the ASU-57 which would mount the 57-mm 113P automatic gun, which could achieve a pathetic muzzle velocity of  720 m/s when firing UBR-271. The only advantage this gun offered the vehicle was an increased rate of fire. The vehicle was equipped with a four-cylinder 50 HP engine and carried 51 rounds, most of which were stored within the fighting compartment. Unlike the ASU-57, this vehicle was made of steel, and used little aluminium in the construction. 

In 1949, VRZ No. 2 would propose a 3.4-ton vehicle that mounted the Ch-51 compact 57mm gun combined with the OP2-50 sight, and an SG-43 machine gun for anti-infantry application. This vehicle would carry 30 rounds for the main gun and 400 for the machine gun, operated 6mm of armor, employed the GAZ-51 engine (70 HP), and (arguably the most appealing facet) was amphibious. The system employed a propeller to allow for speeds of 7-8 kilometers per hour when afloat. Unfortunately, this project would be a failure as it demonstrated poor cross-country capabilities. 

Object 572 (which would become ASU-57) was created at OKB-40 and would feature the same Ch-51 compact 57mm gun found on VRZ No. 2 proposal. Between 1948 and 1949 the vehicle would pass field and military tests with flying colors. ASU-57 entered service in 1951, the same year it began serial production. The system would make its first public appearance in 1957. Inside the vehicle, an SG-43 could be found, and eventually an AKM. The vehicle employed thin aluminium armor; some steel was used, but it was sparing to keep the weight down. ASU-57 operated the compact four-cylinder M-20E, which provided 50 HP at a speed of 3600 RPM (this engine was also used in the GAZ-69). The reduced weight of the ASU-57 contributed to its exceptional cross-country performance. The vehicle had a ground pressure of 0.35 kgf/cm2 which ensured its functionality within heavy snow cover and swamps. 

ASU-57 was equipped with the TPU-47 intercom system which allowed the crew to effectively communicate with one another, and a 10RT-12 radio. The radio was located in front of the commander's position. In 1961 the 10RT-12 and TPU-47 were replaced by R-120 TPU and R-113, which afforded the ASU-57 with a communication range of 20 kilometers. 

Following the ASU-57's introduction to service, they were organized into anti-tank companies featuring nine vehicles; every airborne regiment operated such a unit to combat medium tanks of the time. 

The moment the ASU-57 entered service, an amphibious variant was being devised under the designation Object 574 (ASU-57P), which was first built in 1952. Four prototypes were tested between 1953 and 1954. This modification weighed 3.35 tons and significantly expanded the hull to allow for buoyancy to be achieved. The engine installed on the standard ASU-57 was improved to offer 60 HP, which would supply sufficient power to cross water obstacles. Interestingly, ASU-57P would feature an improved gun, known as Ch-51P, which improved the fire rate to 12 rounds per minute and introduced a more advanced muzzle break. Initially the vehicle was to feature two propellers, but this design reduced traction when coming ashore, and therefore, a new system was employed that used the gearbox to generate power to a propeller. A heat exchanger was also installed which cooled the vehicle while afloat and dispersed this heat into the water. Unfortunately, this vehicle would remain a prototype. 

In 1955, the airborne forces were in need of a new combat vehicle with a more powerful gun to engage modern threats. To meet these requirements, an ASU-57 equipped with the B-11 107mm recoilless rifle was developed; this design was, for obvious reasons, a failure. 

To land the ASU-57, the Yak-14 heavy glider was developed in 1948, coinciding with the production of Object 572, which was delivered by the IL-12D. Experiments with Tu-4T were considered, but this proved unsatisfactory. With the adoption of AN-12 in 1959, the capabilities of ASU-57 were greatly expanded. Parachutes to deploy the ASU-57 from this aircraft were developed at No. 468 in Moscow. Here, the MKS-4-127 and MKS-5-128R multidome parachutes were conceptualized and designed. When employing these systems, the ASU-57 was secured to the PP-128-5000 landing platform (later P-7). The combined weight of the platform, parachute, ASU-57, and associated provisions was 5,160kg, two of which were deployed from a single AN-12 with a descent speed of 7 meters per second. The ASU-57 could also be lifted by the Mi-6. 

SU-85: 

The SU-85 was developed to fulfill a wide array of tasks and was not designed with the express purpose of serving as an airborne fighting vehicle. Because of this, they were to see integration within motorized rifle, tank, and airborne formations (which were, of course, the primary consideration of its development). It is best to consider the SU-85 akin to the Kanonenjagdpanzer present within the Bundeswehr at this time. 

Object 573 (which would become the SU-85) began development in 1953 at the Mytishchi Machine-building Plant and entered service in 1956. The vehicle mounted the 85mm D-70 as its main gun, which was developed by F. F. Petrov at Plant No. 9 (produced at No. 75). The gun could move 15 degrees horizontally in either direction and from -4.5 to +15 degrees vertically. For direct fire, the TSHK2-79-11 was employed, and for indirect fire, the S-71-79, when used in this way, it is stated that a range of 13400 meters could be achieved when employing OF-372 (high explosive fragmentation). For engagements in night conditions, the SU-85 was supplied with TPN1-79-11 and L-2 IR illuminator. 

The ammunition employed by SU-85 included UBR-372, 3UBK5, and OF-372. UBR-372 employed the BR-372 armor-piercing tracer (weight of 9.3kg), which could penetrate 180-200mm at an angle of 60 degrees with a distance of 1000 meters. The round has an exit velocity of 1005 m/s. UBR-372 makes use of the KV-5 percussion primer due to the fact that the round exceeds the maximum pressure KV-4 is capable of withstanding. In many regards, the round is identical to BR-367 and employs the same base fuze. The dimensions of the ballistic cap are indistinguishable, with the only difference being the wider copper obturator and driving bands present on BR-372; this modification marginally increased the weight of the shell. While this round was capable of easily defeating tanks such as Centurion Mk. 2, it stood no chance against the upper glacis of M48. It must be noted that despite this, BR-372 was still capable of defeating M48s' lower glacis at a distance of 2400 meters. 3UBK5 operated the 3BK7 HEAT round, which shares many of its design components with 3BK2. 3BK7 included six-bladed stabilizer fins with a steel slip ring (which departs from 3BK2 in its location and through the use of a nut as opposed to a wedge collar to secure the ring), as well as the GPV-2 piezoelectric spitback fuze. Compared to earlier systems such as 3BK2, 3BK7 had a higher muzzle velocity and was lighter due to the use of the A-IX-2 explosive charge. The round is designed to reduce the influence of rifling, but not eliminate it entirely. 3BK7 uses a copper obturator band instead of the iron-ceramic band found on 3BK2. These changes assisted in reducing the weight of the projectile. 3BK7 penetrates 240mm of RHA and poses a serious threat to MBTs in service at the time of its introduction. 

For anti-infantry application, an SGMT (SG-43) could be found inside alongside 250 rounds for the machine gun (dispersed across 8 boxes), one AKM with 300 rounds, 15 F-1 fragmentation grenades, and an SPSh-44 flare pistol. 

SU-85 protected the crew from small to medium caliber armor-piercing ammunition. An emergency hatch was present on the floor of the fighting compartment for immediate evacuation of the vehicle. 

Much to the design team's chagrin, the YaMZ-206V two-stroke diesel engine was employed within the vehicle, which had 210 HP and an RPM of 1800. The engine was started electrically and employed a relatively large liquid cooling system to offset its poor performance. It was impressed upon those developing the vehicle that SU-85 had to be designed around this engine, as a result, the cross-country performance of the vehicle was diminished (albeit marginally). The engine was positioned in such a way that it offset the weight of the gun. SU-85's mechanical transmission featured a five-speed gearbox, with 5 forward and 1 reverse gear. A torsion bar suspension was present that incorporated hydraulic shock absorbers. 

SU-85s commander employed the TKN-1T night observation device, which was independent from the gunner's optic, for the driver; TVN-2 was available. When outside of night conditions, the commander operated the TNPK-240A, which had a maximum magnification of eight times. The crew communicated using the R-120 TPU intercom system and had access to an R-113 for long-distance interaction (20km). To obscure itself on the battlefield, SU-85 operated two BDSH-5 smoke bombs, which were mounted to the rear of the vehicle; these could be repurposed to allow for the transportation of fuel drums. 

Each airborne division operated 31 SU-85s organized into assault gun battalions, which were to be delivered by AN-12. The SU-85 was severely constrained by the fact that it was intended to be landed and unloaded on a prepared runway, after which a PP-128-5000 platform would arrive supported by an MKS-5-128M multi-dome parachute, which contained a GAZ-66 loaded with boxes of ammunition for the vehicle. In 1961, the inability to conduct high-altitude drops using SU-85 into the rear of the enemy was becoming a factor that limited the application of the airborne forces, and as a result, a solution had to be devised. This would come in the form of the P-16 landing platform, which could support a maximum weight of 21,000kg. This made it possible to deploy SU-85s from AN-22s. While this development was indeed important, it coincided with the development of the BMD-1, which would soon make the SU-85 obsolete. 

Mechanization of the Airborne Forces and the introduction of the BMD-1: 

The BMD-1 was first conceptualized due to the lack of an amphibious vehicle that could be supplied to airborne troops. Volgograd Tractor Plant was chosen to design and produce the system, this is due to their experience in the production of light armored vehicles. Astrov Design Bureau wished to usurp the contract, seeing as they had spearheaded the previous generation of ASU-57 and SU-85. At this time, Volgograd was in the process of updating the aging PT-76, and found that the strict requirements which were demanded by both programs shared many facets, and therefore, BMD's distant ancestry is tied closer to PT-76 than BMP-1. The BMD's unique requirements were that it had to be light enough for AN-12 to carry two of them, be capable of employing the P-7 + MKS-760 multiple parachute system, and to share its armament with BMP-1 (which was a contract Volgograd competed for years prior).

The BMD was to have a crew of 2, and transport 5 (this would be diminished to 4) paratroopers internally, there were also to be firing ports along the hull to allow for defense from any direction the system may be engaged from. It was to share similarities to the BMP-1's power plant, and operate a water jet propulsion system. The first prototype to see similarities to the BMD was Object 911, which saw propositions for a rear engine and transmission configuration, and the ability to carry six dismounts. The vehicle was to feature a two-man turret, alongside a bow-shaped front which would improve its amphibious capabilities. Similarly to the BMD, Object 911 would concentrate the dismount compartment towards the front of the vehicle, six sitting behind the turret, alongside firing ports along the sides and rear. The system would feature a unique hatch design, forcing the crew to dismount over the engine, being wide enough for two to exit simultaneously. Object 911 would operate a mechanical transmission with a two-disc main friction clutch and a gearbox containing two clutches and two coaxial planetary gears, alongside two hydrojets, being almost identical to those found on PT-76. The vehicle would also employ a tracked suspension with a rear drive sprocket and front idler, and 5 road wheels, which were identical to those found on PT-76. Like the BMD, pneumatic suspension was used, which allowed the vehicle to raise and lower its height from 426 millimeters to just 96. The armament would be identical to that of BMP-1 as per program requirements, the vehicle would functionally depart in its more niche characteristics.

Object 914 would be a more conventional proposal, and was the first prototype to be air transportable, though it could not be dropped from altitude. The vehicle would have a crew of 10, factoring in dismounts, and would operate a nearly identical layout to that of BMD in regards to the position of machine gunners relative to the driver, though unlike the BMD, the armor would be high hardness steel. The V-6M diesel engine was employed, which was located to the rear of the hull, similarly, a two-disc main friction clutch and a gearbox with two clutches would see integration. A conventional torsion bar suspension was employed as well as hydraulic shock absorbers, the second prototype would see the integration of hydraulic track tensioning. Object 914 would employ the same water jets as Object 911.

Finally, Object 915 came along, which actualized each requirement. The vehicle was made of an aluminum alloy (ABT-101); this material was easier to repair in the field compared to alternatives that required heat treating following argon welding. ABT-101 is composed of 91% aluminium, with the other 9% being largely zinc, with small quantities of magnesium. ABT-101 has a hardness of 145 BHN.

Object 915 protected the crew from 12.7mm armor-piercing munitions along the frontal arc; some sources claim the turret was rated for 14.5mm, and along the sides, the vehicle was rated for 7.62mm. After ballistic tests conducted in 1972 it was found that BMD-1s front hull and turret were immune to 23mm BZT from a distance of 500 meters when shot from a frontal arc. To ensure proper amphibious capabilities, the hull is quite narrow and has a bow-shaped front. There were three TPNO-170 optical devices installed in the driver's compartment, which feature electric heating to prevent fogging, this is engaged through a conductive layer of glass glued to the front planes of the prisms; thermal resistors are soldered into the prisms, acting as temperature sensors. The commander's optics are reinforced to prevent penetration from shrapnel. In front of the commander's seat is a machine gun with TNPP-220A sighting device, which is similarly electrically heated, and has 30 degrees of observation, and TNPO-170 observation device. There is a second machine gunner located on the other side of the driver, who has access to TNPP-220A. Dismounts have access to two TNPO-170 devices and an MK-4S periscope device near the rear hatch, which provides an unmagnified picture, though it could be adjusted along the vertical axis. This periscope could be elevated by 18 degrees and depressed by 12 degrees. The hull is equipped with headlights, side lights, a wave deflecting shield, front and rear mudguards, and water jet propeller flaps, as well as a radio antenna, landing gear mounting equipment, towing hooks, and a device for transport on a trailer alongside two boxes for spare parts, a crowbar, shovel, and emergency buoy. The engine transmission compartment is located to the rear of the hull, and is isolated from the middle compartment with a sealed partition, the engine is a V-shaped 6-cylinder, four stroke diesel 5D-20, which is liquid cooled, this system is almost identical to BMP-1s engine, but 5D-20 employs a different cooling and ventilation system.

The engine has only 240 horsepower, which is 60 less than the BMP-1s, though this does not limit the system considering its weight. The engine uses an electric starter or a backup air intake system; with the introduction of a compressor driven by the engine, the air intake system became the main option in 1973. To facilitate starting at low temperatures, the engine is equipped with an electric nozzle heater included in the cooling system. The fuel system includes three tanks located in the engine-transmission compartment. The air purification system is two-stage, with a cyclone block in the first stage, filter cartridges in the second, and automatic dust removal. To increase the safety of tackling water obstacles, two connected valves are included in the engine air intake system, providing air intake when submerged through the center compartment. The engine has an ejector-type cooling system, which also provides ventilation for the engine compartment and dust extraction from the air cleaning system. The transmission is mechanical, consisting of a two-disc main friction clutch; there are 4 forward and 1 reverse gears. The 3rd and 4th gears are synchronized, the system also features two coaxial single-stage planetary gearboxes and two clutches. Track tensioning is done with a hydraulic drive, the suspension system is pneumatic with hydraulic shock absorbers. The suspension consists of a pneumatic spring, lever, balancer, and travel limiter, made in the form of a stop with a rubber cushion. The return rollers also have a pneumatic spring, which works as both an elastic element and as a hydraulic shock absorber, as well as an actuator when changing the vehicle's ground clearance. This mechanism also holds the return rollers in the appropriate position (when preparing the BMD for jumps and when afloat). This system involves two cylinders, the first cylinder is divided into two chambers by a piston, one which contains nitrogen gas, the second is filled with a mixture of transformer and turbine oils (50x50%). The volume of the oils can be adjusted, as a result the clearance is changed. The chamber in front of the piston is filled with oil and is connected to the chamber in the pneumatic cylinder, as a result of which the piston moves and the gas is compressed. During its return stroke, because of the compressed gasses having expanded, the oil returns and pushes the piston to its original position. Valves allow the return stroke to operate higher fluid resistance than during the forward stroke. The clearance can be controlled from 100 to 450 millimeters. The change in clearance was originally to be used only when preparing the vehicle to be loaded onto an aircraft, but the BMD's ability to change its height gave it significant advantages in the exploitation of cover and concealment in ambushes and defensive positions. Amphibious capabilities are provided by water jet propulsion, consisting of two water jets. There are two pumps with electric motors that serve to pump out water and displace the system.

The vehicle is armed with the 2A28 smoothbore low-pressure cannon, which was designed to allow ammunition compatibility with airborne forces who employed SPG-9 (an early requirement that did not function in reality). The 2A28 has a barrel life of around 1250 rounds. The weapon is fired electrically, though a backup mechanical striker also exists. The fire control system of BMD-1, like BMP-1, offers the shooter a reliable chance of first-round impact against armored targets at up to 800 meters. The probability of destroying an APC with the 2A28 from 500 meters is roughly 80% in the first two rounds. Against a stationary tank at 500 meters the percentile is 70%, though at 800 meters the chances degrade to 50%. At 200 meters the PG-7V is capable of hitting a tank with a roughly 90% chance of impact, cementing the vehicles role as an ambush weapon. The primary ammunition supplied to BMD-1 is PG-7V (later VM) and OG-15V. PG-7V combines the PG-9 fin-stabilized assembly with the PG-15P propellant charge. This munition had superior ballistic performance as well as penetration compared to 76mm HEAT fired from the PT-76s D-56T, and is capable of reliably destroying barriers with equal effectiveness to its contemporary. The maximum penetration PG-7V is capable of achieving is 346mm, which is more than enough to defeat M60A1, Leopard 1, AMX-30 and Chieftain frontally, though it was less capable against M60A1 and Chieftain when compared to Leopard 1 and AMX-30. Once the heavier OG-15V entered service, it was issued to BMD-1. The OG-15V is subsonic, and operates smaller stabilizing fins, and is significantly more capable than the 76mm employed on PT-76 against light armored targets and barriers. OG-15V had superior fragmentation effects compared to its contemporaries. This round's downside is its inferior range compared to PG-7V. Later OG-15VM would enter service, which would improve its incendiary capability and explosive effect.

Object 915 would successfully pass tests in 1967 and was praised for its high degree of cross-country mobility. The accuracy of firing the main gun on the move was significantly increased compared to BMP-1 due to the hydropneumatic suspension system. The vehicle was also superior in its amphibious capabilities when compared to BMP-1, in regards to effectively and safely exiting and entering water it held further advantages. After its adoption the BMD-1K would enter service which supplied the vehicle with a second R-123M, there is an antenna filter which allows both radios to operate on a single antenna, alongside R-124, an AB-0.5P/30 gasoline electric charging unit, a GPK-59 gyroscopic course indicator, a heater and fan for the fighting compartment, and GO-27 chemical reconnaissance device were installed. 

BMD-1P would begin development soon after and integrated 1PN22M2, which included markings for firing OG-15V, stamped road wheels that were hollow, which served to improve buoyancy, and 9M111 Fagot. All previous systems were upgraded to BMD-1P standard, later 9M113 would be adopted and employed, oftentimes 9M111 and 9M113 would be carried in tandem, one 9M113 and two 9M111. The missiles may be removed and employed separately from the vehicle on tripods stored within the system. BMD-1P was later affixed with 90V2 Tucha smoke system, according to some sources, R-173P and R-174 radios would later be installed on BMD-1PK.

By the mid-80s, Increasing the lethality of the BMD-1 was seen as an important step in keeping the system relevant; as a result, work on BMD-2 began. The 2A28 did in some regards struggle to engage smaller targets, especially those on the move, and there was also the ever-present threat of rotary wing aircraft, which would cause problems for airborne forces who operated diminished anti-aircraft measures compared to their conventional contemporaries. Initially, there were proposals for a lengthened 73mm gun, which was tested on the BMP-2 competitor Object 681, though the success demonstrated by 2A42 (open-bolt, gas-operated autocannon with a short-stroke recoiling barrel mechanism) resulted in the adoption of this cannon instead. As a result, accuracy against weapon teams and mobile targets was drastically improved, and the system could still threaten second-generation MBTs from the sides and rear. The new turret restricted the use of 9M14, though by this point, 9M111 and 9M113 had been fully integrated, and 9M14 had already been largely retired after the introduction of BMD-1P. The ability for the 30mm cannon to engage air targets with its high degree of elevation was exceptional, this was only bolstered by its fire rate, which could be shifted from 200 to 550 RPM. BMD-2 finally ushered in an electromechanical stabilizer, in the form of 2E36-1 (dual axis), which has both semi-automatic (for anti-aircraft engagement) and automatic modes. The accuracy of the weapon allows it to engage ATGM teams with a 100% chance of destruction within 15 rounds. BMD-2 operates BPK-1-42 sights found on BMP-2. This optic has a fixed magnification of 5.6x in regards to the day channel, and is stabilized. The system includes a stadiametric rangefinder and passive + active night vision, which has a detection range of roughly 900 meters for tank-sized targets. Interestingly, when firing the 30mm cannon, BMD-2s turret had a tendency to rotate every so slightly right, this is a symptom of the way in which 2A42 is mounted, it is negligible and only an issue in long continuous bursts . The BMD would later inspire an entire family of vehicles based on its chassis, those being the BTR-D APC, the 1V119 Artillery control vehicle, the BREM-D armored recovery vehicle, and 2S9 Nona.

BMDs may be transported in pairs of two in both Mi-26 and Mi-6. When it deployed from an aircraft the BMD falls at a rate of 5 to 6 meters per second, and crews are often dropped directly behind them. The systems included a locator so the crew could find them without complication. In 1971, General Margelov decided that Airborne forces would benefit from BMDs landing with a limited crew inside the vehicle. Obviously, there was a great deal of concern, and the project was scrutinized for its lack of reason, or serious consideration of the dismounts' safety. Initially the tests would be denied entirely, but exceptions would be made if a proper staff could be assembled to observe and manage the endeavor. The State Research Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine would begin preparing with tests that sought to determine how such a landing would effect the crew, here a new issue would arise, chief among them being the inability for the crew to save themselves if the landing was doomed to fail. When questioned about who would conduct these landings Margelov immediately volunteered, but Grechko refused to endanger him, as a result, Margelovs son would be selected, who understood the importance of the project and was personally working on the system at the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Airborne Forces. Equally as enthusiastic was Leonid Gavrilovich Zuev, who would join Marshal Kulikov in the drop. 

After many preliminary experiments using sensors to test the impact speed (some involving animals and others dummies), the landing system was considered safe for the volunteers. Before the test could begin, in 1972, simulators were developed to prepare the crew for the experience and procedures that were expected of them. At this time Grechko would once again halt the program citing fears that these systems could significantly endanger the airborne forces, he would have to be convinced yet again that this was indeed a good idea by Margelov before he would allow the project to continue. The simulators proved vital as following their application many candidates for the test would be excluded after their spines were examined and determined to be unfit for the extreme parameters presented by the exercise. 

Testing of the Centaur landing system was to be engaged in 1973. The crew was to land in the vehicle, unmoor the BMD in just 2 minutes (automatic pyrotechnic unmooring was not employed for this test), before conducting firing drills while on the move. On January 5th the jump occurred, and the crew miraculously survived. During the test, Margelov kept his service pistol loaded so that he could end his own life in the event of his son perishing in the exercise. Later tests would be conducted, and similarly the crew survived. 

Centaur would be quickly replaced with Reactaur in 1976 (or Reactive Centaur), this variant used only one parachute which primarily served to align the BMD with the retrorockets. This was more effective as the parachutes did not have the chance to cover the vehicle following the landing, the descent speed was 4 times higher, and in many regards Reactaur was significantly safer. The only complaint leveled against the system was that the retrorockets were quite loud and startled the crew. Reactaur also increased the readiness of the airborne forces by being attached directly to the BMD, meaning no preparation was needed before loading the vehicle into the aircraft. The speed of descent experienced when using Reactaur ensures that the BMD is only visible for an exceedingly short period and therefore the location in which it will land is difficult to pinpoint. The first unit to test the new landing system was the 76th Guards Airborne Division, this test was unfortunate, as the crew was supposed to be dropped in snow to reduce the shock endured by the first experiment, but due to wind conditions they landed on a small patch of ice, despite this the mission was successful and the evaluation would result in the system entering service that year. 

From 1973 to 1991, the Centaur and Reactaur systems were used over 100 times. 

Airborne forces equipped with the BMD were provided with extreme degrees of cross-country mobility as well as massive firepower advantages over threats they expected to encounter. This capacity for rapid shock attacks and incredible anti-armor capabilities was unrivaled throughout the 70s and 80s, which drastically increased the Strategic Airborne Forces' capability to seize key terrain and complete objectives, while offering a unique scope for raids at considerable distance and momentum.

BTR-D:

In 1969, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Airborne Troops Scientific and Technical Committee drafted proposals for the design and eventual adoption of an armored personnel carrier that would complement the BMD-1. Work on this system began at Volgograd Tractor Plant under the supervision of A.V. Shabalin. The most important requirement that was almost immediately outlined for the program was that this new vehicle had to preserve much of the BMD-1's components and characteristics, to ensure a great deal of parts compatibility. This proved difficult, and as a result, after much deliberation, it was decided that lengthening the hull of the vehicle was an acceptable adaptation. The BMD-1's extraordinarily compact design made it difficult to significantly increase troop carrying capabilities without this addition. This was problematic, as lengthening the vehicle would reduce lift capabilities and would, more importantly, require parachutes in service at the time to be redesigned. Luckily, this project would coincide with the development of the IL-76 and new advanced landing capabilities, which would alleviate these concerns. Initially, the vehicle was to feature a remote-controlled machine gun, but the turret in which it was housed proved problematic and interfered with the landing + dismount process. This also diminished the storage of ammunition inside the vehicle. 

Object 925 (as it was designated) would begin state tests in 1973 and would be adopted in 1974 (after which it was designated BTR-D). In service, this vehicle would fill a vital transportation requirement which had not yet been realized. The BTR-D could transport material, evacuate wounded personnel, and ferry infantry. Due to the importance of this vehicle, each airborne unit would receive a company of BTR-Ds, and all engineers subordinate to the airborne forces would be issued them. 

The BTR-D carried a total of 14 passengers, 10 F-1 fragmentation grenades, multiple ammunition storage boxes for the dismounts, 2 RPG-16s/RPG-7Ds, 2 RPKs, 21 VOG-25s, 5 magazines for each of the crew's rifles, 26mm flares for SPSh-44 (5 per gun), and two MANPADS. Dismounts ride on 8 folding quick-release seats. The communication equipment, observation devices, and chemical protection measures on board are identical to those found on the BMD series of vehicles due to the reduction of proprietary parts outlined in the program requirements. 

BTR-D can be modified into an ambulance with an easily affixed package that allows the vehicle to accommodate four stretchers. To engage this, the seats are removed, and stretcher brackets are installed. The stretchers are stacked in pairs on the right and left sides of the troop compartment. To retrofit the BTR-D to support the transportation of two 200-liter drums (which can be filled with fuel or lubricants), all seats except for three are removed. In this configuration, the vehicle can also be made to carry twelve boxes of ammunition.  

In 1975, the airborne regiments would receive BMD-1KSh, which saw the commander's station rearranged among other changes to accommodate two R-123 radios, two R-111 radios, and one R-130 radio. R-123M and R-111 possess the ability to engage (and automatically switch between) four predetermined frequencies, and can operate simultaneously. Staff officers are provided with two tables so that they can more comfortably conduct their work. A similar vehicle, BMD-1R, is equipped with the R-161A2M VHF radio, which can provide clear communication up to two thousand kilometers in range. 

In 1979, the BTR-D was modified to operate the 902G Tucha smoke grenade launcher system. Two launchers were affixed to each side of the vehicle. The projected 3D6 smoke grenades generate a 60-meter smoke screen with a duration of 60-130 seconds and have a range of 300 meters. 

In 1979, Volgograd would design the BTR-RD anti-tank missile carrier, which would be adopted in 1983. BTR-RD operated the 9M113 ATGM, which could be fired at a rate of two missiles per minute. Inside the vehicle are a 9M111 and 12 additional missiles that are to be dismounted and operated separately. BTR-RD replaced the SU-85 and the D-44 anti-tank gun. 

BTR-ZD, which entered service in 1984, was designed to carry anti-aircraft missiles, 20 of which were stored inside. This vehicle often mounted the ZU-23-2s supplied to the airborne forces out of convenience and increased flexibility. This started due to the fact that BTR-D was chosen by the troops as the preferred option for towing the ZU-23-2, as the GAZ-66 proved unsatisfactory. Eventually, during exercises, especially those that involved river crossings, the ZU-23-2 would be placed atop the BTR-D. This would allow for the system to fire throughout the course of thwarting a water obstacle. This eventually became standard practice no matter the circumstance, much to Volgograd's chagrin, as their representatives thoroughly objected to this solution. Because this was never a formally authorized modification, different units had different methods for mounting the ZU-23-2, which led to some less than elegant results, aesthetically speaking. 

In the mid-1980s, the BTR-D would see the inclusion of R-123M, R-173 and the R-174 intercom system, which would replace the older semi-transistorized radios. 

In 1984, the BREM-D was proposed, which was an 8-ton armored recovery and engineering vehicle. This vehicle would enter service and serial production in 1989. I will avoid speaking about this system as it falls outside the timeframe of this article. 

GT-MU is a light airborne armored personnel carrier, which is considered an inexpensive alternative to the BTR-D, and as a result occupied many rear service positions within the airborne forces. Command posts, chemical reconnaissance, and material support were its primary aims, though it could serve as a troop transport if necessary. This is not encouraged as the vehicle lacks an integrated weapon system and is therefore rather vulnerable. 

RKhM-2 is a chemical, radiological, and biological reconnaissance system designed for use within the Soviet Airborne Forces, improving upon the lackluster UAZ-469RH. Like UAZ-469RH, RKhM-2 has no defensive armament but makes up for this by carrying an RPG-18 (or RPO-A), and a large volume of F-1 fragmentation grenades. Just like its contemporaries, the vehicle is equipped with GSP-12, VPHR, PKhR, DP-3B, and DP-5B devices for complete, and constant atmospheric monitoring, as well as KPO-1, and fence dispensing measures. RKhM-2 conducts chemical reconnaissance at 30 km/h and radiation as well as biological reconnaissance at 5 km/h. In regards to communication systems R-124 intercom and R-123 are available. Due to the GT-MU being used as the chassis for RKhM-2, an attenuation factor of 2.6 to 4 is present. The primary disadvantage of this system as opposed to BMD/BTR-D-based proposals, is that the crew cannot land inside the vehicle, though it makes up for this with an impressively inexpensive production cost per unit. 

1V119, which sought to provide an artillery reconnaissance and fire control capability to the airborne forces akin to PRP-3, began development in the late 1970s. The system employed the BTR-D as its chassis, which expedited the R&D process as this vehicle already had an established reputation of excellence. In 1982, the vehicle would enter service, and that same year it would begin serial production. 1V119, like PRP-3, occupied a myriad of roles, including terrain navigation assistance, general reconnaissance activities, spotting for ATGMs when operating within a defensive posture, limited chemical reconnaissance, and the transmission of target coordinates to artillery systems. When supporting batteries, 1V119 is used as a mobile command post, which may be manned by the Chief of Staff or the Senior Officer of the battery. The Chief of Intelligence within an artillery regiment may also be assigned to 1V119 to conduct his duties and coordinate actions on the battlefield. In regard to onboard equipment,1V119 operates the 1RL133-1 ground surveillance radar, 1D11-1 laser range finder, 1PN32 night observation device, GO-27 radiation alarm/detection system, 1V44 navigation system as well as the 1G13M and 1G25-1 gyrocompass, 1V520 ballistic computer for fire direction, two R-123M radio stations, an R-107M radio station, and the R-124 tank intercom system. Two TA-57 field telephone sets are present alongside 500 m telephone line to establish the R-107M in a detached observation position. A 6000X9000 mm camouflage net is provided to the crew that may be used to obscure the vehicle or a reconnaissance position erected by the crew. Stored inside for self-defense purposes, one can find an RPG-18 or Strela-2M. Many of these systems and the roles of those who operate within the vehicle are described in my night fighting article, where I break down the PRP-3. 

2S9 Nona-S:

In the early 1960s the SU-85 was becoming increasingly antiquated, and towed guns were no longer an effective solution to offsetting the inefficacy of this system. To solve this complication, between 1967-1968, two prototypes were proposed by Volgograd which employed Object 915 as their chassis, these would be the 2S2 122mm howitzer, and 2S8 120mm breech-loaded mortar. 2S2 was requested under the same decree which would result in the development of 2S1, 2S3, and M240. In 1969 it was determined that the next generation of airborne fire support vehicles would use a 120mm mortar as opposed to a 122mm howitzer. Research and development to design such a system was carried out between 1972-1975 at TsNIITOCHMASH (No. 25) under V.M. Sabelnikov.  F.F. Petrov was also involved in the design process, he would frequently propose the application of his 122mm M-30 howitzer, which proved unsatisfactory due to the space it occupied inside the vehicle. 

At this time, V.A. Golubev at OKB-9 was working on the installation and development of the new 120mm mortar, which was to be mounted on 2S2, as this transpired, early experimentation which would lead to the mounting of the prototype 120mm mortar on Object 925 had already begun. The ammunition for this system was developed at NPO Bazalt, which was headed by E.I. Dubrovin and G.E. Belukhin. High explosive fragmentation rounds were spearheaded by M.M. Konovayev and Y.G. Snopok, while V.A. Priorov developed an anti-tank munition that would allow for the dual purpose application of the new weapon system. 

The 120mm mortar which would be selected for the project had its roots in a towed recoilless system that had been in development for quite some time. Here it was found that a recoilless rifled mortar offered similar efficacy to that of a 152mm howitzer. The project was subjected to a great deal of scrutiny, and machines to produce ammunition which would allow the system to function were non-existent at the time. It would take some time to convince those who objected to the concept that this was indeed the future of mortars within the USSR and that designs produced on the basis of Shavyrin’s guns could no longer be modernized. Rifled mortars featured greater accuracy and could operate heavier, more effective ammunition. After developing this mortar it was necessary to determine a system in which it could be installed, this is how Margelov and Petrov got involved in the program and proposed its use on a new airborne artillery system. Of course Petrov would push against the integration of this gun but that was entirely a result of his personal preference towards the howitzer he had designed. It is stated that the French MO-120-RT-61 provided a great deal of inspiration for the project. 

Eventually, after many heated debates, in 1974 a mockup was devised which would receive the designation Nona-D. Firing trials proved difficult, as due to a freak accident a round exploded in the barrel a day before the vehicle was to be demonstrated. Luckily the system was repaired well before this event was to transpire, after which the support of Margelov was won and the vehicle was selected in favor of its competitors. Unfortunately at this stage in the Nona’s development, Volgograd backed out of the project and refused to produce the vehicle. Despite this the first version of the turret would see production in 1976, and by 1979 a battery to test the vehicle was assembled. The airborne forces were eager to get their hands on the new weapon system, so much so that they began using the Nona well before it officially entered service. 

When the Nona was tested by those from the Artillery Academy, there was a great deal of skepticism present regarding the likelihood of a 120mm mortar creating a crater with a width of 5 meters, as was promised by the design team. After two rounds were fired, General Matveyev was so impressed he requested that a photo be taken with him standing at the edge of the crater created by the system. 

The Nona would officially enter service in 1981. The artillery regiment of the 98th Airborne Division was one of the first to fully integrate the Nona in 1982. The vehicle employs the BTR-D as its chassis and retains its internal layout. Within the vehicle the gunner is placed left of the gun, while the loader is located on the right. After 2A51 is fired, compressed air clears the barrel, this lasts 1.2 seconds. The Nona incorporates a hydraulic recoil brake which ensures a recoil stroke of 400mm. An experienced crew can achieve a rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute, though a more likely ROF is 4-6 rounds per minute. 25 rounds are stored inside the vehicle. Nonas gun can be adjusted vertically between -4 to +80 degrees. The 1P8 periscopic sight is employed for indirect fire, while 1P30 sees use in direct fire engagements. 

1P8 can be used for direct fire in emergency situations if 1P30 is rendered inoperable. In cases of low visibility the K-1 cannon collimator can be employed to engage targets with reduced accuracy. Systems are present which reduce the probability of errors occurring when operating the sight if the vehicle is at an angle or on the move. A level is present which provides increased redundancy. A terminal is available to the gunner which is used to provide him with information supplied by the FCS. If the gun is elevated to an unfavorable position which may endanger the crew a warning light is lit to inform the gunner of this error so that he may correct it. The other lights on the terminal assist the gunner in determining if the gun has been elevated to the correct position to engage his desired target, when all three lights are illuminated, 2A51 is ready to be fired. 1P30 features divisions which assist in direct fire with the various types of ammunition supplied to 2S9. When direct fire is to be engaged, the gunner turns the turret to face the target, after which he reports the range of the enemy using the divisions present on the sight. 

3OF49, the primary munition employed by the Nona, has a steel body and has an explosive mass of 4.9kg. The round is capable of producing 3500 fragments with a mass between 0.5 to 1.5 grams (with a velocity of 1800 m/s), the largest of which can penetrate up to 12mm of RHA at a distance of 10 meters. The crater generated via the use of this round is often 2 meters in depth and 5 meters in width. 3OF49 can be fitted with a proximity fuze which increases its effectiveness by 2 to 3 times. The round has a range of 8800 meters 3OF51 has a cast iron body with an explosive mass of 3.8kg, and has a muzzle velocity of 367 m/s. 3OF50 is a rocket assisted projectile which engages its engine 10-13 seconds after leaving the barrel. 3BK19, which was introduced towards the conclusion of the Cold War, is a HEAT muniton with a mass of 13.2kg and a muzzle velocity of 560 m/s. 3BK19 has a range of 600 meters meaning 2S9 would have to ambush its target. The round penetrates 600mm of RHA which is enough to threaten most MBTs of the era. 

Nona operates the R-174 intercom system which allows the crew to communicate with one another, and R-123M or R-173 for long distance interaction. The vehicle is landed using the PRSM-925 retro rocket parachute system, three of which are dropped from an IL-76. 2S9s were organized into batteries which featured two Nona platoons and a command platoon alongside a material support unit to ferry ammunition to the mortars. Such a unit could deploy Win roughly 4-5 minutes. Each division had access to 2-3 batteries. 

Command and Control: 

Throughout much of the early Cold War, the Soviet airborne forces were not afforded their own communication devices and instead relied on specialist systems designed for operation within the army. After their reorganization under the General Staff of the USSR, the airborne forces saw renewed investment, which meant the development of airborne radio systems became a possibility. This was only bolstered by the integration of mechanized elements, which meant that heavier communication equipment could be carried across all units which allowed for greater range and flexibility. This removed the need to lay telephone lines between command installations, which increased the speed at which control elements could reposition, and more importantly, meant that orders could be issued while on the move. 

Of the means in which airborne command and control could be improved, automation was indeed one of the most important endeavors. Automating aspects of the control process would increase the speed at which the airborne forces could deploy. Fifteen automated alarm systems were integrated within each airborne unit, and as a result, deployment times fell to just 10 minutes. These alarms would sound regularly to uphold the readiness of these units; an experienced formation could assemble into columns within 4 minutes of receiving the signal, and in 12 minutes, not one BMD was to be left at the base. 

The primary communication systems employed by the airborne forces included the R-128, R-154, R-141, R-152, R-440, BMD-1KSh, and BMD-1R. 

R-128 alongside R-254 were used to assemble units once a landing had occurred, and were exceedingly common in airborne formations. R-128 was a beacon transmitter that broadcasted a single tone, which could be tuned from 44 to 50 MHz. R-128 employed HKN-20 NiCad batteries filled with potassium hydroxide (starved electrolyte), which was common across most batteries present within the Warsaw Pact. R-254 is a 600 kHz beacon receiver that exists to pinpoint the location of R-128. R-254 comes in ten frequency variations. 

R-154-2 entered service in 1960 and was produced by Kozitsky Omsk Radio Plant and is a long-distance communication device proofed against shortwave interference. The device can receive telephone and telegraphic signals, of which it can receive two simultaneously. High-speed telegraphy was enjoyed within the  Soviet military as it was rather difficult to intercept or interrupt. Telegraphic communications are recorded within the device and can be printed for later inspection. R-154 has a frequency range of 1 to 12 MHz and has three subranges. A sensitivity of 10 mV is present when operating in telephone mode which drops to 2 mV in telegraph mode. The system weighs 100kg and therefore requires a mechanized transportation device to operate effectively. Compared to R-250, R-154-2 is the superior radio; this is evidenced by the quartz filters in the UHR, far greater stability, and the fact it was exceedingly simple, which made it relatively easy to repair in the field. 

R-141 is a medium power radio station mounted on GAZ-66B and BTR-D, which served in separate communication battalions. The R-140 semi-transistorized simplex short-wave transmitter was the primary mechanism by which the system operated. This device featured an output power of 1000 watts (or 800 according to some sources) and a range of 1.5-30 MHz. When operating in telegraphic mode, R-140 has a range of 2000 km, when engaging telephonic communications a range of 1500 km is present. R-140s range is significantly reduced if two-channel, single band operation is engaged due to the splitting of the systems power between each of the channels. Before an operation, the radio was tuned to 10 preset frequencies, this would define the range in which the radio would operate as it was used. Automatic tuning was present. R-140 included the R-155P and R-311 receivers, a TA-57 field telephone, and R-105M (frequency range between 36.0-46.1 MHz with a communication range of up to 25 km. A signal-to-noise ratio of 20 dB is present alongside a frequency departure of positive or negative 4 kHz). 

R-152 is a portable high-frequency radio that was developed for use within the airborne forces with a frequency range between 2.0-30.0 MHz. R-152 allows for broadband telegraph (7x2 kHz) transmissions at a speed of 25, 75, and 150 baud, as well as narrow-band telegraph (7x2 kHz) at speeds of 25, 75, and 150 baud. When employing the dipole antenna, R-152 can achieve a range of 500 km, this increases to 300 to 2000 km if the system's traveling-wave antenna is used. The radio has a sensitivity of 3-4 µV and a transmitting power of 30-40 W. R-152 features a spurious emission suppression of 50 dB. 

R-440 is a rather unique system that was designed to solve an exceedingly difficult task, that being the effective transmission as well as reception of commands, information and requests for support within strategic depth. Of course, the need for long-distance communication systems was by no means a requirement exclusive to the airborne forces, but such a capability was necessary to ensure that they were properly employed. 

In the 1970s, a complex that would become the solution to this problem was already in development at the Moscow Research Institute of Radio Communications and Krasnoyarsk Radio Engineering Plant under the “Unified Satellite Communication System” program. At the outset of the project, USSS was to be a general-purpose device that would see integration across all branches of the armed forces. This communication system was to be entirely digital, immune to deliberate interference, and operate as a network across multiple vehicles with 1.5-2.5 m antennas in 9 to 11 directions simultaneously. Around 1975, the first iteration of R-440 was delivered to the troops mounted in GAZ-66 alongside PTC-1 and PTC-2 receiving + transmitting centers, which would act as information handling control points. R-440 would officially enter service in 1980, after which efforts would be made to increase resistance to noise jamming, throughput capacity, and flexibility. R-440 had a frequency range of 4/6 GHz, which would be improved to 7/8 GHz via the introduction of R-441. R-440 is designed to interact with satellites in geostationary and elliptical orbits, which provide digital duplex telegraphic, telephonic, and telecode communication. A single R-440-0 communication station provided communication in two directions with a maximum transmission speed of 4.8 or 5.2 kbit/s, which allowed for the creation of many high and low speed channels. Low-speed telegraph channels with a speed of 50 baud would always be available in either direction. When operating in anti-EW mode transmission speed decreases to 1200 baud. One transmitter has an output of 130 W. When transmitting, the frequency range of the device is broken into 10 trunks, each with 50 MHz. 

Why a Mechanized Airborne Force: 

The mechanization of the Soviet airborne forces allowed for quite a lot of independence within enemy depth. The ability to establish a highly mobile rear service capable of transporting large quantities of supplies considerable distances, provide heavy, long-range radio systems to each unit, and cross water obstacles without additional assistance was unrivaled at this time. Compared to light infantry, who are primarily foot mobile, a mechanized airborne force can land farther from their objective and still reach the target with enough haste to ensure surprise is achieved. Deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, and defensive positions become increasingly deadly with the integration of airborne IFVs and artillery systems. Night combat is considerably easier as each vehicle can assist in finding and engaging targets. The anti-aircraft capabilities of a mechanized airborne force are similar to those of a motorized rifle unit at the tactical level, which is favorable when one considers the extremely limited anti-aircraft capabilities of a light infantry unit. The ability to reliably defeat armored targets such as APCs, IFVs, and tanks is of great importance when operating within the rear of the enemy. This issue is difficult to solve as ATGMs are exceedingly heavy and are difficult to transport long distances on foot. Mechanization solves this complication by providing vehicles that can use them independently of attached infantry. Due to the fact that a mechanized airborne unit carries all of its sustainability with it, these formations can fight for longer periods and will not suffer fatigue anywhere near that of a light infantry unit. Mechanized airborne transportation vectors protect their crews from chemical and nuclear weapons, can conduct chemical reconnaissance (as well as decontamination), and therefore can be used in recently nuked terrain. 

While these advantages are not to be ignored, they come with unique disadvantages that are important to consider. Due to the exponential increase in mechanization experienced within the airborne forces throughout the Cold War, the ability to deliver ASU/BMD-equipped units was an ever-present concern. As an example, it would require 110 IL-76s to deliver a BMD-equipped regiment. The solution to this issue was a wide array of aircraft, each occupying a unique lift requirement. While these aircraft did have the disadvantage of varying speeds, altitudes, and ranges, this was indeed the most effective decision. In wartime, it was expected that the VTAs' lift capability would be augmented by Aeroflot, which possessed many An-12s and IL-76s (these aircraft were regularly involved in airborne exercises to simulate this capability). It is also possible that the massive volume of Aeroflot's medium and long-range passenger aircraft would see integration (employing civilian aircraft to deliver airborne forces would allow for a significant degree of surprise to be actualized if done in isolation). 

Because of the large volume of aircraft needed to deliver a BMD-equipped unit, the period in which such a drop could be conducted is limited. The airborne forces would be restricted to a surprise attack in the first few hours of a war in Europe, or a situation where temporary air superiority was achieved. In regards to surprise, in an ideal world, the enemy will not be expecting an attack at all, though this is unrealistic, so the Soviets focus instead on ensuring the enemy is unaware of when the offensive is to transpire. The enemy is not likely to be shocked when the attack comes, but he may be surprised as to the exact moment it begins, and therefore he will be disadvantaged. In regards to a conflict in Europe, the Soviets believe that against a coalition such as NATO, the ability to surprise certain members is exceedingly important; if any given ally is unprepared, it will leave fatal gaps in a defensive line which are to be exploited. In this more realistic situation, the airborne forces may be able to make many successful deployments. It is important to note that the target of this deception is not military leaders but instead political officials, as they decide on key matters such as mobilization. At this level, Soviet surprise manifests within the manipulation of tense political situations, it is important the enemy does not see the Soviet Union as an immediate threat, nor believe itself to be in a situation that could insight war. If the enemy believes they may provoke an attack, they will not be properly surprised. Soviet leaders believe that striking prior to the peak of a political crisis is imperative for this reason. Surprise may begin at the political and military level, but it transcends these realms and penetrates civil action as well. The entire nation must be involved in the act of deception and disinformation or surprise will be impossible. At the operational level, commanders will work to ensure the defender is unaware of where exactly the attack will occur. Measures to ensure the enemy cannot scramble are impossible to achieve due to modern hardware preventing such actions. Therefore, the Soviets must deceive the enemy into establishing itself along the wrong axis or preparing for the wrong kind of threat. All of these factors are important when considering the possibility of limited airborne operations within the strategic rear of NATO. Further applications that transcend conventional deep operations include the immediate occupation and exploitation of areas hit by nuclear strikes, as well as counterattacks to diminish the capabilities of an offensive force are possible. 

The vulnerability of a mechanized airborne force during insertion is high, during the fly-in and drop, air attacks would likely inflict significant casualties on these formations before they reach the ground. Once a successful landing has occurred, the speed at which a mechanized airborne force can regroup is slightly diminished when compared to light infantry, as more equipment is involved in any one deployment. The first 45 minutes of a landing are seen as the deadliest time for the airborne forces, as even a numerically inferior enemy can destroy the unit in pieces as they work to prepare air defense and anti-tank weapons. As a result, the prospect of landing paratroopers with their equipment was subject to significant consideration. This was successfully implemented through the Centaur (later Reactaur) landing system present on the BMD-1/2. A multitude of failed designs preceded this, many of which attempted to employ the Kazbek-D landing seats initially developed for the Soyuz descent module.

While airborne forces will initially have a large reserve of logistical support, once this runs out, the volume of supplies required by such a formation is exponentially higher than that of a light infantry unit. It must be noted that despite this, a light infantry unit will have just as much trouble receiving supplies as a mechanized one; here, the primary concern is not the volume needed but the ability to deliver it at all. Here, the integration of a mechanized rear service becomes vital, as supplies can be delivered at considerable distances from the main body without complication. 

Generally speaking, if these units are capable of landing, regrouping, and receiving minimal or satisfactory resupplies, a mechanized airborne force is tactically, as well as operationally, more capable than any light infantry contemporary. 

History and Challenges of Landing a Mechanized Airborne Force: 

The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the beginning of a renaissance in airborne development. During this time, the VDV received systems such as the BMD-1, D-30 122mm howitzer, AGS-17 grenade launcher, 9M111 anti-tank missile, and the BM-21V multiple rocket launcher. These innovations, of course, could not exist without a considerable amount of research and development being directed towards landing platforms and parachutes. At this time, the future of the airborne forces was still uncertain, and as a result, a myriad of unique proposals were still subject to consideration. Notably, the development of landing systems that would facilitate the airborne deployment of PT-76, BTR-60PB, BMP-1, and 2S1. 

Following the introduction of the highly successful PP-128-5000, a new landing system for An-22, which would become P-134, was already in development. P-134 would be a unified system that allowed for various loads to be deployed from a single platform. 14P134 was the lightest of the three variants, with a maximum capacity of 7 tons, followed by 2P134, which could deliver 12 tons of equipment; the heaviest of the bunch was 4P134, which could comfortably support 16 tons. Between 1968 and 1969, 4P134 would be tested alongside the experimental PS-9404-63R parachute system and the VPS-11782-68 extraction system. At this time, the 2P131 automatic release system was also being trialed. The P-134 series would consist of a steel frame featuring longitudinal beams that allowed the platform to slide into An-22's cargo hold, two nets for securing cargo, and a massive foam pad to cushion the landing of heavy equipment. On average, it took 1 hour and 15 minutes to load a P-134 series platform into an An-22, but heavier loads that did not interface easily with the available loading equipment could take up to 7 hours. 4P134 would enter service under the designation P-16 in 1972, with its express purpose being the transportation of BMP-1 and 2S1. Interestingly, the 2S1 passed state tests and was fit to enter airborne service, but was rejected for unknown reasons. PP-128-5000 would be replaced by 14P134 (designated P-7) in 1973, and would serve as the primary system for landing lighter vehicles in conjunction with the MKS-5-128M multi-dome parachute system. The MKS-5-128M allowed for a maximum deployment altitude of 8000 meters. P-7 would differ from P-16 in its aluminium frame. To deploy its shock absorbers, P-7 included valves that captured air during the platform's descent. Upon impact, this air would rapidly release from these valves and cushion the landing even at high speeds.  

After the introduction of Il-76, the P-7 and P-16 platforms would be improved, receiving the designations P-7M and P-16M. The improved P-7 platform would support 11 tons and would make use of the recently introduced MKS-5-128R parachute system. As the airborne forces grew, their need for heavier equipment such as the SU-85 decreased, and as a result, the P-16 series of platforms would be removed from service, making P-7 the VDVs' primary landing system. The first successful application of these recently introduced technologies was at the 1970 combined arms exercise conducted in Belarus known as “Dvina”. Here, 7000 paratroopers and 150 heavy elements were deployed in just 22 minutes. It was here that Margelov first suggested the deployment of BMD-1s with a limited crew inside them, which led to the application of Kazbek-D shock-absorbing seats and the development of the Centaur landing system discussed above. 

While these platforms were in development, the Parachute Jet System (PRS) that would define the airborne forces in the latter half of the Cold War was underway. This technology was designed alongside the BMD-1 and received the designation PRS-915 (due to its close relationship with Object 915). This solution offered many advantages; not only did it reduce the weight of the platform and its instruments, but it turned out to be far cheaper when compared to conventional landing practices. The PRS was also more reliable than standard multi-dome parachutes due to the fewer moving parts involved in the deployment process. PRS-915 would successfully pass state trails in 1970, and see adoption between 1972-1973. After its introduction, PRS-915 was immediately modified to feature an improved suspension system, which further stabilized the BMD-1 in flight and increased its reliability. After the adoption of Il-76, the increased space provided within the cargo hold allowed for the equipment present on PRS-915 to be reorganized, increasing the ergonomics of loading BMD-1 into the aircraft. This variant, dubbed PRSM-915, would enter service in 1976 alongside an improved parachute that no longer had the unfortunate side effect of tearing as a result of high descent speeds. Initially, PRSM-915 was to be a modular platform that could land equipment with weights between 4 and 20 tons, but this did not see further consideration as development continued. 

PRSM-915 has a service life of up to 7 years and could be collected after a successful deployment, but this number was ultimately extended after tests were conducted in 1984, where systems produced in 1972 were used multiple times without complications. With the introduction of BTR-D, 2S9, and 1V119, PRSM-925 would enter service to support the modified hulls of these vehicles. A similar modification was designed to support BMD-2, which had an increased weight of around 8 tons. This incorporated design solution employed in both PSRM-915 and PRSM-925 it would be designated PRSM-916. 

A Comparison Between M551 and BMD-1: 

In regards to armament, the M551 and BMD-1 are difficult to effectively compare, and present challenges unique to their respective designs. This comparison is important as these are the only truly airborne armored vehicles designed for direct confrontation within their respective militaries. 

BMD-1 has a clear disadvantage when speaking to the volume of missiles offered to each vehicle. Prior to receiving the more advanced 9M111 and 9M113 (of which 3 were carried), BMD-1 carried four 9M14 missiles, two of which were placed on a ready rack within the turret. The other two missiles were located in the troop compartment. Loading these missiles was rather easy and did not force the gunner to expose himself to enemy fire. To do this the gun is placed at a 30 degree angle, which allows the gunner to access the launch rail. Here the 9M14 is mounted, the fins are deployed, and the missile is ready to fire. The location of the ready racks are convenient and allow the gunner to engage these actions from his seat. To prepare the 9M14 for firing a 50 to 55 second period is expected, which includes preparing associated elements like the guidance equipment, it is possible for an exceptionally competent gunner to engage this process in 40 seconds. This is a rather long period, which could prove problematic in combat conditions, but is offset by the ability for BMD-1 to exploit reverse slopes via the use of its hydropneumatic suspension and exceedingly small size. An additional advantage presented by this configuration is found in the event of an ambush, where the BMD-1 can quickly re-engage the enemy with its main gun after a missile has been expended. In the first two minutes of an engagement a gunner is expected to be capable of achieving two successful loading, launching, and guiding cycles before replenishing the ready rack. If the BMD-1 is employed in a prepared defensive position three missiles within the first two minutes is possible if the turret is turned to the left as to allow the gunner to access his reserve ammunition. The speed in which one can load the 9M111 and 9M113 later supplied to BMD-1 and BMD-2 is similar when compared to the prior figures. The issue presented with this upgrade was that the gunner had to expose himself when loading the missile.

The M551 carries 8 missiles (some sources state 10 missiles were carried), significantly more than the BMD-1. Due to the gun launched nature of these missiles, exposing oneself to enemy fire was not a possibility. This came with its own disadvantages though, due to the extremely cramped turret, and the frequent failures experienced with the electronic breech (caused by the ten removable separate circuit boards present within the turret being shook from their beds by the violent recoil of the gun) the loader frequently found himself operating a manual crank before loading the 27kg missiles. This left him exhausted, and diminished his ability to perform his role in high stress situations. Despite this the M551 still maintained an advantage in loading speed over the BMD-1, with a reduced re-engagement capability. This is because the HE and HEAT rounds upon being fired resulted in a particularly violent recoil that had the unfortunate consequence of generating a great deal of dust and smoke, which could interfere with the MGM-51s guidance system rendering it momentarily inoperable. This compounded on a reported MTBF of fifty shots. 

The BMD-1P and BMD-2 despite carrying less missiles than the M551 provide exponentially greater capabilities in this regard. The minimum firing range of the MGM-51 is 730 meters, which is exceedingly long, this was due to the unfortunate layout of the tank. This is problematic as it severely limits the ranges in which the missile can be employed, especially in the context of a meeting engagement, and significantly reduces the time in which the gunner can correct the missile along its trajectory. Early variants such as the MGM-51A had a rather short range (around 2000 meters), this was resolved via the introduction of MGM-51B and C which extended the range to 3000 meters. Due to the use of thrust vectoring the missile experiences reduced steering responsiveness once its engine burns out. MGM-51 penetrates 150mm of RHA at 60 degrees, and 600mm at 0 degrees. 

The minimum firing range of 9M111 is just 70 meters, and provides superb engagement capabilities against fast moving targets at speeds up to 60 km/h at and beyond 300 meters. The maneuverability of both Milan and TOW do not surpass 9M111, which is exceedingly impressive considering Milan is a thrust vectoring system (like MGM-51) known for being rather responsive. While MGM-51 is slightly faster than 9M111 at 323 m/s (9M111 having around 200 m/s), It has roughly comparable range. 9M111 has a maximum engagement range of 2000 meters, this was later extended to 2500 meters with the introduction of 9M111M. 9N122 is a relatively small warhead at just 1.76kg when compared with the 6.8kg shaped charge of MGM-51, but still manages to penetrate 200mm at 60 degrees. For both missiles this is likely higher as the technical penetration depth of missiles tends to be lower than the average depth. 9N122M found on 9M111M is a larger and heavier warhead which provides an additional 30 mm of penetration. 9M111 would later be replaced on BMD-1 and 2 with the 9M113, which offered 3000 meters of range. Due to the 9M113 seeking to replicate the impressive characteristics of 9M111 its aerodynamic and steering characteristics are identical, with the only differences in flight performance being improved speed (260 m/s). 9M113s warhead, 9N131, has a technical penetration of 250 mm of RHA at 60 degrees, but many secondary sources state that this figure is inaccurate, and the realistic penetration depth expected from 9M113 is 560 mm. 

The 152mm M657 HE-T employed by M551 is obviously superior to the 73mm OG-15V employed by BMD-1 when used against fortifications and personnel. This round is exceedingly sensitive and cannot be fired through brush or other obstructions, which can limit its application. Furthermore, the highly flammable cartridge cases are vulnerable once the barrier bag has been removed, and can be ignited easily. This round has a maximum range of 9000 meters (and a muzzle velocity of 682 m/s) when used to deliver indirect fire. The preferred ammunition for anti-personnel is the M625 canister round which is extremely effective in dense foliage. This munition employs 10,000 steel flechettes loaded in five separate bays that are secured by a closing cup crimped over the forward end of the body. OG-15V employed by BMD-1P is a subsonic HE-Frag round with a 1,600 meter maximum range and a muzzle velocity of 290 m/s. This round provides excellent fragmentation and has a rather high explosive mass relative to its caliber. While this round does provide limited anti-armor capabilities and later saw the introduction of an increased incendiary effect through OG-15VM, it was nothing compared to the aforementioned rounds. While these details are important one could argue that the OG-15V was more practical for the vehicle's expected application. OG-15V was much easier to load, which increased the rate of fire significantly, was smaller and therefore more could be carried, was more accurate against priority targets, and could be used in closer proximity to friendly infantry. One could also argue that the 2A28 is the more practical gun, as it features a nigh non-existent recoil stroke of just 150mm and has a barrel life of 1,250 rounds. This is favorable when compared to the M81 of M551, which was found to have a barrel life of only 100 rounds in testing, this was later raised to 200 rounds after the missile key and tube keyway were modified. It is also important to consider the fact that upon firing its main gun M551s front road wheels were thrown into the air by the violent recoil forces, the muzzle blast is so great that all crew members are to be inside the vehicle when a conventional round is fired as to avoid injury. M551s conventional anti-tank round, M409 HEAT, penetrates 355 mm of RHA and has a maximum range of 1600 meters (as defined by the gunnery manual, secondary sources are inconclusive on this range). Past 800 meters, it is stated that MGM-51 is the preferred munition; this could be a result of limited accuracy at this distance. PG-15V has a very similar muzzle velocity when compared to M409 at 665 m/s (680 m/s for M409) and a similar penetration at 326 mm. 

The fire control system of BMD-1, like BMP-1, offers the shooter a reliable chance of first-round impact against armored targets at up to 800 meters. The probability of destroying an APC with the 2A28 from 500 meters is roughly 80% in the first two rounds. Against a stationary tank at 500 meters the percentile is 70%, though at 800 meters the chances degrade to 50%. At 200 meters the PG-7V is capable of hitting a tank with a roughly 90% chance of impact, cementing the vehicle's role as an ambush weapon. The primary advantage M551 has in this regard is its gun stabilization, which BMD-1 lacks. The M551 also has more favorable conditions for the commander, which diminishes the workload expected of the gunner, this is indeed important but is offset by the BMD-1s dismounts providing visibility and coordinating with the gunner. 

BMD-1 employed the 1PN22 combined day-night sight, which featured fix magnification of 6x in regards to the day channel. The night channel features a 6.7x fixed magnification and a field of view of 6 degrees. At night BMD-1 could identify tank sized targets up to 400 meters in favorable conditions, which is still within the range in which 9M111 and 9M113 can engage targets. While information on the exact range of the M44 night vision periscope is sparse, it is stated that this optic could only be employed with conventional ammunition. 

While M551 has slightly thicker armor than BMD-1, BMD-1s upper glacis is angled more aggressively, and employs ABT-101 which is harder than 7039 found on M551 (ABT-101 is 45% as effective as steel and has a BHN of 145, 12 more than 7039), this gives it the ability to resist 23mm BZT at distances beyond 500 meters. Against the most likely threats both vehicles are likely to encounter BMD-1 and M551 are well protected and immune to 12.7mm AP. What makes BMD-1 more survivable when compared to M551 is its size. BMD-1 is 1.9 meters tall, and can reduce its height to 1.5 meters via the use of its hydropneumatic suspension, while M551 is 2.9 meters. 

While BMD-1 and M551 are similarly protected, M551 is 7.7 tons heavier, which is 0.2 tons heavier than two BMDs stacked atop one another. This significantly reduces the cross country capabilities of M551 in comparison and means that the vehicle must be prepared before limited amphibious actions can be engaged. Due to the use of a screen to ensure floatation the M551 is incapable of defending itself while crossing water obstacles and the driver is effectively blinded (the commander must give instructions). Because no water jets are provided to M551 it swims at a speed of 4-6 km/h (the BMD-1 swims at 8 km/h). Of course the amphibious capabilities of M551 in an airborne context are significantly less important as the infantry they are supporting cannot follow them across rivers. A unit employing BMD-1s will have no issues fording water obstacles of any width as infantry can ride within these vehicles and dismount upon reaching the other side. M551 does not provide any sustainability to infantry nor does it protect them from chemical weapons. 

The airborne capabilities of M551 are inferior when compared to BMD-1, the crew must land separately and the vehicle remains in the air for a considerable period of time which increases the speed in which the enemy can determine where the landing will be regrouping. The low-altitude parachute-extraction system is preferred to this method, but has the added disadvantage of requiring a prepared landing area that is controlled by friendly forces. The Soviet airborne forces experimented with such a system and determined that in parachute operations such a capability is impractical as well as rather dangerous. Due to the extreme weight of M551 it cannot be transported via helicopter and therefore its use case is further restricted. BMD-1 also provides air defense through the inclusion of a MANPADS launcher stored in the dismount compartment. 

The Airborne Forces at the Operational and Strategic Level:

Operations involving the airborne forces are often planned and executed by the TVD, and seek to engage assets of both theater and frontal importance. The primary objectives of the airborne forces include the destruction of nuclear deliverance systems and their command elements, the seizure of bridges alongside associated crossings of extreme value, the destruction of higher level command/communication facilities including political institutions, seizure of anti-aircraft systems, destruction of reinforcement points such as airfields as well as ports, taking out key industrial facilities such as power stations, oil refineries, military production facilities, and storage depots, and lastly the capture of important transportation junctions. 

Units will seek to deploy 150-300 kilometers behind the enemy. The depth of the mission is directly tied to the size of the force required; shallow operations could be engaged by a battalion or even a company, but objects of strategic importance may require a regiment. Some sources state that 100 kilometers behind the enemy is cause for the application of a regiment, but this is inconclusive. Divisional assets such as artillery batteries, engineer companies, and reconnaissance elements will be attached to augment the capabilities of these units depending on the mission. No matter the objective, raiding detachments are the primary element employed by the VDV in pursuit of its aims. These units can take the shape of a company or battalion, and as a rule, are mounted in BMDs. The purpose of raiding detachments is to cause as much chaos as possible while seeking to destroy the unified target of the unit they are attached to. The mobility of these units is extreme, which improves their ability to engage the enemy on their terms. 

24 hours before a drop is to transpire, special long-range reconnaissance units will be deployed, which will seek to triangulate communication posts, objects of importance, and threats that could diminish the likelihood of a parachute operation succeeding. If possible, air defense weapons 20 kilometers from the route are to be suppressed, though this may not be possible; in this case, local air superiority is to be temporarily achieved. This will allow radars, air defense weapons, and airfields 200 kilometers from the line of contact to be suppressed. Drops are to take place at night, usually a few hours before dawn in pursuit of surprise and concealment. Aircraft will depart from separate airfields and move to create a coherent formation shortly before leaving friendly airspace, this will significantly reduce the effectiveness of nuclear attacks. Airfields will not house more than one VTA regiment for this reason. Airborne operations will depart from 1000 kilometers within friendly territory to avoid medium-range missiles and air attacks destroying airborne formations on the ground. Depending on the level of readiness present, these units can deploy within 5-8 hours. 16 main and 4 to 6 reserve airfields are required to facilitate an operation. Airborne formations are not to remain at an airfield for more than 24 hours when preparing to deploy, and will move between bases at night. 

The fly-in will be conducted at the lowest possible altitude, with a great deal of top cover provided by air superiority fighters, fighter bombers, and electronic warfare aircraft. Chaff trails will be deployed to potentially confuse the enemy as to the true size of the formation. Similar electronic warfare and suppression attacks will be conducted on non-essential axes to confuse the enemy on where the attack will transpire. Individuals and personnel of extreme importance will be dispersed across a multitude of aircraft.

Ideally, a security element will land and secure a drop zone; in this case, regiments will employ three drop zones, and battalions only one. In extreme cases, a regiment can land at just two drop zones. A regimental drop zone is likely to be 6x1 kilometers in size (2500x500 meters for a battalion). In daylight conditions, a unit can deploy in 25 minutes; this increases to an hour at night. In this case, two ingress routes will be employed. Regimental drop zones will be placed 5-15 kilometers from one another, with each battalion separated by 5 kilometers. 

Despite the integration of artillery, airborne IFVs, and a considerable volume of SHORAD, the lack of heavier fire support restricts the airborne forces to maneuvers that champion stealth as well as surprise. The mechanized capabilities of the airborne forces shine in defensive positions established around recently seized terrain/installations and rapid attacks on unprepared enemy forces. BMD-equipped troops also function in decentralized ambushes, where they can level their firepower and mobility to disorient larger formations. 

Combined Arms in the Rear of the Enemy: 

A unique capability present within the Soviet airborne forces is their ability to conduct true mechanized combined arms operations in the rear of the enemy while still preserving the capability for decentralized raids. These maneuvers begin with the unit landing and eventually regrouping. Following this, groups, usually a platoon to battalion in size (depending on the scale of the operation), break off and begin to engage in tasks detached from the main body. Here, command and control are divided among these units. Eventually, as the mission develops, these forces will recombine into a centralized formation and pursue a common goal. Night conditions are considered ideal as the airborne forces can stealthily reposition and avoid meeting engagements. Due to the equipment employed by the airborne forces, the tactics demonstrated by BMD and BTR-D mounted formations are exceedingly similar to those of conventional mechanized forces from the battalion to platoon level when under fire, with the primary differences between the two being present in the length of engagements these units can withstand and the types of engagements they will pursue, which are described above. Many of the locations in which the VDV will seek to capture are to be destroyed. Airfields, for example, are to be disabled by engineers before an immediate exfiltration from the area. When industrial assets are disabled, energy and water supply sources, fuel depots, raw materials, and finished products are destroyed. 

The airborne forces cannot succeed in any of their aims if they are not supported by comprehensive logistical and technical reserves, with material as well as medical support being the most difficult to manage. Battalion and company commanders are personally responsible for leveraging their staff and capabilities to ensure that this support is delivered in a timely fashion, as the inability of units to receive missiles, ammunition, fuel, food, and other material resources will destroy their functionality. As a result, the battalion commander monitors the consumption of material using automated systems and his staff to establish a realistic picture of the logistical situation. He must report to the regimental commander on the readiness, supply, and consumption of these resources if he is operating as part of a larger formation. He will also draft reports on the condition of armored vehicles, the sick, and the wounded. The individuals involved in this process include the deputy battalion commander for technical support of landing equipment, the deputy battalion commander for airborne training, the deputy battalion commander for technical support of communications, the chief of communications of the battalion, and the battalion medical staff. At the company level, the airborne training instructor, senior technician, and sanitary instructor. A technical observation post will usually be deployed (which serves to track supplies present within individual units) alongside a repair/maintenance point for armored vehicles, a field kitchen (to supplement dry rations), a ration supply point, and a medical station. A rationing system will be drawn up at the beginning of an operation, which will be modified as the mission progresses to meet the availability of material within the battalion. 

Supplies are broken into two categories following an airborne landing. These are expendable supplies, which encompass most combat provisions, and reserve supplies which are not to be employed for any means outside of specifically supervised application. Items in this realm include fuel, lubricants, and other supplies that cannot be easily replenished. In urgent cases, reserve supplies may be consumed, but only with the permission of the battalion commander. 

If a vehicle is damaged, it is to be repaired at its immediate position if possible, and if it cannot be evacuated, it will be destroyed to avoid capture. 

Once a unit has landed, supplies are to be regrouped and organized under the regiment or battalion. A “depot” is established, which is operated by the material support staff of the regiment or battalion. As a rule, hot food is to be prepared and served three times a day at these locations; in certain circumstances, hot food twice a day, with the provision of dry rations, is considered satisfactory. In a worst-case scenario, dry rations can be eaten cold for three meals a day at the expense of individual comforts. Water is provided on a similar schedule, but must first be examined by the sanitary and medical service of the battalion to avoid an unfavorable epidemiological situation. 

When supplies are delivered to a unit, the rear services of the battalion or regiment are sent to collect them and bring them to established supply points. Missiles and ammunition are delivered from these points directly to units engaged in combat. If this is not possible, ammunition will be delivered at the closest possible point to minimize the period in which vehicles and personnel spend out of combat. 

Medical attention is provided to units in combat by evacuating them on mechanized ambulances and bringing them to established field hospitals. If this cannot be done, they will be attended to within a mechanized element. 

At the divisional and regimental level, the Chief of the Rear, who is a deputy commander and logistics staff officer, coordinates all logistical planning and controls transportation. The Deputy Commander for Armament controls technical support actions. To ensure the Chief of the Rear is informed of the situation at the front, so that he may properly adjust plans and so on, systems are in place to ensure he receives reports every 12 hours on fuel and ammunition states, and another report every 24 hours on other materials. He must monitor the operations net and maintain constant communication with his subordinates, he must monitor troop movements and make regular appearances before his subordinates, or have members of his staff do so in his place. While maneuver units are preparing their plans, the Chief of the Rear, the Artillery Supply Officer, and Chief of Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply attend combat briefings. As these events transpire, the Rear Commander and his deputies prepare proposals for logistical support using calculation tables. The Chief of the Rear will issue proposals as the Formation Commanders issue orders, once these are each approved by the Overall Commander, copies are then submitted to subordinate formations so that rear services may be briefed. There is no set organization for these units, as the size and scale of the formation is often determined with each mission and the requirements they will need to meet. Though more often than not the Divisional Rear carries five days of supply, three days being held at unit level and two days held at divisional level, these units are highly mobile and only operate material support, maintenance, and medical battalions. In practice, combat formations are capable of consuming their mobile reserves until proper supply lines can be reestablished. This is done through what is known as skip echelon resupply, which calls for bypassing the next higher formation and delivering directly to subunits. This is exceedingly similar to motorized formations, this is a massive advantage present within a mechanized airborne force. A functional rear service can be established to supply such a formation and ensure greater autonomy. 

Air Defense Tactics: 

A considerable threat to the airborne forces was helicopters and fixed wing aircraft; the solution to this is abundant SHORAD, which is for good reason in great excess within these units. In regards to organic support, each regiment operates a minimum of twenty-seven 9K32 or 9K38 (depending on mission requirements, specifically the exclusion of 9K31, a greater number will see operation, up to fifty-four) and an attached air defense battery consisting of six ZU-23-2 alongside a platoon of 9K31 (these were not air deployable and would only see use in an air landing).

In practice, there is at least one 9K32/9K38 attached to each group of vehicles. In a situation where 9K31 is not present, it is possible that every other vehicle will carry 9K32/9K38. Dedicated MANPADS operators, a part of the anti-aircraft missile battery, are usually tasked with covering tactical command posts and enveloping platoons. ZU-23-2 (which is capable of being attached to BTR-D for mobile support) defends the unit's main body during a march, every two battalions often has a battery between them. When attacking, these units will deploy to advantageous positions or attach directly to attacking battalions, depending on the mission.

While the airborne forces lacked the insurmountable anti-aircraft protection afforded to conventional Soviet formations, the threats they were likely to encounter called for a greater reliance on short-range weapons. Studies conducted by Soviet military academies, aimed at both the Vietnam War and WW2, discovered that pilots are likely to expend their munitions well before they have entered their effective range when under fire. It was also found that traditional anti-aircraft artillery forces the height at which such attacks are flown to be raised significantly, which in the age of the missile is invaluable to the defending party. When observing proxy conflicts, the presence of resistance (even if numerically insignificant) was enough to severely degrade the efficacy of air attacks, and engagement via missiles severely degraded the cohesion of attacking pilots. This was further demonstrated in the Middle East, where it was observed that Israeli pilots were frequently routed by relatively weak air defense in the form of fire from anti-aircraft machine guns atop armored vehicles. For these reasons, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the airborne forces should not be disregarded. 

To best exploit short range air defense weapons masking terrain is to see liberal application in the establishment of anti-aircraft ambushes. These terrain features will also decrease the effective range of some air launched munitions, forcing enemy aircraft to close within range of the aforementioned systems. 

To supplement the lack of radars to detect incoming air attacks, round robin visual reconnaissance is established throughout each unit. This method of surveillance is conducted through observation sectors where conventional optics are employed in 360-degree search networks. Each sector will overlap by 20 to 30 degrees. In ideal circumstances the aircraft will be detected 2-2.5 kilometers before it reaches the unit. 

With the introduction of BMD-2, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the airborne forces increased significantly. The BMD-2 includes a dedicated anti-aircraft sight known as the PZU-8, which is effective against targets traveling at 300 meters per second, at altitudes of 2000 meters, and a range of 2500 meters. This range increases to 3000 meters against helicopters. The 2A42's high rate of fire and 3UOR6 fragmentation tracer (OT) rounds facilitate this. Usually, one 3UOR6 is mixed into a burst of 3UOF8 high-explosive incendiary (OFZ) rounds. 3UOF8s' incendiary effect increases its effectiveness against air targets. In an anti-aircraft role, 30mm OFZ is generally more efficient when compared to 23mm OFZ, with only 1.4 hits being required to guarantee a shootdown (this is favorable when considering 3 hits are required to bring an aircraft down using 23mm OFZ). Against larger aircraft, 23mm OFZ was found to require 6 impacts, which is rather inefficient when compared to the 2.8 hits required when using 30mm OFZ. The range in which a BMD-2 gunner can correct his fire against an airborne target is identical to that of ZU-23-2. To supplement 2A42, PKT is also employed against airborne targets out to 2000 meters. 

When engaging aircraft with the BMD-2, the gunner aims ahead of the aircraft and fires a “barrage” as it is described in the manual for three to four seconds. Each individual within the BMD-2 who is capable of doing so, especially the squad machine gunner, is to deliver one magazine's worth of ammunition in the direction of the aircraft to increase the likelihood of striking the target. Small arms fire should not be engaged until the target is within 500 meters of the unit. When firing at enemy rotary wing aircraft, it is not unlikely that 9M111 and 9M113 will see use against such systems, as they possess the range and speed to target these threats when they are hovering. 

BMD-2s 2E36-1 stabilizer possesses a unique semi-automatic mode of operation, which is to be used when firing at enemy aircraft. This is activated automatically once the gun has elevated past 35 degrees, after which it begins to interface with the PZU-8 anti-aircraft sight. In semi-automatic mode, 2E36-1 loses some of its precision but gains a great deal of speed, which facilitates the tracking of fast-moving targets. In automatic mode, the stabilizer permits a full turret rotation in 12 seconds, while in semi-automatic mode, this decreases to just 10 seconds. In semi-automatic mode, the elevation speed decreases significantly, which ensures accurate adjustments can be made by the gunner against a maneuvering aircraft.

Defensive Positions and Anti-Armor Tactics:

An airborne battalion would be tasked with defending a frontage of up to 5 kilometers, with a depth of 3 kilometers. This front may widen significantly if the battalion has erected its defensive positions in difficult terrain that would decrease the capabilities of the attacking party. 

A battalion defense is made up of company strongpoints, connected by a network of anti-tank missiles and machine guns. The gaps between these positions are on average 1500 meters in length. Platoons will be separated by 300 meters each across this system. If this position is established outside of combat conditions, a reinforced platoon will occupy a position 2 kilometers from the main body. Their primary efforts will consist of disrupting reconnaissance activities and warning the main body of an impending attack. 

If the battalion is operating as a part of a regiment, a second battalion will prepare for a counterattack to exploit a successful defense. This reserve is capable of supplementing the defending party if they need to, and will be briefed on the positions they must occupy in the event that the first echelon suffers unacceptable losses.

BMD-1, ZU-23-2, and other systems capable of providing fire support are located in advantageous positions that allow for the exploitation of reverse slopes. These units will be placed 200 meters from one another, and will vary in their depth depending on the role of the system. Killzones, where anti-tank weapons can exploit the sides of armored vehicles, will be established before an engagement. The maximum range of these systems will be taken into account before a defense is established, to ensure they can exploit their range against the enemy. Continuous fire from anti-tank weapons is ensured by the “leapfrogging” of missiles (one operator fires and guides his missile while his neighbor reloads and does the same). It is possible that a roving contingent of BMD-1s will be established to harass the enemy; this will ensure that the primary base of fire is difficult to locate. Within platoon's strong points, BMDs are dispersed by 150 meters per fighting position. Tanks and IFVs are to be destroyed first, followed by APCs and infantry. It is possible that 2S9 and SU-85 will accompany BMD-1s in anti-armor ambushes. 

The capacity for BMD-1Ps to erect extremely effective ambushes is high, as their missiles (9M113/111) are situated well above their main gun. Because of this, a skilled crew can make use of the vehicle's hydropneumatic suspension to conceal the vehicle, leaving all but the ATGM above a reverse slope. This means that engagement via the BMD-1Ps missile can be quickly followed up with a shot from the 2A28, all by raising the height of the system above the ridge long enough to engage the already damaged target, before returning to a concealed position. Areas that allow for this to be effectively executed will be located on the flanks of a likely attack. 

Air defense weapons will be located between each defensive position, reserve air defense weapons will be located in depth along the probable route of exfil that enemy aircraft will employ following an attack. 

The transition between an effective defense to a counterattack will be rehearsed and conceptualized before an engagement. 

After engaging the enemy, missile systems, anti-aircraft weapons, and machine gunners are to rapidly shift their positions to ensure that priority targets are difficult to pinpoint. Due to the high mobility of the airborne forces, it is possible for a defending force to rapidly move to flank the enemy if they manage to actualize a breakthrough.  

In an event where the defending force has been encircled by a superior enemy force, a circular defense will be established before a hasty exfiltration under the cover of night. A breakthrough must accompany this endeavor, and as a result, the battalion will seek to mount a surprise attack on the encircling force to potentially form a momentary gap, which would facilitate the unit's escape. 

At night, units occupy secondary fighting positions closer to the line of contact, but as dawn breaks, they are encouraged to return to their daylight posts. 

Cities are an ideal location for an airborne battalion to establish a potent defensive position. In this case, a platoon will occupy up to two buildings, and the unit will work to spread itself evenly throughout two to three blocks. Buildings are to be fortified with whatever elements are available to the airborne forces, such as bags of soil, foliage, bricks, and other improvised solutions. BMD-1s will be situated within the first floors of occupied structures, or across long streets where they can make use of their guided missiles. If the battalion has time to prepare a defensive position, BMD-1s will be hulled down in fighting positions behind stone/brick fences. Anti-aircraft systems are placed atop roofs alongside observation posts. 

Airborne Organization: 

The average airborne division is rather small, being only 6900 strong. This is easy to critique externally, considering the massive size of international contemporaries like the 82nd Airborne Division. But this would be a mistake, as the airborne forces were more akin to an understrength motorized rifle division than a conventional airborne formation. The difference in manpower is not the result of diminished squad sizes or anything of the sort, but the lack of a tank regiment, anti-aircraft missile regiment, independent tank battalion, independent anti-tank artillery battalion,  independent chemical defence battalion, tanks within infantry regiments, and an independent helicopter detachment.

This is accurately reflected at the tactical level, where squad sizes are, in many regards, identical to those found in conventional motorized rifle formations. The average BMD-1 mounted squad is comprised of a radio operator armed with an AKS-74, a machine gunner armed with an RPKS-74, a grenadier armed with an RPG-16 or RPG-7 (depending on the year), a senior rifleman armed with an AKS-74, and a rifleman armed with an AKS-74 (like motorized rifle platoons, a marksman is present and will accompany one squad in the unit). 

Each airborne division had three parachute regiments, an artillery regiment, an independent anti-aircraft battalion, an independent self-propelled artillery battalion, an independent reconnaissance company, an independent communications company, an independent engineering battalion, an air-landing security battalion, an independent material support battalion, an independent equipment maintenance and recovery battalion, and an independent medical battalion. Each parachute regiment comprised 84 BMD-1s (with an additional 6 in the reconnaissance company), 12 BMD-1Ks (plus one in the reconnaissance company), 12 BTR-Ds (plus one in the reconnaissance company), 6 120mm mortars, 12 9M111s, 6 ZU-23-2s, and on average 6 9K38s. 

The primary element employed by the airborne forces for raiding and associated actions is the company. A parachute company totals 79 personnel, including 6 officers, 2 ensigns, 11 sergeants, and 60 soldiers. There are 9 BMD-1s, 1 BTR-D, and 1 BMD-1K within each company alongside 44 RPG-18/22s, 30 9M111s, 81 rounds for the 3 RPG-16s, 295 F-1 fragmentation grenades, and 75 RGD-5 fragmentation grenades.

Individual Equipment of the Airborne Forces: 

Throughout much of the Cold War, the Soviet paratrooper's equipment centered around the immortal RD-54 (Paratrooper’s Backpack Model 1954), which went unchanged since the day it entered service. The RD-54 belongs to a unique set of simplified load-bearing equipment that places a satchel at the heart of the system. The primary function of the RD-54 is to allow for ammunition, explosives, chemical protection equipment, and battlefield provisions to be carried long distances, while also being light enough to wear during a descent. Each individual within a squad was expected to carry two F-1 fragmentation grenades, two thirty-round magazines, an entrenching tool, an unspecified number of hand-held anti-tank grenades, grenade fuses stored in small side pockets, and consumables similar to what was provided to motorized rifles (discussed in my platoon tactics article). It was not uncommon for paratroopers to modify the RD-54, allowing for additional ammunition to be carried alongside other creature comforts. The small size of the RD-54 is often criticized for its inability to sustain significant overpacking comfortably, and the limited ammunition it provides the user. In Europe, these issues are limited by the highly mechanized nature of the airborne forces, which allowed for much of the unit's sustainability and ammunition to be stored within their transportation. In Afghanistan, where light infantry became the norm for the VDV, these critiques proved costly and resulted in the RD-54 receiving a somewhat poor reputation among those of the limited contingent. 

The RPG-16 is an anti-tank weapon designed specifically for the airborne forces. The system can be broken into two pieces, both of which are placed in specialized coverings alongside its ammunition to ensure a comfortable landing. The 58.3mm PG-16V grenade, including the PG-16P propellant charge employed by the weapon, weighs 2.05 kilograms and has a muzzle velocity of 250 m/s, which accelerates to a maximum speed of 475 m/s. This is significantly faster than the RPG-7’s PG-7V, which has an initial velocity of 115 m/s, with a 300 m/s maximum. PG-16V has a unique design when compared to PG-7V, as the rounds' 6 stabilizing fins are placed towards the front of the munition, alongside the nozzle block. This was done to limit the possibility of a shot being carried off its trajectory by the wind. PG-16V penetrated up to 300mm of RHA and could be fired accurately out to 520 meters. While the weapon was enjoyed for its range, precision, and ergonomics, the introduction of improved ammunition for the RPG-7D resulted in its replacement. RPG-18 and RPG-22 were distributed across squads to improve the anti-tank capabilities of the unit. 

The GC-30 is designed to land heavy equipment alongside its operators, such as portable radio stations, mines, reserve ammunition, medical supplies, and engineering equipment. The maximum weight that GC-30 can support is around 30 kg. The system is suspended 15.65 meters beneath its operator during a descent, in such a way that it does not interfere with the parachutist. 150-200 meters from the ground, the GC-30 is disconnected and descends independently. This serves to decrease the speed of the landing experienced by the paratrooper moments before he reaches the ground. 

Individual Parachutes: 

The D-1 family of parachutes, initially developed in 1955, was an important step in the modernization of the airborne forces. Before the introduction of this system, significant skepticism surrounded the concept of a parachute with a round canopy. This configuration was believed to be unstable when compared to the traditional square canopy design employed by earlier models. Of course, after tests were conducted involving the D-1, it was found that this was indeed the superior layout, which led to its adoption shortly thereafter. 

D-1 was originally designed to provide a simple parachute system that was accessible to those undergoing basic training. Including the paratrooper and all of his associated equipment, the D-1 had a combined weight of 120 kg. The system permitted jumps at a maximum speed of 350 k/h, from a minimum altitude of 150 meters, meaning the parachute could be employed from rotary wing aircraft. On its own, D-1, when stored, weighs 17kg and has dimensions of 595x385x240mm. The canopy has an area of 82.5 m2 when deployed and is connected to the individual by 28 SHKHB-125 cotton cords, which can each withstand up to 25 kgf. 

In 1959, due to the increased flight speed of modern transport aircraft, it was necessary to improve the D-1's tolerance. This was done through the strengthening of all relevant materials and the introduction of a secondary stabilizing parachute. This did increase the weight of the parachute to 19.5kg, alongside lengthening the minimum deployment altitude by 300 meters. These disadvantages were offset by the fact that the new D-1-8 parachute increased the maximum deployment ceiling by 1000 meters and effectively negated deployment speed regulations. The stabilizing parachute also ensured that the user did not tumble and would always exit the aircraft with his feet towards the ground. The parachute also introduced much-needed redundancy, which reduced accidents. One such introduction was the so-called “double cone lock”, which could be automatically activated by the integrated safety mechanism if one did not pull their parachute in time. One of the primary advantages D-1-8 provided was that the pilot chute cords no longer possessed the tendency to wrap around the user's legs, equipment, or head during a descent. The pilot chute of the earlier iterations was also prone to causing failures if it overlapped the main parachute, which would cause the entire system to fail. D-1-8's descent speed was favorable when compared to D-1; the gradual speed reduction meant that the user experienced two to three times less G-forces when compared to the former. 

To train recently conscripted paratroopers and civilian skydivers, the D-1-5U was produced. This variant featured a simplified control mechanism that made it significantly easier to orient the parachute in the air and perform accurate landings. This was achieved through the introduction of three holes in the rear of the canopy that allow for air to be pushed through the system, and by extension, pushing the operator forward at a speed of 2.47 m/s. 

In the 1970s, the D-5 parachute would enter service and replace the D-1 series. This was a rather advanced design, in that it was simplified to just one parachute, removed the pilot chute, featured the immediate deployment of the stabilizing parachute, and allowed for deployment speeds of 400 km/h. The D-5 increased the maximum deployment altitude by 6000 meters and the descent speed of the user, making the landing safer to conduct and more efficient. The D-5, like the D-1-8, could employ two semi-automatic or automatic safety systems for added redundancy. The one disadvantage presented by this configuration was a lack of a dedicated steering mechanism; one could adjust their trajectory by shifting their weight, but this was not sufficient for anything other than avoiding obstacles. D-5's canopy is made from nylon and has an area of 83 m2 when deployed. The canopy is connected to the user by 28 9-meter-long cords made from SHKP-150, each supporting 5 kgf respectively. 

In the early 1980s, a new parachute, known as D-6, was put into production to replace the D-5. This development was important as it allowed for the user to freely manipulate the trajectory of their descent, alongside significantly reducing the effect wind had on the accuracy of this process. Outside of these major shifts, the core characteristics, deployment process, and safety mechanisms of the parachute remained similar to that of D-5.